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         INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of this research paper is to provide an analysis of how the African National 
Congress' (ANC) relationship with liberal democracy has developed over the course of the 
party's history. The purpose of this analysis is to identify shifts in the ANC's thinking with 
regard to liberal democracy in order to understand both the ways in which this has changed 
and what factors influenced these changes, but also to gain a greater insight into the ANC's 
own understanding of liberal democracy within the South African context and changes in 
the level of its commitment and adherence to liberal democratic principles.    
 
The end of apartheid and democratic transition marked the formal acceptance and 
institutionalisation of liberal democracy in South Africa. The nation is hence formally a 
multi-party system and during the years from 1990 the ANC has set about making its 
transition from a liberation movement to a political and, moreover, a governing party 
-formally accepting liberal democratic values and principles as the rules of the political 
game. However, ideological leanings and practices during its earlier years, characterised 
by a more Marxist-Leninist and radical-nationalist style of politics, provide points of 
contrast and comparison with its more liberal democratic discourse from the late 1980s. It 
therefore seems crucial to ask where the liberal democratic leanings in the party emerged; 
what the ANC's conception of liberal democracy is as well as how this has evolved from its 
earlier political ideologies to the present; and the current level of its genuine commitment 
to liberal democratic values. 
 
The intention of this research paper is to analyse the ANC specifically, as opposed to the 
broader Congress Alliance. However, given the relationship of the ANC with the South 
African Communist Party (SACP), both during the struggle against Apartheid and within 
the Tripartite Alliance, then the ways in which the nature of this relationship has altered 
over time and come to influence the ideology of the ANC is particularly relevant. Similarly, 
the influence of the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) on ANC politics 
and its more recent formal relationship with COSATU – The Congress of South African 
Trade Unions – since 1985, warrant some consideration. The historical roots and traditions 
of the ANC are also of tremendous significance. Furthermore, the extent to which the ANC 
can still also be considered a social movement has bearings on the nature of its relationship 
with liberal democratic values. 
 
 
There exists, today, a vast amount of literature on the transition from liberation movement 
to political party made in a variety of cases across Africa, such that this does not warrant 
further coverage in itself. However, with the advent of multi-party democracy during the 
1990s, this particular transition has been all the more difficult and has presented numerous 
challenges for former liberation movements throughout Southern Africa and the African 
continent at large (see Baregu, 2004). The ANC's own transition and status as a former 
liberation movement; the centralisation of party authority which continues to characterise 
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the ANC (see Johnson, 2003) - with particular implications for internal party democracy; 
and the overwhelming electoral dominance and political power now wielded by the party 
in what is still a young and fragile democracy, does appear to provide grounds for 
specifically undertaking this analysis. If we place this alongside the broader continental 
context where there has in fact been a reversal of some democratic gains and a lack of 
commitment to liberal democratic principles, then this research becomes all the more 
relevant.  
 
On the one hand, South Africa's liberal constitution and bill of rights guaranteeing a broad 
range of civil freedoms is widely celebrated - all the more so given the nation's political 
history of apartheid rule. However, a number of analysts within the field of political 
science have expressed concerns as to the extent of the ANC's commitment to liberal 
democracy and, moreover, its own understanding and interpretation of democratic 
principles.    
 
As noted above, liberation movements at large have faced challenges of transforming 
themselves into political and, moreover, governing parties. With regard to the ANC in the 
post-apartheid framework, Adam, Slabbert and Moodley refer to the dangers of confusing 
"liberal democracy" with "liberation democracy" (1997: 83) - an idea which has largely 
related to concerns over democracy being equated with the ANC who, as the liberator of 
black South Africans, perceives itself as representing 'the nation'. A number of viewpoints 
concerning the limits of the ANC's democratic commitments are therefore associated with 
South Africa's dominant party context. For Giliomee and Simkins, in this system "the vital 
elements of democracy, namely genuine competition and uncertainty in electoral outcomes, 
are removed in a process that is self-sustaining" (1999: 340). With this in mind, while it 
must be emphasised that the ANC has won political power according to democratic rules, if 
the key means by which alternative and contesting political views can be represented (i.e. 
through a political opposition) is particularly weak, then the ANC's own observance of 
liberal democratic practice becomes all the more important.     
 
Simultaneously, an aspect that requires equal examination, alongside the issue of political 
opposition, is the role of civil society in South Africa. If civil society is also to be able to 
hold government to account for its actions, as well as to exercise its fundamental political 
rights and freedoms, as expressed in South Africa's Constitution, then a liberal democratic 
understanding of civil society within the ruling party itself is undoubtedly helpful. A 
further area of examination is, therefore, the state-civil society relationship in South Africa 
and the way in which this relationship, as well as the appropriate role for civil society, is 
understood by the ANC. 
 
In considering the ANC's relationship with liberal democratic ideas, it must be reiterated 
that commitments have been made to political pluralism and rights which would not earlier 
have been a feature of the liberation movement's discourse (Glaser, 1991; 1998). In fact, 
Glaser goes on to note that these values have emerged from "a movement whose historical 
allegiances and practices are far from consistently democratic” (1997: 5) 
 
 Of particular interest, and what appears to be worthy of further investigation, is the period 
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from the mid-1980s to the fall of the communist-led states in Eastern Europe - which also 
coincided with the open expression of liberal democratic leanings in the formulation of the 
ANC's 1988 Draft Constitutional Guidelines. As a period in which the ANC came to 
express the value of multi-partyism in a new South Africa, as well as conceiving of "a 
whole range of individual rights" (Glaser, 1991: 107), the sources and significance of this 
shift warrants further consideration. Moreover, this is something which also coincided with 
a shift in the programme of the SACP, moving away from its orthodox vanguardist terms, 
to an acceptance of a pluralist democratic system for South Africa (Glaser, 1991: 93). This 
move is expressed clearly in the 1991 SACP discussion document, 'Has Socialism Failed?’, 
written by one of the party’s leading theorists, Joe Slovo (1991).     
 
As stated above, post-1994 South Africa has seen the formal establishment of legislative 
multi-party elections based on the principle of one person one vote; representative 
parliamentary structures; and the establishment of constitutionally guaranteed rights and 
freedoms for all. However, particular concerns have arisen as to not only the extent to 
which the values underpinning these mechanisms will endure amongst the ruling block, but 
also to what degree these values are genuinely accepted and internalised by those in power. 
As Southall aptly phrases this predicament, "increasingly the debate is not just about 
whether democracy in South Africa will survive, but about the quality of that democracy" 
(2001: 1).   
 
Having said this, however, a crucial point that must not be understated is that, as Alence 
argues, "electoral dominance has not been taken as licence to dismantle institutions of 
political contestation and constitutional government" (Alence, 2004: 4). Rather, he 
highlights that "the [ANC] government has more consistently treated the consolidation of 
constitutional democracy as a central component of its project of post-apartheid 
governance - not, as many of its postcolonial African predecessors did, as a transitional 
encumbrance to be shucked at the first opportunity" (Alence, 2004: 19). 
 
Nonetheless, the key concern underpinning the rationale of this paper is that there remain 
suggestions within the party's discourse - from its earliest expressions of liberal 
commitments to the present - that can continue to be perceived as a threat to liberal 
democratic principles. Glaser, writing in 1991, comments that despite the emergence of 
commitments to multi-partyism by the Congress Movement, the ‘unitary’ understanding of 
democracy that characterised the "national democratic discourse" of the 1980s, and the 
‘collective’ will of ‘the people’, present threats to the liberal notions of "pluralism and 
rights" central to a democratic polity (1991: 94-95). Good similarly raises concerns over 
ANC intolerance of opposition, citing Mandela's expression of the illegitimacy and 
'unacceptability' of opposition - both political and from within civil society - who tended to 
be branded as 'racist' and "against social transformation" (Good, 2002: 114). A more recent 
cause for concern was drawn upon by Myburgh following the April 2004 national and 
provincial elections when he commented that "for Mbeki the opposition were welcome to 
participate in the elections, but once the will of the people had been freely expressed and 
the ANC returned to power, there should be unity in action, and the minority should submit 
to the majority" (2004).  
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Analysis of ANC discourse and practice therefore raises important questions as to the ways 
in which the nature and balance of the movement's relationship with liberal democracy 
may have shifted and changed since its formation to the present, as well as the ANC 
leadership's own understanding of the meaning of liberal democracy.  This paper is 
therefore an exploration of these issues. It begins by outlining and discussing some of the 
theoretical understandings of liberal democracy; what we mean when we speak of ‘liberal 
democracy’; and the particular values it seeks to instil. The ideas concerning 
institutionalised pluralism and rights surrounding liberal democratic theory are also 
considered in regard to newly democratic states in Africa, and South Africa in particular. 
The section ends by covering some of the concerns regarding the acceptance and 
sustainability of genuine liberal democratic practice by the ruling ANC. 
 
The following section encompasses several sub-chapters analysing where and when the 
early liberal democratic strands in the ANC emerged. It looks at the early leadership of the 
movement - such as that of Pixley ka Isaka Seme and Dr A. B. Xuma, each President 
General of the ANC in the 1930s and 1940s respectively, and considers where the 
democratic and liberal ideas in the movement may have originated, covering the period up 
until 1950. 
 
 The subsequent section then looks specifically at the ANC’s position regarding liberal 
democracy during the 1950s and 1960s. It looks at the leadership influences of those such 
as Albert Lutuli - considered by some to be a 'classic liberal'; and the drawing up of the 
Freedom Charter in 1955 discussing various interpretations of the document in terms of 
political ideology. There is also a particular focus throughout this chapter on the 
movement’s relationship with the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) – renamed the 
SACP when the party was forced underground – and the ways in which this relationship 
may have influenced or shaped ANC thinking at this time, particularly in terms of a future 
vision of democracy.  
 
It then goes on to study the exile traditions of the ANC during the 1970s and 1980s, 
emanating from a Marxist-Leninist mode of thinking, and where these traditions and 
practices fit in with regard to liberal democratic ideas. How do the nature of the ANC’s 
exile politics alongside the socialist ideas of its allies and a number of is members, fit in 
and compare with the liberal democratic politics it later advocated? The second part of this 
chapter analyses the political traditions of the ANC underground through the formation 
and work of the United Democratic Front (UDF). The discusses focuses on the practices 
and ideologies advocated by the UDF leadership and the ways in which the underground 
movement began to outline and envision a new South African polity through its 
understanding of 'democracy'. The focus within this section, therefore, is on the competing 
and conflicting paradigms at this stage between conceptions of liberal and popular 
democracy. Such tensions were a reflection of the broad ideological character and make-up 
of the ANC which housed a multitude of interests and ideological convictions under the 
banner of liberation. 
 
 The analysis then turns toward the mid to late 1980s and the period of the transition as the 
focal point of the paper. It looks in particular at the period from the announcement of the 
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ANC's 1988 Constitutional Guidelines expressing particularly liberal democratic thinking. 
The concern within this chapter is the influences and events during the period of the 1980s 
up until 1994 that shaped the ANC’s stance on ideas of liberal democracy and its merits for 
a new South Africa. The chapter considers the impact of the fall of communism in Eastern 
Europe on ANC thinking, and more specifically on its leadership; and the shifts that then 
occurred in the party's relationship with liberal democracy during the course of the 
negotiation and transition period and crafting of the interim constitution and Bill of Rights.  
 
The following part of the paper then turns to the ANC's period in government. The research 
seeks to answer some key questions concerning the ANC's changing relationship with 
liberal democracy. It looks at whether we can identify any discrepancy between rhetoric 
and practice concerning its commitment to liberal democracy as well as how changes in the 
presidential leadership during this period may suggest changes or developments in the 
party's relationship with liberal democracy. The chapter is divided into three sections: First 
of all it examines the relationship between state and civil society, looking at whether we 
can see changes in the ANC's acceptance and understanding of an independent society. Has 
the ANC’s view of civil society altered considerably from its role during the liberation 
struggle, in particular during the 1980s? It examines changes in the ANC’s perception of 
the appropriate relationship between state and civil society; how the ANC views the role of 
civil society and the demands of various interest groups, particularly bearing in mind 
formal commitments to individual liberty and rights. How are those voices treated that are 
perceived as conflicting with the ANC as the embodiment of ‘the people’? A prominent 
aspect of this debate is, therefore, the extent to which the ANC is, in fact, still a social 
movement.   
 
The second section looks at the ANC’s changing relationship with liberal democracy in the 
context of South Africa’s dominant party system. This analyses how the ruling ANC, in 
fact, views the opposition and what it considers the opposition’s ‘appropriate’ role to be? 
Under conditions in which the ANC is assured of re-election, and opposition parties remain 
weak, a key question to be considered concerns the extent to which the ANC is actually 
committed to liberal democratic principles. 
 
Although the liberal democratic framework does not specifically encompass issues of 
internal party democracy, given that the electoral dominance of the ANC renders issues of 
intra-party (and intra-alliance) democracy all the more important, this will also be covered. 
How are debate and difference within the ANC and the broader Tripartite Alliance handled 
and how is internal discussion interpreted? In undertaking this particular examination, 
liberation traditions regarding the treatment of internal difference and plurality of opinion 
are compared to current ideas and commitments to the liberal democratic values of debate 
and tolerance.   
 
The paper adopts a periodisation, as opposed to a thematic, approach. The intention of this 
is to enable us to identify where particular shifts have occurred over time in the ANC's 
relationship with liberal democracy and to allow for some reflection on and comparison 
between various periods. It also enables us to identify continuities or discontinuities in the 
conception of and commitment to liberal democracy within the ANC and its leadership in 
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particular.  
 
Conduct of the research has drawn upon secondary sources and existing literature 
concerning ANC ideology, coordination and organisation; shifts in transition politics; and 
the ANC in the multi-party context. However, considerable use has also been made of 
ANC publications, documents and speeches as a method of mapping changes in the party's 
thinking, and to make inferences from these sources to identify its stance on liberal 
democracy. Some of the key documents within the text are statements and addresses by A.J. 
Lutuli, 1952-1967; the Freedom Charter (1955); the Strategy and Tactics of the ANC 
(1969); the ANC January 8th Statements of 1986 and 1987; the ANC's 1987 Statement on 
Negotiations; the ANC's Draft Constitutional Guidelines (1988); the Harare Declaration 
(1989); the ANC discussion document Constitutional Principles and Structures for a 
Democratic South Africa (1991); the National Peace Accord (1991); and the State and 
Social Transformation (1998). In terms of further primary data collection, several 
interviews were conducted and personal correspondence undertaken with former ANC 
party members and advisors who continue to be involved in the politics of the country, and 
of the ANC, within their own individual work. 
 
 
 
     Chapter 1 
 
    CONCEPTUALISING LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 
As a basis and framework for the research, this analysis assumes a basic understanding of 
liberal democracy as embodying three accepted and central principles: the 
institutionalisation of an "indirect and representative form of democracy" through the 
holding of regular elections based upon equal political rights (one person, one vote); the 
acceptance of political pluralism through tolerance of differing viewpoints and competing 
value systems within society, allowing for ‘open’ political competition in the form of 
multiple political parties and “electoral choice”; and a “clear distinction between state and 
civil society” through existence of  “autonomous groups” able to check government power 
and guard against abuse of authority (Heywood, 2003: 43), as well as guaranteeing the 
promotion and protection of a range of individual rights and civil liberties (such as freedom 
of the press, freedom of association, expression, movement, etc) within a constitutional 
framework (see Adam, Slabbert & Moodley, 1997: 82; and Glaser, 1991). 
 
Before delving into any discussion over the acceptance of liberal democracy in the South 
African context, what appears crucial to stress, is that this research paper makes the 
distinction between economic and political liberalism - focusing rather on the latter. There 
is a considerable amount written on the ANC's changing relationship with economic 
liberalism. This subject matter has, not surprisingly, stimulated much debate and 
controversy across a variety of fields, not least in light of what has been perceived as an 
'about-turn' in the ANC's economic policy direction - in particular since its accession to 
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power1. The collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and ascension to dominance of a 
neo-liberal global orthodoxy provided the broader international context in which the 
ANC-led government came to power. President Gorbachev's moves toward perestroika 
and glasnost in the Soviet Union and the consummate fall of the authoritarian communist 
governments of Eastern Europe introduced a new wave of both economic restructuring - 
moving away from the failed models of orthodox communism - and a momentous turn 
towards an ‘openness’ of these political systems. Moreover, these shifts undoubtedly had 
both national and international effects. The new democratic South Africa was borne into 
this world of new influences and balances of power. In light of the parallel ideological and 
policy shifts of the early 1990s, a number of observers do, therefore, place emphasis on the 
partnership of economic and political liberalism - not least with regard to contemporary 
South Africa. McKinley, drawing upon the combinations of institutionalised individual 
rights; spearheading of ‘good governance’ initiatives; free market economics and rolling 
back of the state, comments that these features suggest that "the ANC.....has now become 
the standard-bearer of liberal democracy in South Africa and the African continent" 
(McKinley, 2000:2 cited in Johnson, 2002: 222).  
 
It therefore seems necessary to explain in brief what is meant be economic liberalism in 
order to portray its distinct features and ideas from those of political liberalism. To speak of 
economic liberalism involves the ‘opening up’ of national economies to free market forces 
and the lifting of particular barriers and restrictions on economic activity. Through 
increasing reliance on the market, while simultaneously reducing the role of the state in 
managing and determining economic affairs, it is argued that allowing free-market forces 
to guide economies and economic policy will produce higher growth rates and increased 
economic stability. A key element of a reduced role for the state is to privatise, as opposed 
to nationalise, companies and industries, taking much of the burden of public and social 
expenditure away from the state itself.  
 
The reasoning behind much of the liberal economic model’s presumed benefits for 
developing nations is stimulated by the failure of the state, particularly in Africa, to realise 
the benefits for its citizens of social and economic development. In fact, once assumed to 
be a site of democratic power and change, in many cases the state has rather proved to be a 
burden on national economies. For economic liberals, the free market is the answer to 
many of these problems of economic development and to what is believed to be the ruinous 
involvement of the state. Moreover, the focus of economic liberalism on the individual and 
on individual economic activity, involves increases in capitalist activity and private 
business ventures. Liberal economic theory draws away from ideas of communalism and 
more social-oriented policies.  
 
Given the rise to prominence during the early 1990s of the liberal-model in developing 
states and the implementation of a number of World Bank-initiated structural adjustment 
programmes involving conditions of both liberal economic and political restructuring, the 
two concepts tended to be seen as a dual package. On the one hand, the common roots of 
                                                          
1      On the ANC’s economic policy shift toward a capital-friendly and market-led approach, see, for 
example, Patrick Bond (2000) 'Elites in Transition', Pluto Press, London; and P. Bond (2004 ) 'Talk Left, 
Walk Right', KwaZulu Natal, University Press. 
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economic and political liberalism must be acknowledged. Both persuasions share an 
emphasis upon freedom of the individual, pluralism and competition, as well as the need 
for constraints on state power. The fields to which they apply, however - i.e. the political 
and the economic - are where the two differ, and should, therefore, be understood as 
separable and distinct theories.  
 
This study, therefore, considers economic and political liberalism as not only separate 
methodologically (i.e. in terms of the methodological approach taken in the conduct of the 
research), but also as separate on a philosophical level - as two independent concepts, the 
conflation of which can be problematic. A particularly useful example is the frequent 
conflation of the two by socialists (Glaser, 1988; 1989), who have tended to see the 
features and characteristics of liberal democracy as linked to capitalist and 
bourgeois-driven societies and systems. This is an issue which will be discussed further at a 
later stage. Suffice to say that this particular outlook seems to suggest that the fundamental 
components of liberal democracy, such as the right to chose elected leaders; to influence 
public policy and hold these leaders to account through open and democratic public 
institutions; as well as to have protected rights and liberties in the exercise of such 
activities, are neither the concern of, nor valued by, the working classes and poorer sections 
of the population (Glaser, 1989).  
 
I would therefore suggest, firstly, that economic and political liberalism must each be 
understood in their own right as separate ideologies. Many people who consider 
themselves political liberals, by no means consider themselves to be economic liberals, and 
vice versa. Secondly, not only can one be advanced without a consummate move toward 
the other, but, in some cases, the effects of one can also negate the advancement and 
consolidation of the other. Economic and political liberalism are, therefore, not necessarily 
mutually reinforcing. The application of the liberal model to a number of African states 
during the 1990s reflects the difficulties and limitations of what we can refer to as the 
‘liberal model’ (i.e.: the introduction of both liberal economic policy and liberal political 
principles) when applied in the context of underdevelopment; weak or overrun state 
structures and services; and high levels of poverty or economic inequality. While the 
advent of increasingly open and pluralist political systems across sub-Saharan Africa is 
undoubtedly a welcome step, the flip side is that its counterpart has posed some significant 
challenges to the upholding of democratic values. Economic liberalisation in the form of an 
open market-led economy and a reduced role for the state in economic affairs - has, in the 
African experience, served only to exacerbate the incidence of state corruption, and the 
tendency for governments to resort to authoritarian, repressive and extra-legal methods of 
rule by which to manage mounting social unrest stemming from the harsh effects of its 
economic policies (Sandbrook, 1988; Sheahan, 1980, Boron 1981 in Sandbrook, 1988: 
257).  
 
Similarly, for certain states, the commencement of multi-party competition has merely 
translated into the opening up of new avenues and vehicles (in the form of political parties) 
by which groups can compete and vie for access to scarce (state) resources. The intended 
benefits of liberal democracy - the protection of civil liberties and existence of institutions 
through which these liberties can be advanced and governing groups can be held 
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accountable to their citizens - are then negated2. 
 
It must, of course, be emphasised that while there are undoubtedly historical, political and 
socio-economic features which set South Africa apart from many other states on the 
continent, one of the arguments which this paper seeks to grapple with is the converse 
relationship between the political and the economic implied in the liberal model. One of the 
propositions withing this paper is that South Africa provides a demonstration of an inverse 
relationship between economic liberalism on the one hand, and political liberalism on the 
other. While the ANC has come to adopt an increasingly liberal economic policy outlook, 
there has been a simultaneous rise in the governing party's seemingly authoritarian and 
undemocratic tendencies with which to deal with the social unrest and public outcry 
triggered by its own conversion to economic liberalism. Such a reaction on the part of the 
governing party can, hence, be viewed as amounting to an erosion of the principles of 
liberal democracy.        
 
 
Having outlined the central tenets of a liberal democratic system above, we should 
elaborate on these principles and on the reasoning behind its broader acceptance as a 
superior political system in practice. Considerable value is now placed on liberal 
democracy as a guard against authoritarian practice and 'despotism', and as a defender of 
civil and political rights (Sandbrook, 1988). At the extreme, some argue that liberalism 
itself is now "virtually coterminous with democracy", suggesting that given the track 
record and growth of failed democratic experiments under 'one-party' and 'people's' 
democracies, we need to question "whether there is any actually existing credible 
alternative to 'liberal democracy'?" (Welsh, 1998: 2). In light of the high regard in which 
liberal democratic systems have come to be held, then expectations of lasting government 
accountability, political tolerance and civil freedom involve issues that stretch beyond 
liberal democracy's formal features, such as the holding of regular elections; secrecy of the 
ballot; etc, to deeper aspects concerning the embracing of a certain value system - without 
which many of democracy's formal features become empty of any real democratic content.  
 
A contextual analysis of the extent to which liberal democracy has been consolidated and 
accepted as 'the only game in town'3, therefore requires a deeper analysis than that of the 
formal acceptance of multi-party democracy and holding of regular elections.  For example, 
                                                          
2      Although standing outside the scope of this paper, a particularly interesting argument is presented by 
Swilling (1992). While Swilling in no way conflates economic and political liberalism, he does consider that 
while liberal democracy's strength lies in its emphasis upon the promotion and protection of rights, its 
"critical weakness......was to assume that only political life should be subjected to democratic rules and 
accountability" (1992: 76). Economic life hence remains outside of social control. Conversely, therefore, he 
concludes that while socialism’s crucial downfall lay in its reduction of all power relations to that of class, its 
"overriding strength was its extension of the democratic principle to all spheres of society: political economic 
and social..." (ibid). The question that emerges from this standpoint is whether we are then looking for an 
ideal which combines the strengths of the two theories, and disregards their central weaknesses? I.e. some 
form of social-democracy. 
3      Linz, J.J. and Stepan, A. (1997) ’Towards Consolidated Democracies’ in  L. Diamond, M.F. Plattner, 
Yun-han Chu and Hung-mao Tien (eds) Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies, Baltimore, Johns 
Hopkins University 
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there is absolutely no doubt that South Africa is, formally, a multi-party democracy (albeit 
one in which one party is dominant), nor that the nation possesses one of the most liberal 
constitutions the world over, with an accompanying Bill of Rights that commits to the 
protection of all those civil liberties and political rights that underpin liberal democratic 
theory. However, the extent to which these principles are given full protection in practice 
and are genuinely upheld and promoted by those in power is something that can by no 
means be taken as a given. Indeed, Sandbrook refers to the primacy of the ‘internalization’ 
of democratic “political values” by elites as being crucial in upholding support for liberal 
democracy - all the more so where this democracy is in its relative youth (1988: 254).  
 
What this implies is that successful democratisation requires ‘institutionalisation’. 
Institutionalisation, according to Sandbrook's definition, “means that all major political 
actors come to value, and hence defend, the rules that underpin democratic organisations 
and procedures” (1996: 85). It is the absence of such institutionalisation that links to the 
failure of actors - "both political leaders and the public" - to “understand the essence” of 
multi-partyism (Makinda, 1996: 567) and the values it seeks to instil.  
 
Liberal Democracy involves, perhaps first and foremost, the acceptance and 
institutionalisation of political pluralism in the form of multi-party representative 
democracy. Political liberalism hence involves the opening up of a nation's political system 
to allow open and free political competition in the form of political parties, all of which 
have the right to openly campaign and stand for election as a prospective governing party.  
 
The existence of political opposition within a competitive party system is inarguably 
valuable in that it presents alternatives to the governing party; stimulates debate within 
society about ideas and policies; and allows society to question the actions and choices of 
government. Moreover, it is argued that countervailing forces, the most effective of which 
is the existence of a strong political opposition, are essential to check moves by the 
incumbency towards authoritarian tendencies and abuse of power (Giliomee & Simkins 
1999, p 337).  
 
In understanding the principles and values underpinning liberal democratic discourse, we 
must therefore consider the importance of the uncertainty of electoral outcomes. Drawing 
upon Schedler (2001: 19), Habib and Schultz-Herzenberg refer to one of the key principles 
of democracy as being ‘substantive uncertainty’. In other words, “the uncertainty of the 
outcomes of the game” (2005: 167). Given both the track-record of failed transitions and 
reversal of democratic gains, as well as the prevalence on the African continent of former 
liberation movements-come ruling parties, they similarly echo the concern highlighted 
above, that the presence of “institutional mechanisms” - such as “legislative elections, 
separation of powers, civil liberties, opposition political parties, an independent press” - by 
no means “automatically lead to substantive uncertainty” (Habib and Schultz-Herzenberg, 
2005: 168-169).  Rather, numerous critics and analysts have warned of former liberation 
movements tending to confuse 'liberal democracy' with 'liberation democracy' (Johnson, 
2003; Adam Slabbert & Moodley, 1997) failing to abandon "the idea that the state is a site 
to be captured permanently by the dominant party" (Adam, Slabbert & Moodley, 1997: 
83).  
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In a similar vein, and seemingly in line with both the acceptance of electoral outcomes and 
Sandbrook’s ideas of ‘internalization’ and ‘institutionalisation’, Schmitter (1994) refers to 
the key liberal democratic principle of ‘contingent consent’ (cited in Adam Slabbert & 
Moodley, 1997: 82). As he outlines, ‘contingent consent’ is “the principle that the party 
that wins.....will not abuse its victory to deny those who lost the opportunity of winning 
next time.... This is contingent upon the willingness of the losing parties to accept the right 
of the party that wins to take binding decisions over them until next time” (ibid).  A critical 
component, therefore, in ensuring the consolidation of liberal democratic practice, is that 
the ruling party accepts both participation and the role of political opposition, as well as 
their value in sustaining a genuinely pluralistic, tolerant democratic system in which debate 
is fostered and government accountability and responsiveness is maintained. 
 
Tolerance of pluralism and debate - in addition to allowing for the formation of disparate, 
autonomous groups to safeguard democratic behaviour - require that a certain divide be 
drawn between state and civil society. For proponents of both liberal and social democracy, 
tremendous value is placed upon a strong and independent civil society. Alongside the 
existence of a strong opposition, an independent civil society is also a key mechanism in 
being able to maintain a check on the authority of government, sustain debate and open 
discussion and keep government on its toes.  
 
As Glaser summarises, "in liberal democratic theory civil society serves as free space for 
individuals and their voluntary associations; its members seek freedom both from the state 
and (in respect of relations between citizens) guaranteed by the state” (1997: 21). What's 
more, principles of both individuality and equality apply in terms of all being equal before 
the law, and with civil and political rights that apply to the individual, as opposed to the 
collective.  
 
If, as Friedman proposes, “to argue for civil society’s independence from the state is surely 
to argue for the freedom to associate and speak as well as for the right of the organised 
citizenry to influence, and check the power of, governments” (Friedman, 1992: 83), then in 
a liberal democratic framework the freedom and independence of civil society directly 
relate to the issues of pluralism and rights. For society to attain any degree of autonomy 
requires that certain key liberties be guaranteed (Glaser, 1997: 21). Therefore, as noted 
earlier, liberal democracy embraces the importance of institutionalised civil and political 
rights provided for in the constitution itself. The liberal democratic understanding of 
political rights is that they "imply limitations on the power of the state vis-à-vis the 
individual" (Atkinson, 1992: 44). Democracy is therefore based upon what Schmitter 
refers to as 'bounded uncertainty': “- the principle that certain critical issues or rights are 
removed from the arena of political contestation and protected from the will of politicians” 
(1994, cited in Adam, Slabbert and Moodley, 1997: 82).  
 
However, it is important not to overstate the level of citizens' freedom from state control. 
While liberal democracy recognises the need for citizens to be able to utilise rights free of 
state interference, at the same time citizens are subject to its laws and regulations. Of 
course, one of the central functions of the state is the exercise of social control and 
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maintenance of law and order. However, a liberal democratic framework seeks to place 
certain limitations on the application of state authority through institutionalisation of 
certain mechanisms. These mechanisms include things such as civil liberties; the 
separation of powers; and legislative multi-party elections, discussed earlier, in order to 
protect citizens from arbitrary state action and authoritarian rule. Liberal democratic theory 
therefore necessitates that a distinction be drawn between such guaranteed freedoms, and 
those which the democratic state may, within its own right, circumscribe and infringe 
upon. 
 
The key political rights encompassed in a liberal democratic framework are considered to 
be universal franchise on the basis of one person, one vote; the right to secrecy of the 
ballot; the entitlement of all persons - men and women - to be entitled to vote for any party 
of their choice; to have the right to form and join any political party or organisation; and to 
have the right to stand for and occupy any position in office. Liberal democracy equally 
advances particular civil rights: freedom of expression, including freedom of the press and 
other media; freedom of speech; freedom of movement and assembly; and freedom of 
association.   
 
Of course any legitimate limitations on these rights must also be defined and the criteria for 
any limitation constitutionally outlined. This is particularly crucial in the case of South 
Africa given its own political history. For example, with regard to freedom of expression, 
the current Bill of Rights, Section 16 (1) states that this right "does not extend to 
propaganda for war; incitement of imminent violence; or hatred that is based on race, 
ethnicity, gender or religion, and that constitutes incitement to cause harm" (see Appendix 
1). 
 
Having discussed the value of a strong and independent civil society for democracy, it 
becomes clear why liberal democrats consider its suppression, and that of civil society’s 
fundamental rights, as such a danger to democratic stability. As has already been 
emphasised, autonomous centres of power outside of the state are fundamental to the 
maintenance of debate and discussion in society at large; holding government accountable 
for its actions and choices; as well as fulfilling a watchdog role. An important point which 
should be added here is that, in South Africa, given the weakness of the political opposition  
- in both its appeal to the electorate and its limited muscle and leverage in carrying out 
parliamentary oversight - then the role of civil society as a government watchdog becomes 
all the more important.  
 
However, a very interesting and valuable debate is raised by Friedman (1991; 1992) with 
regard to exactly what is meant by an 'independent' civil society. Or, perhaps more 
precisely, what does the ANC mean when it speaks of "the independence of civil society?" 
(Friedman, 1992: 83). This is a particularly relevant question and certainly worth 
investigation. Looking back to the ANC's liberation heritage and its particular 
characteristics as a liberation, and social, movement, there are concerns that have arisen 
from various sources as to the ANC's own understanding of civil society as indeed that of 
some theorists commenting on South Africa. A widely understood characteristic of 
liberation movements is their emphasis upon unity in ideology and action. Struggles 
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against colonial and apartheid rule encompassed an appeal to broad spectrums of the 
population. When oppressive powers sought to divide native populations and suppress the 
emergence of unity and strength in numbers, liberation movements sought cohesion and 
reiterated common goals and ideology. Moreover, the exile conditions of many such 
movements required that extreme discipline was exercised, and obedience and allegiance 
emphasised under conditions in which debate and difference would be divisive (see Baregu, 
2004).  
 
Given the extent of the ANC's status as a hegemonic force, both during and after the 
struggle against apartheid, Friedman notes that “the insistence on civil society’s 
independence in South Africa........seems to break with a powerful strain in resistance 
rhetoric, which has often submerged or denied the wide range of differing interests and 
values among the voteless - and within society as a whole” (1992: 83). During the 
liberation struggle, the ANC certainly came to represent ‘the nation’ – an idea that was kept 
alive throughout the 1980s by the UDF and civic organisations who continued to undertake 
resistance work on the ground in townships and local communities. However, one 
particular contention is that, in post-1994 South Africa, having taken hold of the wheels of 
the state, the liberation movement now seeks to take a hold over civil society. Friedman 
(1991; 1992) and Glaser (1997), interrogating understandings and notions of civil society 
and the establishment of hegemony over it, refer to the ideas of Marxist, Antonio Gramsci 
(1971), which appear to have influenced voices within the liberation camp. Friedman 
observes a Gramscianism which views civil society, not as a site in which ‘consent’ for a 
given hegemony may be ‘won’ through “pluralist political activity” (1992: 86) but, instead, 
as the ‘colonisation’ of  institutions within civil society by ideologists of the liberation 
movement and, hence, of the new ANC-government. 
 
If we are to concur with the argument that an independent civil society, able to exercise 
constitutionally protected rights free of state interference, is crucial for democracy, then 
the possible existence of the above understanding of civil society is concerning. A critical 
question to ask is whether some of the liberation movement’s ideas regarding the definition 
and role of civil society are, in fact, problematic for a liberty-protective, democratic 
system? 
 
Contextualising this particular aspect of the civil-society debate with regard to South 
Africa, Friedman notes that there are activists within the congress alliance itself, and the 
political left more generally, who envisage that “the entire range of interests and values 
within civil society  may be represented by particular organisations” (1991: 10). Hence the 
Congress tradition which appeals to the embracing of a broad range of individuals and 
associations, is also a “concern to recruit all political persuasions”, and “becomes an 
attempt to compress the full range of popular opinion into one hegemonic movement” 
(Friedman, 1991: 11). The arguments put forward by both Friedman (1992) and Glaser 
(1997) criticise a particular brand of theorising about civil society that was adopted by 
various theorists at this time. One such theorist holding the above-mentioned 
understanding of civil society is Mark Swilling (1991) whom Friedman (1992) and Glaser 
(1997) both critique in their independent work, alongside Mayekiso (Glaser, 1997). This 
particular model, as advanced by Swilling, fundamentally undermines the liberal 
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democratic understanding of the plurality of the civil realm. This is not merely “a pluralism 
between civil society and the state”, as Friedman points out (1991: 10) but, rather, 
associational pluralism in society at large. As Glaser summarises, the problem for liberal 
democracy lies is the view of civil society as a ‘collective actor’ (1997: 15) that can be 
represented, despite its inherent diversity, through historically ANC-aligned civic 
movements.  
 
A further point which should be added here regards the challenges to consolidating 
substantive liberal democratic practice in states recently having obtained independence4 
and in which the former liberation movement becomes the ruling party in the new 
democracy. In such cases, the ruling party’s liberation credentials inevitably lend it a 
degree of both political and moral legitimacy. However, the worrying implications of this 
are highlighted by Shubane, who cautions that, under these circumstances, there is the 
danger that “the liberation movement sets itself up as the only legitimate party in 
government. Thus the idea of multiplicity in political representation… [is]…done away 
with" (1992: 41). The governing party then comes to see itself as being the sole 
representative of ‘the people’ – reinforcing both the notion of the ‘collective will’ raised by 
Glaser (1997), and the denying of social and political diversity.  
 
Furthermore, in a dominant party system such as South Africa’s, the immense political 
power and electoral dominance wielded by the ruling party mean that there is the risk of the 
ANC coming to be associated with democracy itself. The problems inherent in the lack of 
both multi-party representation and an independent civil society, in any system claiming to 
be democratic, therefore become obvious – particularly with regard to the role assigned to 
each in ensuring government accountability and keeping a check on the abuse of power. 
 
Relating back to the acceptance of multi-party democracy, then it becomes clear that the 
liberal democratic understanding and definition of civil society automatically reinforces 
the necessity of “allowing for the formation of political parties which represent the many 
interests in society and also contribute to competitive politics” (Shubane, 1992: 41). A 
critical point to emphasise, therefore, is that an analysis of liberal democratic theory 
reflects that its key components are by no means isolated features but are, rather, mutually 
reinforcing. By way of an example, we can say that just as the diversity of society itself 
necessitates the existence of multiple political parties through which their numerous 
interests can be represented, then there must also be formalised and broadly accepted rights 
by which citizens themselves can organise and form such parties when they do not feel 
truly represented by those already in existence. 
 
A final issue of importance should also be noted, not so much as a component of liberal 
democracy, but in light of the dominant party context in which this analysis of the ANC 
takes place. This concerns the issue of internal party democracy. The nature of this context 
is such that the political opposition is weak. Its role in being able to keep a check on the 
abuse of authority and provide alternatives to the ruling regime which ensure that the ruling 
party remains responsive to public opinion is therefore reduced. This necessarily means 
                                                          
4      The term ‘recent’ here is intended to mean those states having gained independence from colonial rule, or 
who are undergoing / have under-gone, democratic transition, since the mid-20th Century. 
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that other areas of democratic debate and diversity, such as those taking place within the 
ANC camp itself, are all the more critical. If issues of true representation, accountability, 
pluralism and rights are to be upheld in South Africa, then those concerned to see such 
consolidation will need to maintain a watchful eye on internal party democracy. 
 
 
 
    PART I 
 
Chapter .2. 
 
1912 - 1950: THE ROOTS OF A LIBERAL TRADITION 
 
 
The following section encompasses several sub-chapters analysing where and when the 
early liberal democratic strands in the ANC emerged. It looks at the early leadership of the 
movement - such as that of J.T. Gumede, Pixley ka Isaka Seme and Dr A. B. Xuma, each 
President General of the ANC during the periods under analysis. Through examining both 
the dominant political ideologies and ideological tensions existent within the ANC, in 
particular from 1920s to 1949, the origins of the movement's democratic and liberal ideas 
are analysed. 
 
The early leadership of the South African Native National Congress (SANNC) - also 
referred to as the Congress - and later to be the African National Congress (ANC), were 
products of missionary education. While the ANC was the first organisation within South 
Africa to transcend ethnic divides reinforced by colonial domination and boundaries, from 
the point of its formation until the late 1920s, it remained a conservative organisation, 
whose ideology and programme remained the attainment of equality and inclusion, or 
integration, of Africans into the “economic life and political institutions” of the country 
(Walshe, 1987: 34). As Walshe describes, they were “ministers, teachers, clerks, 
interpreters,.......not trade unionists, nor were they socially radical.... they were setting out 
to attain what they considered their constitutional rights” (ibid). Early ANC thinking was 
hence characterised by an admiration and respect for classically liberal concepts of 
constitutionally guaranteed rights and values of representative government in the form of a 
parliamentary system. Ideas of 'liberalism' in South Africa at this time were thereby based 
upon what Fredrickson describes as the "idealistic view of the British empire" and notions 
of what was considered a system for 'civilised' subjects (Fredrickson, 1995: 223).  
 
Analysis of ANC language and doctrine during this time reflects that, at least until the 
mid-1940s, the dominant position within the movement was one of 'constitutional 
liberalism' (Welsh, 1998; Rich, 1984; Walshe, 1987). In terms of revolutionary and 
Marxist ideologies, therefore, political forces in South Africa remained relatively removed 
from and uninfluenced by such concepts (Ranuga, 1996: 6). Black intellectuals advocated 
nothing that suggested an overthrow of the ruling class, nor, it should be added, any clear 
statement of demands for majority rule (ibid). Moreover, even when close ties were forged 
with the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) from the late 1940s onwards - a 
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relationship which will be discussed in some detail in the following chapter - many 
members did in fact remain "firmly liberal in their view" (Gerhart, 1978).  
 
Liberal thinking hence dominated the ideological position of the ANC leadership, such that 
from 1912 to 1940, the movement has been described as being characterised by "a type of 
nationalism that is reformist and moderate in perspective" (Ranuga, 1996: 6). Both the 
historical and socio-political context under British and Boer imperialism served to shape 
the formation of these values amongst the strata of educated Africans during the early part 
of the 20th century. Although, under imperial rule, Africans were denied the franchise and 
participation in the organisation and decisions of government,  from the 1850s Africans in 
the Cape had been included in the common voters role "on the basis of a qualified but 
non-racial franchise" (ibid). Liberalism therefore had a significant influence upon the 
values considered amongst particular groups of Africans to be 'the norm' and, equally to be 
aspired to. The Cape liberal tradition therefore came to be held in high esteem by the ANC 
leadership. This related in part to the desire for assimilation amongst many educated 
Africans, who sought not to aggravate or challenge the colonial authorities but, rather, 
aspired to be included as equal participants in the latter's system. As Ranuga concisely 
explains, "African leaders were hopeful that the British liberal principles of equality before 
the law, civil rights, freedom of the press, and an independent judiciary would be 
encouraged by the Cape Constitution and extended to the other provinces" (Ranuga, 1996: 
6).  
 
Furthermore, as noted above, having undergone missionary education, these men were also 
strong believers of "Western and Christian norms", perceived to be "closely interrelated" 
(Walshe, 1987: 34). Ideas of moderation, obedience, tolerance and respect for the rule of 
law were highly valued practices in the minds of these Africans, and thus influenced the 
ideas and practices of the early policy and programme of the ANC. Looking to the hopes 
and aims expressed by the ANC leadership at this time, early leanings toward the 
aforementioned principles highlighted by Ranuga (1996: 6) reflect the early strands of 
ideas that form a key part of conceptions of current liberal democratic theory. 
 
In one of its earliest forms of expression, the 1919 Constitution of the SANNC by no means 
expressed a desire for an overthrow of the existing parliamentary system - let alone a vision 
of an alternative. Rather, the movement's constitution advocated the "equitable 
representation of Natives in Parliament or in those public bodies that are vested with 
legislative powers", seeing its own role as "the medium of expression of representative 
opinion" for Africans within the republic. Moreover, in addition to defending the "freedom, 
rights and privileges" of all Africans, the document cites the mutual contract between state 
and society, expressing the importance of educating Africans "on their rights, duties and 
obligations to the state and to themselves individually and collectively" (emphasis added). 
While the colonial government was clearly discriminatory and exploitative, the values for 
the Congress leadership lay in the specific practices and institutions of the representative 
democratic system. While the Congress' specific position on ideas of political  pluralism 
are not sufficiently discernable from the wording of the 1919 Constitution, there is 
certainly reference to the advancement and protection of rights. In fact, 1923 witnessed the 
Congress' first attempt at formulating an African Bill of Rights (see footnote 4).  
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It should also be noted that a prominent feature of this period was that the moderate and 
reformist leadership of the Congress had a particular aversion to Marxist-Leninist ideas, 
largely on the grounds of its militant and radical discourse which clashed starkly with the 
liberal reformist view of the Congress. The SANNC's fairly conservative stance with 
regard to political and social change was matched by a tremendous hostility to militant 
politics - both of which reflect the education and status of the leadership, many of whom 
held fairly elite positions and for whom specifically 'working class' concerns let alone the 
idea of 'a classless society' held little appeal5. 
  
The Congress' attitude toward Marxism-Leninism is reflected clearly in the eventual forced 
resignation in 1930 of the Marxist-oriented ANC President-General, J.T. Gumede - an 
event demonstrating the lack of radical influences amongst the older leadership at this time. 
Influenced significantly by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union following a visit 
there in 1927, Gumede was replaced only 3 years later by the conservative leader Pixley ka 
Isaka Seme from which point Gumede's radicalism was effectively 'silenced' (Walshe, 
1987: 181). Seme's Presidency of the ANC came at a time when the Communist Party in 
South Africa (CPSA) was being encouraged by Moscow to begin promoting the idea of an 
'independent black republic' in South Africa as the most realistic way for an avenue to 
socialism. Seme hence warned against infiltration attempts by revolutionary and 'militant' 
communists (Walshe, 1987: 181).  
 
Fredrickson does, however, highlight an interesting point regarding further reasoning 
behind the ANC leadership's dismissal of communist ideas. He notes that, although 
"radical black intellectuals" were "attracted by Communist opposition to capitalism and 
racism", their aversion to communism lay in the idea that they must "surrender their minds 
and talents to a party bureaucracy that had little respect for the free play of the intellect and 
imagination" (Fredrickson, 1995: 180). With regard to the importance placed upon 
freedom of thought and opinion within a liberal democratic framework, then this should 
perhaps not be overlooked as it reflects a concern within the Congress leadership for the 
free exploration of individual ideas, unhindered by rigid party doctrine. 
 
The period from 1940 to 1949, however, saw something of a shift in the balance of forces 
within the ANC, from a liberal reformist ideology to that of an appeal to African nationalist 
sentiments. In 1936, the government introduced legislation which brought about an 
abolition of the Cape African franchise, the effects of which were to be considerable for the 
liberal reformist policy so staunchly defended by the ANC leadership. A great part of their 
liberal belief rested upon the hope of the eventual extension of the franchise to the African 
population in all provinces of the republic. Moreover, it had also been hoped that the 
participation of a considerable number of the native population in the Second World War 
may induce changes in the position and rights granted to Africans within the Republic. 
However, by the early 1940s it had become clear that the government had not the least 
                                                          
5  ANC leadership from 1912- 1917 under the Rev John Dube and then from 1917-1924 under Sefako 
Mapogo Makgatho reflected this particular leadership type, both of which were conservative in their outlook. 
ANC President General from 1924 - 1927, Rev Mahabane, insisted upon a struggle that remained along 
"peaceful and constitutional lines" (Ranuga, 1996: 15). 
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intention of improving the lot of Africans, but was, rather, turning to the introduction of 
increasingly discriminatory legislation.  
 
The impact upon the policy and ideological direction of the ANC was, as Gerhart describes, 
that the disappointment in government and its failure to improve the status of Africans 
stimulated a new militancy amongst African intellectuals (Gerhart, 1978: 66). As Walshe 
describes, "the 1936 abolition of the Cape African Franchise, which black liberals 
defended passionately, deprived black liberals of a key reference point and contributed to 
their disillusionment" (Walshe, 1987: 279). The liberal opinion and position of the ANC 
had never really faced any challenged until the late 1930s (Rich, 1984: 77). However, 
alongside the action or, indeed, inaction of the government, an increasing frustration with 
the control and involvement of 'liberal whites' in the affairs of Africans equally bred 
amongst members of the ANC. Thus Rich summarises that "a new generation of African 
political leaders began to come to the fore by the 1940s who were also far less likely to 
accept as automatic the clientelism on which the white liberals had continued to rest their 
political appeal to Africans" (1984: 77)6. As a result, the President-General of the ANC 
from 1940, Dr A.B. Xuma, began to face increasing pressure from ANC members to adopt 
"a more militant and independent political line" (Rich, 1984: 74). 
 
On the one hand, the direction of the ANC under Xuma certainly took a turn with regard to 
policy and practice, while Xuma himself - a man who had also looked toward integrationist 
ideals and the involvement of Africans in the existing system through assistance and 
support of white liberals - began to reiterate the need for Africans to begin generating and 
pursuing independent ideas and action (1984: 78-79). This shift in attitude toward liberal 
and reformist thinking during the 1940s is reflected most prominently in the formation of 
the ANC Youth League - or Congress Youth League - (ANCYL) in 1943. The ANCYL 
came to take on an orthodox nationalist approach, a racially conceived idea of nationalism 
that was critical of imported ideologies such as communism, and lambasted the Congress 
leaders’ previous approach to the plight of Africans. The ANCYL's manifesto highlighted 
both the lack of understanding of the situation of "the rank and file" demonstrated to date 
by the Congress leadership; and the lack of serious or 'convincing' programmatic effort to 
'eliminate' the voids dividing the privileged from the mass of the people (ANCYL, 1944). 
 
While the league adopted a particularly militant and nationalistic stance that openly 
emphasised the harsh policy and ruthless attitude of government to the African majority, it 
should be noted that it continued to remain committed to the attainment of key rights for 
Africans within a democratic system, citing specifically 'demands' for "the right to be a free 
citizen in the South African democracy; the right to an unhampered pursuit of his national 
destiny and the freedom to make his legitimate contribution to human advancement" 
(ANCYL, 1944). On the one hand, therefore, in considering where particular strands of 
thinking with regard to liberal democratic values have been upheld or adapted, then 
although the 1940s were a new phase, there were certainly not dramatic shifts in 
                                                          
6 Many frustrations had emerged from the government's policy of 'Trusteeship' established in 1936 which 
provided parallel political institutions for Africans and a continuance of segregation (Walshe, 1987: 266). 
This appeared to Africans as a mere insulting attempt at appeasement which they would no longer continue to 
accept (see Rich, 1984). 
  22
fundamental ideology. However, the Youth League also represented a brand of African 
nationalism new to the ANC, conceived by leader, Anton Lembede, that conjured up 
romantic notions of an African past and African cultural roots, hence forming the grounds 
on which to reject imported ideologies (see Gerhart, 1978: 65-68).  
 
In 1943, the ANC began work on formulating Africans' Claims in South Africa. The 
document was a response to the announcement of the Atlantic Charter in 1941 by Great 
Britain and the United States, and listed a set of claims for Africans, based upon the 
conditions in South Africa and the rights claimed by the native population within this 
context (Asmal et al, 2005: 1-3). The document also comprised a Bill of Rights drawn up by 
the Congress Committee. It directly addressed political rights concerning the right of all 
people to choose their form of government; to direct representation in parliament and to 
full citizenship rights. The rights and demands claimed in the document included the 
extension to all adults of the right to vote; to both stand for, and be elected to, government 
office; to  freedom of movement; freedom of the press; and the right to equal justice in 
courts of law. Given the content of the 1943 document, it would appear that, if anything, 
the ANC's demands for the full democratisation of existing representative institutions of 
government, as well as the extension of civil and political rights considered to be key to 
liberal democracy, became far more pronounced in the Africans' Claims. While early 
statements of Congress  during the 1920s and 1930s made clear their support for both a 
representative system of rule as well as the 'liberty of the individual'7, Africans' Claims 
appear to take the form of a more clearly articulated and explicit set of claims with respect 
to such principles.  
 
In light of the developments of the early part of the 1940s, therefore, a point that warrants 
further consideration is that, toward the end of the 1940s, the issues under debate 
concerned not so much what the ANC was demanding from the government, as the means 
by which they were to be achieved. In other words, it was not that the ANC was retracting 
from liberal democracy as an ideal, but rather that it was moving away from the ideas of 
gradualism that had previously characterised its programme, toward more explicit 
demands.  Indeed, despite the formulation of Africans' Claims by Dr Xuma and a 
Committee of traditionally more conservative leaders, Walshe observes that it was both 
accepted by the emerging 'radical' elements of Congress found in the ANCYL and  
“became the basic policy statement upon which later ANC documents were essentially 
based” (Walshe, 1987: 278).  
 
Similarly, Ranuga notes that the revised ANC Constitution in 1943, replacing the earlier 
Constitution of 1919, upheld the same 'liberal reformist' and 'moderate' aspirations of the 
movement (1996: 34). What could be said about the Africans' Claims, however, was that it 
seemed to bear a more 'social-democratic' face (Rich, 1984). This also perhaps suggested a 
move away from any ideas of classic economic liberalism. While still encompassing the 
ANC's traditional liberal political objectives, its statements on equality in various fields of 
politics, state social services, land, industry and labour, commerce, education and public 
health demonstrate the social democratic benefits added to Congress' "traditional political 
                                                          
7  The African Bill of Rights (1923), formulated from Resolutions of the Annual Conference of the African 
National Congress, 28-29 May, 1923 
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objectives" such as the franchise, equality before the law and press freedom (Rich, 1984: 
85-86). 
 
The ANCYL's acceptance of the Africans' Claims document reflects that, although, as 
Gerhart observes, Lembede was of a different generation to the conservative leaders such 
as Seme (Gerhart, 1978: 46), he still held "a reluctance to break completely with the liberal 
integrationist values of the past" (1978: 63; see also 63).  For her, the Youth League's 
"underlying conception of political change still revolved around ideas of reforming, rather 
than totally scrapping, South Africa's existing system for the distribution of power" 
(Gerhart, 1978: 68). Rich similarly adds that, despite the pressure it generated for a more 
radical approach by ANC leaders, the League still relied to a significant degree on existing 
ANC organisation (1984: 84). 
 
A further point which appears particularly relevant to this analysis, is that despite the shifts 
in its approach to achieving its objectives, which took the form of outright 'demands' as 
opposed to the Congress' earlier 'requests' to the South African government, the ANCYL 
continued to have little to say about the actual form or type of democracy that they 
envisaged (Gerhart, 1978: 68). At this stage, the ANC appeared to have no particular stance 
on what it envisaged the place of whites to be, for example, in a future state (ibid). Nor, it 
should be added, was there any open discussion of how pluralism within the African 
majority would be dealt with, nor of how the existence of competing political ideologies 
would be dealt with. The 1944 Manifesto of the ANCYL continued to refer to each group 
as a collective entity - as 'the white man' and 'the black man' - as opposed to groups within 
society made up of a plurality of individuals. The manifesto also reiterated the need for 
unity, for "a compact group" in order to achieve their set aims (ANCYL, 1944). 
 
Overall, however, the major shifts occurring during this period appear to have related to an 
increasing militancy and nationalistic approach to the attainment of Congress' objectives. 
A rising, younger leadership within the ANC was growing increasingly impatient with the 
moderate and 'evolutionary' approach to change, as well as Congress' leadership's 
cooperation with liberal whites. This is by no means to undermine what Rich has suggested 
to be a "growing democratisation of African political consciousness in the 1940s" (Rich, 
1984: 85). However, in terms of the actual changes or shifts in ideology, it may be more 
accurate to reflect on what Asmal, Chidester and Lubisi argue in their work mapping the 
history of the ANC's human rights tradition, that the ANC was "no longer submitting 
requests...[but instead]....asserting the claims of Africans for their human rights in South 
Africa" (2005: 2) (emphasis added). 
 
With the growing disillusionment that emerged amongst Africans from the mid-1930s and 
the negligible effects of the work of the Congress during its early decades, then by the 
1940s the ANC was faced with somewhat of a "liberal ideological dilemma" (Rich, 1984: 
76). Having said this, as Gerhart argues, it can also be said that "a solid majority in the 
ANC" did not shift toward "a militant policy of non-cooperation" until 1949 (Gerhart, 
1978: 81) - a point reflected in the early nature of the ANCYL's discourse discussed above. 
In 1949, the growth of African nationalist sentiments amongst the liberation movement 
came to the fore in the drawing up of the 1949 Programme of Action, a document which 
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was a far greater reflection of the move away from the liberalism of the 1920s and '30s 
toward a new African nationalism.  
 
This Programme of Action was the first statement of the ANC asking for self determination 
(Ranuga, 1996: 41). The document reflected the growing militancy and challenges 
emerging from a new generation of leadership and was the first document which stated 
openly the ANC's proposed use of boycotts, strikes, civil disobedience, and 
non-co-operational tactics (ANC, 1949). A key characteristic of the document, and one 
which is perhaps telling of the ANC's thinking at that time, is that the use of  central terms 
in the document such as "national freedom", "political independence", "self determination" 
were left 'undefined' (Gerhart, 1978: 83). There seemed to be no clarity as to what 
particular words and phrases were suggesting. What exactly was the content of the 
nationalism that the ANC sought to unite the people under? (ibid) And what did these 
terms mean with regard to a future state and a form of political system? By the end of the 
1940s, these questions appeared to have been left unanswered.  
 
This perhaps goes a significant way to explaining the 'all-inclusive' character of the ANC. 
The vagueness of some of its political formulations were precisely what enabled it to hold 
together a broad alliance of political inclinations and representations. Furthermore, the 
content of the Strategy and Tactics is a further reflection of the ANC's focus at this stage 
being geared not toward 'ideological theorizing' (Gerhart, 1078: 84) or resolving the 
ambiguities of its discourse, but rather toward more decisive political 'action' (ibid). The 
announcement of the Programme of Action and the onset of the 1950s therefore marked a 
new approach to struggle from the ANC, but also a new phase in relations between the 
ANC and the CPSA, with a consummate shift away from the previous hostility to the 
latter's involvement. It is to this that the discussion now turns. 
  
 
 
Chapter 3 
 
THE 1950s AND 1960s: THE ANC - SACP ALLIANCE  
 
 
Analysing the relationship between the ANC and the CPSA/SACP, as well as the 
transitions in ideology of the ANC itself, Ranuga (1996) describes what he understands as 
three 'phases' in the relationship between the two organisations. The previous chapter 
discussed the hostility to Communist ideas during a period in which the ANC adopted a 
particularly liberal reformist and, it should be added, conservative stance that took place 
form the 1920s to 1943. The following phase from 1943, was also discussed, marked by the 
rise of African nationalist sentiments within the ANC and the formation of the ANC Youth 
League who viewed Communism still with hostility, but also as an foreign ideology, 
un-applicable to the South African context (Ranuga, 1996; Norval, 1990: 38). However, 
this phase also came to see a closer cooperation with the CPSA - a relationship which 
began to cement following the Defiance Campaign in 1952 (Ranuga, 1996). The third 
phase which then began to set in is that identified by Ranuga as 'pragmatic cooperation', 
consolidated on the basis of the principles of the Freedom Charter in 1955. It is to the 
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transitions and shifts in the ANC's commitment to principles of liberal democracy, during 
the 1950s and '60s, that this discussion now turns.  
 
Considering the period from 1950 onwards, this chapter seeks to provide a deeper 
understanding of the nature of the relationship between the ANC and SACP, as well as the 
extent to which ANC thinking, in particular with regard to liberal democratic ideas, was 
influenced and shaped by this relationship. 
 
Between the late 1940s and the early 1960s, a relationship of cooperation was gradually 
consolidated between the ANC and SACP. By the 1950s, some of the traditionally 
conservative ANC leadership had slipped into a backseat role within the movement as the 
more radical youth leaguers had come to the fore. In 1949, Dr James Moroka replaced 
Xuma as ANC President General and was a man far more sympathetic to the approach of 
the ANCYL. It was the following year, in 1950, that the CPSA was officially banned by the 
newly instated apartheid government under the Nationalist Party (then reconstituted 
underground as the SACP - South African Communist Party). No longer allowed to 
function as an organisation within South Africa, members of the party sought to join the 
ranks and cause of the ANC in its own battle against the apartheid government. The late 
1940s and early 1950s therefore saw a particular sympathy on the part of communists with 
the cause of the ANC and the extent of the oppression they faced from the apartheid regime. 
There emerged, as a result, a series of joint campaigns between the organisations against 
the strictures of the government.     
 
In terms of the ANC, it must be remembered that black South Africans had decreasing 
reason to put their faith in liberalism and liberal reform as a method of realistically 
achieving change (Fredrickson, 1995: 223; Gerhart, 1978). Little had been done or 
achieved in the face of state repression, despite pronouncements of older leaders about the 
merits of liberal ideas and values. As a result, for ANC members there emerged a new 
willingness to embrace alternative allies and alternative viewpoints in their struggle for 
liberation.  
 
One particular argument regarding the SACP is that the party strategically sought to gain 
political influence through the ANC as a mass organisation in order to steer South Africa in 
a communist direction. Such a viewpoint has come from more authors such as Norval 
(1990) and Styles (1989). In 1928 directions had been issued from Moscow to the 
Communist Party internationally to work with and support National Liberation 
Movements in Africa, including the ANC, to 'transform' them into revolutionary 
organisations (Norval, 1990: 33). Undoubtedly the hopes of the SACP were that eventual 
success by the liberation movement could play a crucial stage in taking South Africa a 
further step toward socialism, and eventually communism. Norval, drawing upon an  
extract from the African Communist for example, proposes a scenario in which the ANC 
functioned as "the mass national movement" while the SACP guides it in the communist 
role of the 'vanguard party' (1990: 93-94). His picture, however, is one of an extreme.  
 
An opposing argument to this, however, is that the actual ideological influence of the 
SACP can be overstated (Gerhart, 1978; Suttner, 2005, personal interview, Ranuga, 1996). 
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Ranuga, for example, states that the new face that the ANC-SACP relationship took on 
during the 1950s "was not symptomatic of an ideological convergence between the 
moderate nationalism of the ANC and the communism of the CPSA....[but]...simply a 
product of cooperative action" (Ranuga, 1996: 52). He goes on to state that "bonds of 
comradeship" were solidified through joint events and action such that "ideological 
differences between the two organisations were either overlooked or relegated to the 
background" (ibid).  Ideologically, therefore, the organisations continued to remain 
distinctly separate and Congress leaders not only "continued to register their opposition to 
communism" (Ranuga, 1996: 55), but also continued their underlying commitment to the 
right to vote, to participation in parliament and to the attainment of civil rights (Gerhart, 
1978). In essence, the fundamental objectives of the ANC, on the ideological plane, 
appeared to at least converge with some key liberal democratic principles.  
 
From 1946, several key communist and Marxist-leaning people joined that ANC or worked 
closely with the movement - two of which were the prominent Moses Kotane and Dr Y.M. 
Daidoo, respectively. Kotane was an SACP member who occupied a place on the ANC 
Executive  from 1946 until 1952. Similarly, although not a member of the ANC,  Dr Y.M. 
Daidoo, a communist in the South African Indian Congress (SAIC), signed an agreement 
with Xuma in 1947 to embark on "joint cooperation" to fight for "full franchise rights, 
better economic and industrial opportunities and other basic human rights" (Ranuga, 1996: 
42). Between 1950 and 1955, the multi-racial Congress Alliance was formed - an alliance 
between the ANC, SAIC, South African Coloured People's Congress (CPC) and the 
Congress of Democrats (COD) - an allied organisation, formed in 1953, made up of white 
liberals and communists.  
 
Those on the political Right, tended to view the ANC's new found cooperation with the 
SACP as some form of communist takeover (see, for example, Norval, 1990; and Styles, 
1989). Having said this, Ranuga, although coming from far more socialist and left wing 
perspective, also comments that "the SACP had every reason to strengthen its cooperative 
relationship with the ANC because.......it was operating underground and was therefore not 
in a position to project itself as the vanguard party of the masses" (1996: 126). However, 
the question that concerns us is not so much the intentions of the SACP, as the extent to 
which the ANC's  ideological path and vision for a future South Africa was significantly 
effected by the relationship with its communist allies.8 . 
 
 "The influence of Marxist class perspectives in key ANC leaders.....was 
unquestionably strong, but communism's net effect was less to sway Congress from its 
chosen path than .... to reinforce some of those elements in Congress thinking which were 
most firmly rooted in the Christian liberal tradition" (Gerhart, 1978: 108). 
 
On the one hand it must be noted that there was somewhat of a 'de-radicalisation' of the 
                                                          
8  From 1951 to 1958, it was strong Africanists who were against the participation of communists, not those  
African nationalists committed to a liberal and non-racial ideas (Gerhart, 1978; and Fredrickson, 1995: 224). 
Thus for Pan-Africanists, a group who would later break away from the ANC in 1969, white liberals and 
communists tended to be grouped together (Ranuga, 1996: 126). Gerhart hence describes a 'tension' between 
two types of nationalism, that of the liberal / non-racial nationalism which had become the dominant strand 
within the ANC versus an orthodox / exclusivist nationalism of the Africanists (1978: 13-16).  
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Youth Leaguers that had come to the fore in 1949 (Gerhart, 1978: 108). Gerhart therefore 
suggests that just as these men were "moving into positions of influence in the senior 
congress, most were also modifying their political opinions" (Gerhart, 1978: 107). This 
related back to the underlying commitments to liberal political values that had underpinned 
the founding of the ANC, as Gerhart states that the ANCYL leaders "moved out of the 
bounds of orthodox nationalism and closer toward the non-racial 'realist' position more 
traditionally associated with the ANC" (ibid). This viewpoint would appear to suggest that 
the ANC-SACP alliance was one of both pragmatic cooperation and of support and 
comradeship. For Gerhart, when it came to ideas of a future order, she insists that the ANC 
"remained  firmly wedded to its liberal values" (Gerhart, 1978: 118). This suggestion 
perhaps warrants further consideration. Raymond Suttner, a former member of the SACP 
underground from 1969 and a member of the ANC's National Executive Committee and 
the Central Committee of the SACP  from 1991, commented that while communists were 
placed in a number of different positions, "the price the Communist Party paid was to lose 
its independence" (2005, personal interview). Would this not appear to tie in with Gerhart's 
opinion? 
 
Further consideration of the role of communists within the ANC itself seems to conjure up 
a similar picture. Fredrickson, for example, speaking of involvement of Moses Kotane9, 
makes a particularly intriguing statement. He notes that "by 1939....an African with strong 
nationalist sentiments and an undeniable dedication to the cause of national liberation as an 
end in itself led the Communist Party of South Africa. Indeed it can almost be said that the 
Communist Party was prepared to subordinate its own ideology and ambitions to the cause 
of a non-communist African democratic republic in ways that went beyond what Lenin 
would probably have found acceptable" (Fredrickson, 1995: 209).  Kotane was, of course, 
only one member and had historically been an African nationalist as well as a 
Marxist-Leninist. However, as a party leader this is perhaps not an insignificant insight. 
Fredrickson goes on to suggest that "Kotane came close to saying to African nationalists 
that he and his party would support them to the fullest without trying to impose their own 
ideology" - a statement which was, in fact, "directly contrary to Stalin's injunction that 
Communists in anti-imperialist fronts should always seek to dominate" (ibid). 
 
A further point which perhaps reinforces the idea of 'pragmatic cooperation' on the part of 
the ANC, as opposed to an ideological unity, is that the CPSA was the only group in South 
Africa making the idea of a non-racial or 'racially integrated' society seem conceivable 
(Fredrickson, 1995: 210).   
 
From 1952, Chief Albert Lutuli was made President-General of the ANC, a position he 
held until 1967. Although Lutuli never described himself as a liberal, his ideas and 
discourse have caused some to view him as the ''quintessential liberal" (Norval, 1990).  In 
the face of government repression, although Lutuli came to understand the desire by some 
members of Congress to turn to non-peaceful means by which to make their demands, in 
his political outlook he remained committed to ideas of parliamentary representation and 
                                                          
9  Kotane was Chairman of the Western Cape ANC from the late 1930s and was selected to be General 
Secretary of the Communist Party in 1939. He continued his activity with the ANC throughout the 1940s 
(Fredrickson, 1995: 209) and remained on the ANC National Executive until 1952. 
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constitutional rights, regardless of the violent means by which they may need to be pursued. 
In a comment concerning the 1952 Defiance Campaign, Lutuli described the campaign’s 
objectives as in no way seeking "to overthrow the form and machinery of the state but only 
urges for the inclusion of all sections of the community in a partnership in the government 
of the country on the basis of equality" (Lutuli, 1952 cited in Fredrickson, 1995: 247) - a 
statement reflecting a continued respect for ideas of a liberal democratic system.   
 
However, a crucial point which should not be overlooked is that the democratic and liberal 
values, as defined by Lutuli, continue to resonate with notions of 'civilised peoples' and 
their own self-determination, hence this would continue to be the ANC's understanding of 
democratic rights at his stage. While there appears to be no explicit statement on notions of 
pluralism and how constitutional rights are defined in a way that pluralism can exist within 
a tolerant culture, Lutuli does emphasis the importance of democratic representation and 
consultation (Lutuli, 1957).    
 
Within his autobiography, Lutuli also stated that he in no way shared the 'philosophical 
outlook' of communists and always maintained opposition to their ideology (1962, cited in 
Ranuga, 1996: 55). However he valued them as 'human beings' and cooperated with them 
in that way (ibid). On the one hand, those who warned against the threats posed by 
communist involvement have suggested that the liberal figure of Lutuli provided a perfect 
face behind which "socialists and communists could carry out their scheme of taking over 
the ANC" (Norval, 1990: 47)10. Norval, in fact, suggests that Chief Lutuli's banning by the 
apartheid government in 1952, 1954 and again in 1959 "allowed those with a more 
communist orientation to take increasingly prominent roles within the ANC" (ibid). The 
question that suggestions such as this raise, therefore, concerns the extent to which the 
voice of Lutuli was a true representation of the ideological leanings of the party at large. 
What can certainly be said, however, is that Lutuli received a great deal of support from his 
fellow comrades within the movement. Moreover, Raymond Suttner emphasised the 
particularly close relationship  between Chief Lutuli and SACP General Secretary, Moses 
Kotane. Growing to know one another on a personal level, Lutuli began to read about 
Marxism, in particular smuggled copies of the banned African Communist (Suttner, 2005,  
personal interview). Rather than being marginalized by communists, the ANC under 
Lutuli’s leadership appeared rather to have found areas of common ground with the SACP 
in their mutual struggle against the state, without surrendering their ideology or their 
objectives with regard to liberal democratic ideas11.  
 
Nelson Mandela, in his speech from the dock at the Rivonia Trial in 1964, stated his 
awareness that "communists regard the parliamentary system of the west as undemocratic 
and reactionary" (1964: 43). However, in his very same speech he emphasises his own 
‘admiration’ for this system:  "The Magna Carta, the Petition of rights, and the Bill of 
Rights are documents which are held in veneration by democrats throughout the 
                                                          
10  This group of critics such as Norval and Styles stand in one particular camp emphasising extreme 
authoritarian and totalitarian influences of the SACP. The COD, formed in 1953, Styles describes as a 
"communist front organisation" (1989).  
11   COD, for example, also enjoyed full support of Chief Lutuli due to his belief that they 'identified' with the 
ANC in its "struggle for human liberties" (Lutuli, 1962 cited in Ranuga, 1996: 46). 
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world.......I regard the British Parliament as the most democratic institution in the world, 
and the independence and impartiality of its judiciary never fail to arouse my admiration” 
(1964: 43). Despite Mandela’s open acknowledgement of the merit of a classless society as 
advocated by the communists, he still appears to place the greatest value in representative 
democratic institutions and the separation of powers.  What appears not to be raised 
however, is any elaboration on objectives linked to constitutional pluralism.  It would 
appear that one of the most important questions that the ANC’s understanding and vision 
of a democratic future raises, therefore, is where are issues of pluralism and individual civil 
and political rights such as freedom of expression, speech, etc placed within this vision? If 
the SACP and ANC were essentially fighting for the same democratic rights for the people, 
as Ranuga (1996) suggests and Mandela alludes to in his statement regarding the assistance 
given by communists in the struggle for liberation and democracy (1964: 42-43), then 
where exactly are ideas of liberty protection and diversity of political opinion to be catered 
for in a united South Africa? 
 
 
Inherent in the Communist ideology is indeed the view of a classless society, but also of 
society as one ‘social body', devoid of all internal difference, in which the individual itself 
is subordinated to both the Party and the existence a one single dominant 'Truth' - that of 
communism (Lefort, 1986; 1988). As Anthony Polan has written, the idea of communism 
is the removal of politics itself. For Communists there was no need to debate over ideology 
or to cater for political choice as the choice has already been dictated by the very Truth of 
communism itself (1984). For communists, therefore, democracy, which is itself the 
institutionalisation of political difference, is not required. Such a view of liberation is 
surely problematic if the ANC seeks a democratic state based upon fundamental human 
rights. This would, however, link directly to the suggestion that in their pragmatic 
cooperation, many such ideological differences were overlooked. 
 
The question remains, however, as to whether the ANC  had indeed thought about issues of 
political pluralism in a new South Africa, and whether it saw itself as being able to house 
these differences? In an article written by Lutuli in February 1962, he speaks of the 
existence of political parties in a future state that “should arise from a community of 
interests, rather than from a similarity of colour” (1962). Moreover, he envisions their 
competing for elections in which voters will have their free choice to put a particular party 
in government (Lutuli, 1962). With such a clear recognition of a need for institutionalised 
multi-partyism, then other than in the gradual recognition by the ANC of the existence of 
class-based as well as race-based oppression, the political ideologies of the ANC and 
SACP would appear not to converge at all. At least we can conclude that the relationship 
between the two did not appear to shift the ANC’s allegiances away from liberal 
democratic-based ideas. Having said this, it is crucial to touch upon one of the most central 
documents of the Congress tradition. The 1955 Freedom Charter, although triggering an 
eventual split between the Pan-Africanist camp within the ANC and those committed to the 
Charter's clauses - the ‘Charterists', the document was accepted by the SACP as a basis for 
their alliance in the struggle for liberation in South Africa. 
 
The crafting of the Freedom Charter was a reflection of an emerging non-racial unity. The 
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document was launched at the Congress of the People in Kliptown, Soweto, in June 1955. 
It was a product of a collection of demands being made by Africans across the country and 
then drawn up and ratified by a select Committee of the ANC. In 1956 the Freedom 
Charter was officially adopted as "a basic policy document of the ANC" (Gerhart, 1978: 
94). Consolidation of ANC-SACP unity was based upon the agreements of the Freedom 
Charter. Interpretation of the Charter’s clauses, accepted by these two organisations with 
supposedly different ideological outlooks has therefore stimulated considerable debate,  
not least given the involvement of a number of prominent communists in the drafting of the 
document 12. Some such standpoints, however, have been of a fairly extreme and right wing 
nature. Norval, for example, suggests that far from being a 'blueprint' for a democratic 
future envisioning the implementation of "human rights reforms, the Charter must rather 
be read "in the context of the Marxist ideological world view" (1990: 49) - in particular 
given the document's support from the SACP. Norval refers, in particular, to the notion of a 
'people's democracy' implicit in the Freedom Charter, which he equates to "leftist jargon 
for a one-party socialist state" (1990: 51). 
 
In stark contrast, Ranuga appears to claim a reversion back to earlier principles within the 
ANC during this period, noting that the Freedom Charter drew its inspiration not from the 
1944 CYL manifesto or the 1949 Programme of Action, but rather from earlier liberal 
traditions of the movement cited in the 1943 Africans' Claims document (Ranuga, 1996: 
48). Despite Ranuga clearly voicing his criticisms of the document from a pro-socialist and 
pro-Marxist standpoint, his retelling of events does lend credence to the ANC's formal 
claim in 1963 that, despite the inclusion of nationalisation - a reflection of the participation 
of SACP members and leftist Congress thinkers in the drawing up of the document, the 
Freedom Charter was in no way a politically left-wing or 'communist-inspired' document 
(ANC, 1963: 19-21 cited in Ranuga, 1996: 48). 
 
With regard to ANC -SACP agreements over the Charter, however, a particularly relevant 
point is raised by both Sampson (1958) and Styles (1989) who argue that that the Freedom 
Charter is not a document reflecting any clear political ideology (Sampson, 1958; Styles, 
1989: 71), a suggestion which perhaps goes part way to explaining the ANC - SACP's 
convergence over the content of the document. Sampson, writing in 1958 described the 
Freedom Charter as “mainly a catalogue of the most common-or-garden claims and dreams 
for the future…only one thing was unmistakably clear: the insistence on a multi-racial 
state” (Sampson, 1958: 109, cited in Ranuga, 1996: 47). However, this very point has lead 
other theorists to highlight the need to look, instead, to the ideological leanings of the 
actual authors of the document in order to understand what is meant politically by each of 
the document's clauses. Styles, for example, argues that "given the Freedom Charter's 
ideological vagueness and imprecise political formulation it must be evident that any 
understanding of the Freedom Charter will not be found in an abstract perusal of its 
clauses..... It must rather be understood in terms of the political objectives of its main 
proponents" (1989: x). This has, therefore, as detailed above, prompted some analysts to 
                                                          
12  1953  - Z.K. Matthews proposed the idea of the drawing up of a 'freedom charter'. Those involved: ANC, 
COD, SAIC, SACPO. A panel to oversee it - Secretariat: Yusuf Cachalia; Lionel Bernstein (later replaced by 
Joe Slovo); Walter Sisulu (later replaced by Oliver Tambo); Stanley Lollan. (see Styles, 1989: 1) 
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read in to the Charter’s clauses a Marxist orientation13. 
 
Either way it would be possible to argue that the Freedom Charter was able unite people of 
various political persuasions simply because it was neither a legal document, nor did it 
really state any particular political ideology. Some of the Charter’s clauses, and perhaps 
those which had the potential to cause the greatest difference of opinion, could be 
interpreted in different ways. A further conclusion that can be drawn is that although the 
document may not have been revolutionary in its content, as such, it provided no concrete 
statement as to how issues of political pluralism would be dealt with. ‘Equal rights’ and 
self determination’ appear, rather, as vague statements that do not suggest an open commit 
to liberal democratic ideals. In fact, with regard to liberal democracy, the Freedom Charter 
was far less explicit than the Africans’ Claims had been 12 years earlier. 
 
Broadening this debate slightly, however, the ideological leanings of the ANC and the 
extent to which they veered in a liberal democratic direction perhaps also need to be 
viewed against the backdrop of the international context at that time, not least in terms of 
the growing support received by the ANC from the Soviet Union. The 1969 ANC 
document entitled Strategy and Tactics of the ANC places the internal struggle within a 
broader international context. 
 
 The ANC did emphasise, first and foremost, the importance of the national struggle (ANC, 
1969). While acknowledging that workers as a majority group amongst the oppressed had a 
significant role to play, Mandela also wrote from prison that the movement maintained that 
the most pressing and important goal remained the challenge of overcoming racial 
oppression (Mandela, 2001). What Ranuga highlights, however, is "that this phase of 
struggle [i.e. at the national level] is said to be not in conflict with the principles of 
internationalism" (1996: 57). The 1969 Strategy and Tactics document acknowledges the 
"international context of transition to the socialist system" in which the South African 
struggle is taking place. In other words, a stage that is characterised by "the breakdown of 
colonial rule as a result of national liberation and socialist revolutions" (ANC, 1969). With 
regard to this, Ranuga highlights an interesting point, that the ANC does not 'confront' the 
important issue of how it considers itself to relate to this internationalist trend. He 
consequently asks whether given "the context of the [then] current global trend towards 
socialism, the ANC is ipso facto part of that socialist trend"? (1996: 57) 
 
This very issue raises further serious concerns with regard to the possibility of the adoption 
of internationalist trends at a later stage (i.e. once the goal of national liberation has been 
achieved). A key point to remember here is the concept of the 'two-stage theory of 
revolution', propagated by the SACP, and the dangers of this theory in relation to 
maintaining a commitment to liberal democratic values of pluralism and rights. Here, and 
rightly so, several concerns have been raised as to the depth of commitment of pluralistic 
and rights-protective claims by the ANC, should they merely be representative of a 
                                                          
13   The areas which have stimulated much of this speculation are largely related to the Charter’s clauses 
concerning the economy and, in particular, ‘nationalisation of the country’s wealth which have implied a 
move toward a socialist/communist style state. Given the restricted scope of this  research, however, this will 
not be covered in any greater detail.  
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temporary stage: i.e. the attainment of a democracy which is necessary only as a 
transitional stage in order to consolidate a dominant and permanent regime. Glaser, 
analysing specifically this issue, summarises the problem succinctly, stating that "there 
exists the danger that once a first stage of national democracy, with its guarantees of 
liberties and pluralism, has been completed, a second stage will be commenced under the 
aegis of a single entrenched vanguard party, fused with the state and dominating civil 
society" (Glaser, 1991a: 108-109). Moreover, he argues that there is an inherent suggestion 
that "the kinds of democratic rights and institutions established in the first stage - 
parliamentary government, universal political rights, majority rule or whatever - are of a 
lower order than........an entirely distinctive, supposedly 'higher' form of democracy under 
the leadership of a single, entrenched  'working class' party, legitimated by rubber stamp 
parliaments and by various tightly controlled mass organisations" (Glaser, 1991b:70). 
Within such a conception lies a real danger to liberal democracy, whatever the ANC's 
claims and values may be stated to be at this stage.  
 
Taking this debate further, Glaser highlights a related point that should be born in mind 
throughout the duration of this paper. He observes that , while the ANC and SACP hold 
separate ideologies, that of anti-colonial nationalism and orthodox communism, 
respectively, neither of these "has proved very amenable to discourses of pluralism and 
liberty in other societies and contexts" (1991a: 95). Rather, they each "employ unitary and 
organic conceptions of the democratic subject, the people in the former case, the proletariat 
in the latter" (ibid). This very understanding of the democratic subject lies in antagonism 
with the notion of society's pluralism and the need for individual rights. Moreover, key 
elements of liberal democratic theory concerning the ideas of bounded uncertainty and 
contingent consent are removed under such an understanding of the democratic or, rather, 
'general' will. The danger hence lies in the fundamental assumption that "the will of the 
subject can be fully and sufficiently embodied in a single national liberation movement or 
vanguard party" (Glaser, 1991a: 95). 
 
An interesting statement from Mandela can be drawn from his comments on communism  
and the ANC during the Rivonia Trial in 1964. Talking of the ANC Youth League's initial 
demands in the 1940s to 'expel' communists from the movement, Mandela states that this 
had been disallowed on the grounds that "from its inception the ANC was formed and built 
up, not as a political party with one school of thought, but as a Parliament of the African 
people, accommodating people of various political convictions" (Mandela, 1964: 42). This 
particular statement by Mandela raises some interesting questions which should be 
continuously reflected upon in the coming chapters, not least given the currently ongoing 
debate concerning the ANC's identity as a social movement - a role that has perhaps 
complicated its adaptation to a political party within a liberal representative democracy. On 
the one hand, it reflects an acknowledgement of the broad variety of interest groups and 
ideological convictions that existed within South African society. On the other, it sets the 
scene from which a broad movement encompassing a wide range of people under the 
banner of one cause, that of liberation, can seek to become all things to all people, to 
represent ‘the people’ and ‘the nation‘, regardless of their internal diversity. 
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Chapter 4 
 
CONCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY: POLITICAL TRADITIONS OF THE  
1960s - 1980s 
 
 
The ANC in Exile 
 
When the South African government banned the ANC and a number of other opposition 
organisations under the Unlawful Organisations Act in 1960, the ANC confronted a new 
and challenging period in its life as a resistance organisation. Having sought to build itself 
up as a mass nationalist movement within the country, conditions of illegality posed a 
challenge to the continuation of its goal of national liberation. Moreover, this period of 
exile, alongside that of the domestic struggle which continued at home, largely from the 
mid 1970s onwards, perhaps reflected more than any other the multitude and, indeed, 
discord of political traditions and persuasions existent within the ANC, both in exile and 
underground. 
 
The ANC’s banning in 1960 resulted in a decade of tremendous strain and reorientation for 
the liberation movement as it sought to operate in exile conditions and in a situation in 
which it was removed from the political climate and situation on the ground in South 
Africa. As a result, it seems necessary to examine the years between 1960 and the mid to 
late 1980s inside and outside of South Africa as two separate, yet still interdependent, 
phases in the development of ANC ideology. This chapter therefore deals solely with the 
political traditions of the movement in exile, while the section to follow forms the 
counterpart to this sub-chapter, examining the location of liberal democratic discourse 
within the internal struggle of the civic movements, and the internal ANC underground, 
many of which came to carry out their work under the banner of the UDF. Certain periods 
written here therefore overlap with the events and transitions studied in the sub-chapter to 
follow. The impact and implications of the divergent ideological paths and influences that 
characterised these parallel periods are crucial in enabling us to understand the discussions 
and challenges that faced the ANC toward the end of the 1980s, and following its 
un-banning in 1990, as it embarked on a new era, not only in the sense of its transition to 
legality, but its transition from liberation movement to political party. 
 
Ellis and Sechaba state that "during its years underground, the ANC came to lose the 
character of a mass movement which it had developed in the 1950s and became more of an 
elite organisation” (1992: 36). They do equally note, however, the inevitability of this 
given that the movement was “now deprived of the possibility of working legally to 
cultivate support at the local level" (ibid). In exile, the ANC was incredibly concerned 
about the survival of the movement itself as, from 1960 onwards, it found its members and 
leadership scattered across both Africa and the globe, while “internal supporters were 
neutralised or imprisoned“ (Ellis & Sechaba, 1992: 41). Moreover, following the Rivonia 
Trials in 1963-64 a number of the ANC’s prominent and highly capable leaders such as 
Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu, were sentenced to life-imprisonment on Robben Island 
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following their trial by the Apartheid state. Thus were the circumstances in which the 
liberation movement began its early exile experience, prompting some analysts to describe 
the mid-1960s as a quiet and “depressing period” for the movement at large (ibid). 
 
A prominent, and not unsurprising, feature of the ANC’s exile politics, was the shift in its 
focus away from internal political organisation and manoeuvring as a means of 
undermining state power, toward a militarization of the political struggle. The movement 
spent a great deal of the 1960s and 1970s building a up a cadre of armed combatants 
capable of posing a military threat to the South African security forces, although the 
apartheid government’s military strength was vastly underestimated by the ANC-SACP 
alliance. However, as Barrell summarises, “whatever ANC intentions in 1961-62, it largely 
ignored mass-based political activity, concentrating its most gifted and talented organisers 
in armed activity” (1991: 70). 
 
The relationship between the ANC and SACP, examined earlier in chapter three, was also 
an alliance that developed and strengthened significantly during the ANC’s period in exile. 
Observers have cited a number of reasons for this, a core one of which is the duration of 
existing experience the Party had in operating under conditions of illegality, as well as its 
strong links to the Soviet Union. The SACP was able to offer considerable advice and 
assistance to the ANC in strengthening its structures, as well as building up a new military 
wing, in exile conditions (see Suttner, 2004). The ANC and SACP entered into a formal 
military alliance and, alongside the ANC’s campaign of ‘sabotage’, 1961 saw the launch of 
Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the ‘Spear of the Nation’. Although initially formed as an 
‘autonomous’ organisation, the membership of MK was drawn from both the ANC and 
SACP and was later embraced ‘formally’ as the ANC’s ‘armed wing’ (Ellis & Sechaba, 
1992: 32-33). Through the SACP’s connections and knowledge of military practice, people 
were able to travel to Eastern Europe, China and other African states in order to obtain 
training for MK (Ellis & Sechaba, 1992: 34).  
 
As had begun to occur prior to the ANC’s banning, there were a number of ANC members 
who held Marxist ideological leanings, a feature which became all-the-more pronounced in 
exile, and overlaps in ANC-SACP membership became ever-more prevalent. Inevitably, 
this has led to the continual re-surfacing of questions regarding the real extent of SACP 
influence on ANC doctrine and practice. Analyses of ANC-SACP interaction, the ANC’s 
organisational and leadership structures seemingly modelled on the SACP, as well as 
aspects such as the drawing up of military strategy and tactics, are well-covered and it is 
not my intention to relay details of those issues here. However, for the purposes of this 
research, the nature of this interaction between the two banned organisations, as well as the 
particular circumstances and impacts of exile experience, provide key areas for following 
the path of liberal democratic lines of thought if, at all, they existed during this period 
within the ANC, and its leadership in particular. 
 
As was mentioned in both chapter three and in the opening of this paper with regard to the 
theoretical framework for this very discussion, the SACP envisaged its alliance with the 
liberation movement along specific strategic lines, with a view to the ‘national democratic 
revolution’ being a necessary pathway, or ‘stage’, in order to move forward to the 
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formation of a socialist and, eventually, communist system. While it must be reiterated that 
the concept of the ‘two-stage theory’ was a construct of the SACP, and not of the ANC, the 
overlapping membership of the two organisations renders the issue of extreme relevance – 
particularly in terms of the ANC’s own understanding and vision of the form that a future 
democratic state would take. 
The SACP's concept of the two-stage theory was reaffirmed in the 1962 National 
Conference of the Party, held in exile. The conference also adopted a new party 
programme entitled 'The Road to South African Freedom'. This document also applied to 
South Africa what it termed 'colonialism of a special type' (Ellis & Sechaba, 1992: 37), in 
which the racial basis on which the South African state had been constructed, prevented the 
formation of a working class alliance between black and white workers. Before class 
oppression could be tackled, and the Communist vision of the dictatorship of the proletariat 
could be realised, racial oppression first had to be eliminated. This, of course, followed 
directly the command of the Moscow-led Comintern in 1928, which promoted the support 
of national liberation movements as a necessary first stage to lead to the "eventual triumph 
of socialism" (Ellis & Sechaba, 1992: 37)14. With the SACP's reinforcement of this 
objective, Ellis and Sechaba summarise that the Party reaffirmed  
"its belief that nationalism can be a progressive force only when it is 
under the Party's leadership, reiterating its long-standing strategy of 
seeking to work with a broad front of political groups for the attainment 
of a national revolution in South Africa as the necessary first stage 
leading to the eventual triumph of socialism" (Ellis & Sechaba, 1992: 37) 
(my emphasis added). 
 
The SACP's theoretical understanding of the South African context through the ideas of 
'colonialism of a special type' and the two-stage theory of revolution lay bare the political 
benefits of the alliance for the Party in both the medium and long term. The question that 
interests us is the extent to which the SACP's vision of a future 'democratic' state is at all 
replicated in any way in the programme or language of the ANC? As chapter three 
highlighted, there are divergent and frequently opposing standpoints regarding the extent 
of the SACP's leverage over the ideology of the liberation movement. For Norval, while 
the ANC remained “the mass national movement”, as far as the SACP was concerned, it 
needed "the Party to guide it" (Norval, 1990: 94). In fact, Norval, referring back to the 
Freedom Charter which remained the guiding document of the ANC and SACP in exile, 
interprets its clauses as a reference to the introduction of a 'people's democracy' which he 
likens directly to “leftist jargon for a one-party socialist state" (1990: 51). Given the 
SACP’s support for the document, he similarly understands the Freedom Charter to be 
inferring a 'communist-style freedom' and a 'totalitarian' state (1990: 52).  
 
Norval clearly sees an extremely heavy influence of the SACP, to the extent that he views 
                                                          
14 It should be noted when assessing the nature of the ANC-SACP relationship and the level of the latter's 
ideological influence, that the SACP was not merely part of a communist bloc, but was more specifically 
aligned with the most repressive form of the totalitarian communist party in Moscow. The Moscow 
leadership, it should be noted, remained fully against any notions of reform. 
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the ANC in exile as merely the '"visible public vehicle" for some form of 
behind-the-scenes circle of communism-inspired elites (Norval, 1990: 120). While 
Norval's conclusions lie at one extreme end of the spectrum of interpretations of the 
ANC-SACP relationship, it is not untrue to state that the ANC certainly fitted the bill with 
regard to the Communist policy of "forming a vanguard in potentially worker-oriented 
groups" (Prior, 1983: 187). Furthermore, Prior comments that it also coincides with the 
Party's endeavour "to collaborate with movements who were ambiguous on the issues of 
social reform or social revolution" (ibid). This point is particularly interesting, not least 
with regard to the ANC's formation of its own ideology of democratic change and vision of 
a future democratic polity. With regard to issues such as 'social reform' or 'social 
revolution', much of the ANC's language encompassed rather sweeping or vague terms, 
without any concrete plan or policy outline. In exile, inevitably, planning came to focus 
rather on armed strategy and external organisation, while its policy on future reforms as 
well as, it would seem, its projection of a future democratic state and institutions would 
seem to have remained somewhat undeveloped. 
 
During the years in exile the SACP undoubtedly played a considerable role in ANC affairs. 
The period of Oliver Tambo‘s leadership, from 1967 until 1991, coincided with a time 
when the SACP gradually came to hold significant roles in ANC policy-making (Ellis & 
Sechaba, 1992: 41). Some critics therefore suggested that Tambo was too "relaxed and 
unassertive" and because of this “allowed the ANC to be hijacked by Communists” (ibid). 
Certainly, the ANC became more linked to and familiar with international politics and 
alliances than it ever had before (Ellis & Sechaba, 1992: 42), a marked shift from the 
earlier position of the Youth League which viewed communism as a foreign ideology. The 
SACP functioned on the basis of democratic-centralism, a policy in which decisions were 
taken by a small central leadership and any debate or discussion carried out and contained 
within this clique. In exile, the SACP became increasingly 'secretive' (Ellis & Sechaba, 
1992: 38-39). Given that this was a tradition which fitted with the operational style of the 
Communist Party internationally, its amplification under exile conditions was somewhat 
foreseeable. Additionally, the severity of the setback suffered by both the ANC and SACP 
following the discovery of MK battle plans and arrests of several leaders at the Rivonia 
Trial in 1963, led to both allies having to rethink and reassess their operations15.  
 
The ANC, however, was certainly subject to rifts in exile and tendencies toward an 
authoritarian clamp-down on dissident opinion. Perhaps one of the earliest examples of this 
the fairly well-known expelling of the ‘gang of eight’, a group of dissidents within the 
ANC who had criticised the alliance and its domination by forces from the Communist 
Party, and complaining at the diminishing ‘freedom of speech’ under these conditions 
(Ellis & Sechaba, 1992: 64). Although perhaps only small feuds, they were occurring in 
exile, and the reaction of the ANC leadership to expel the group did perhaps suggest a 
tendency had emerged that would not tolerate disagreement or questioning of decisions 
taken at the centre. A similar incident, although on a far greater scale, occurred following 
the armed campaigns of the mid-1960s and originated from within MK (Ndebele & 
                                                          
15   The Rivonia Trial followed the discovery of  M-Plan documents (operation Mayibuye), the battle plan of 
MK , by the apartheid police following a raid at Lilliesleaf Farm in Rivonia, Johannesburg. Seven leaders 
were both arrested and charged   (Ellis & Sechaba, 1992: 38). 
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Nieftagodien, 2004: 586-7). Tambo received a memorandum, signed by Chris Hani, from a 
group of MK Commanders and Commissars, criticising the ANC on a number of points, 
one of which was the lack of contact with the situation on the ground in South Africa (see 
Ellis & Sechaba, 1992; Ndebele & Nieftagodien, 2004: 587). There were also demands 
from the ranks of the ANC and MK that decisions demanded greater consultation with the 
wider membership (Shubin, 1999: 87). The view of a majority of the ANC leadership was 
that such an action on the part of MK members warranted extreme punishment, looking 
upon it "as a violation of military discipline, even a betrayal" (Shubin, 1999: 87). 
 
In a similar vein, a commission of enquiry, organised following the 1966 Consultative 
Conference of the Congress in order to “look into working relationships within the 
alliance”,  reported criticisms of the leadership for being “characterised by the imposition 
of decisions, harsh disciplinary measures and unwillingness to encourage discussion”  
(Ndebele & Nieftagodien, 2004: 586). 
 
On the one hand, conditions of exile and illegality in which the movement operated 
certainly necessitated not only greater discretion in the exercise of communication and 
consultation, but also the need for maintaining a strong and cohesive organisation that 
could withstand factional rivalry, disputes and ideological differences which could 
threaten the very unity of the organisation itself, let alone its probability of success in the 
face of state security services and a militarily strong state. However, it also reflects an 
emerging tendency within the ANC to place a premium upon central decision-making over 
more democratic consultation. It also assumes, unquestionably, the right of a central group 
to make decisions for, rather than after consultation with, the wider movement. This raises 
the issue of the liberation movement coming perhaps to view itself as greater than the sum 
of its parts or as, in effect, the embodiment of the people: as a movement that stands above 
the rights and views of individuals, at least so long as it is pursuing a goal understood to be 
in the common good. Should this be the ANC’s view of its position and role, then this 
becomes of an issue considerable significance, particularly when we come to analyse the 
movement’s position with regard to liberal democratic freedoms and individual rights in 
the post-1994 democratic context. 
 
The ANC’s 1969 Conference in Morogoro, Tanzania, did deliberately envisage a 
‘consultative conference’ as it followed the aforementioned emergence of concerns within 
the organisation regarding debate and centralised decision-making (Shubin, 1999: 89). The 
adoption of the 1969 Strategy and Tactics document in Morogoro, however, caused 
substantial debate as its wording and language clearly reflected the prominent involvement 
of communists in its drawing up. The Morogoro conference engendered some 
“far-reaching organisational change” in the ANC and Congress Alliance (Ndebele & 
Nieftagodien, 2004: 596), key elements of which appear to have been the dramatic 
reduction in size of the National Executive Council (NEC) and simultaneous introduction 
of the Revolutionary Council, set up specifically to direct MK and hence focus wholly on 
the armed struggle (Prior, 1983: 189). A further, and fairly momentous, decision was that 
ANC membership in exile would be opened up to non-Africans, and the Revolutionary 
Council itself contained white, Indian and coloured members (Ndebele & Nieftagodien, 
2004: 597). This decision also undoubtedly ‘boosted’ the already overlapping membership 
  38
between the ANC and SACP (Prior, 1983: 192). Ndebele and Nieftagodien note that “apart 
from Tambo, the members [of the Revolutionary Council] were all leading lights in the 
Communist Party” (2004: 597)16. 
 
 One the one hand, as was touched upon earlier in chapter three, certain voices have argued 
that the 1969 document in no way indicated “a shift to the left” (Ranuga, 1996: 56). Other 
authors, such as Shubin (1999) and Karis and Gerhart (1997) have presented similar 
viewpoints, although differing slightly in the extent to which they perceive the Morogoro 
Conference as having transformed the organisational and ideological nature of the ANC. 
For the latter, “although documents adopted at the conference testify to the intellectual 
predominance of their communist drafters, by 1969 the relationship between leaders of the 
SACP and of the ANC had become so symbiotic that ‘triumph’ and ‘control’ do not convey 
its complex reciprocal nature and commonness of purpose” (Karis & Gerhart, 1997: 37). 
Shubin, on the other hand, despite the liberation movement’s support from Moscow, both 
morally and materially, argues that it continued to pursue a ‘nationalist struggle’ and 
remained an independent movement (1999). 
 
The focus of Strategy and Tactics was very much on military strategy and insurrection. 
Analysis of the document’s content reflects a clear revolutionary outlook but with 
unmistakeably Leninist-Marxist leanings. Others would, therefore, disagree with the 
viewpoints of those such as Ranuga (1996) and Shubin (1999). As was highlighted earlier, 
the introduction to the document places the South African struggle within the broader 
international context of a transition to socialism (ANC, 1969). There is little need to state 
here the totalitarian nature of the leading proponents of communism and socialism in the 
Eastern European bloc by whom the socialist transitions in the newly independent colonies 
of Africa were being encouraged. The Strategy and Tactics of the ANC goes on to outline a 
definition of revolutionary policy as “one which holds out the quickest and most 
fundamental transformation and transfer of power from one class to another” (ANC, 1969) 
(emphasis added). This interpretation of the struggle for change in South Africa would 
certainly not lend itself to liberal democratic conceptions of change. In fact, it seems, 
instead, to move away from the Freedom Charter’s outline of human rights including those 
of expression and association. It certainly regresses away from any future notion of an 
institutionalisation of political pluralism. The title of the document itself, Strategy and 
Tactics, somewhat implies the absence of any suggestion within it of the form that a future 
state would take.  
 
Having said this, an intriguing statement is made within the document, that positions the 
eventual success of the South African liberation struggle in a context of a move toward a 
further phase which will involve an internationalist approach: 
 
“In the last resort it is only the success of the national democratic 
revolution which - destroying the existing social and economic 
relationship - will bring with it a correction of the historical injustices 
perpetrated against the indigenous majority and thus lay the basis for a 
                                                          
16   According to Prior, Yusuf Dadoo, Jo Slovo and Reg September came to hold significant power in the 
Revolutionary Council (Prior, 1983: 192).  Joe Matthews also held the position of secretary. 
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new – and deeper – internationalist approach. Until then, the national 
sense of grievance is the most potent revolutionary force which must be 
harnessed. To blunt it in the interests of abstract concepts of 
internationalism is, in the long run, doing neither a service to revolution 
nor to internationalism” (ANC, 1969) (emphasis added). 
 
This understanding of a liberated South Africa seems to echo notions of the two-stage 
theory of revolution. The document suggests that the ANC most definitely prioritised the 
removal of a racialised state and its replacement with a democratic state serving the will of 
the majority, but suggests that this provides a gateway to then look at the struggle in 
internationalist terms, which, according to Strategy and Tactics, is a context of emerging 
socialist transitions. If we concur with Glaser’s understanding of the threat to democracy 
posed by the two-stage theory, then the future state form implied above was of tremendous 
cause for concern. The ANC’s earlier leanings toward liberal democratic notions of 
political and civil rights in the 1940s and 1950s appear to be completely lost in the Strategy 
and Tactics approach. Given the document’s militarised, emotive language, however, and 
its evoking of the need to struggle and reclaim freedom, it is difficult to decipher the 
movement’s precise plans for the future. Strategy and Tactics appears, rather, to fit the bill 
of a rallying document for armed struggle. 
 
The obvious participation of Communists in the formulation of Strategy and Tactics, for 
Ellis and Sechaba, is a sign of "the Party's intellectual role" (Ellis & Sechaba, 1992: 59). As 
they have previously highlighted in their analysis, the SACP leadership was, itself, made 
up of intellectuals rather than members of the working class (1992) - a clear reflection of 
the Communist Party belief in the masses’ need for an intellectual elite to guide them and 
make them realise their need for class revolution. With regard to its role within the alliance, 
Ellis and Sechaba explain that following "decades of operating inside larger organisations, 
the party had evolved the technique of forming a caucus with agreed positions which it 
could then push through in meetings of the ANC" (1992: 60). They argue, therefore, that 
the character of ANC did change considerably following the Morogoro conference, citing 
that the new ANC strategy was “virtually identical to that of the Party [SACP], at least in 
the medium term” (Ellis & Sechaba, 1992: 63). Moreover, the worry remained that the 
SACP’s ‘democratic centralism’ and ‘Stalinist methods’ would “proceed  to dominate all 
other tendencies in the ANC” (ibid). 
 
Some of these conclusions and allegations, however, perhaps need to be considered more 
carefully. The same authors do go on to note that "since by 1973, only one of the top four 
office holders in the ANC was a communist, it would be inaccurate to say that the party 
took over the top positions in the ANC as a result of the Morogoro conference” (Ellis & 
Sechaba, 1992: 61). However, this is followed by their conviction that “the Party's 
achievement was not to pack the ANC leadership with sympathisers or members but to 
buttress its influence by more subtle and, perhaps, more legitimate means" (ibid). With this 
in mind, then the SACP’s influence cannot be seen as illegitimate or enforced via 
dictatorial means. 
 
Reflecting back on an earlier comment made by Ellis and Sechaba regarding the ‘medium 
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term’ aims of the ANC (1992: 63), it is perhaps worth considering a slightly alternative 
understanding of each of the alliance partner’s objectives, as enunciated by Prior (1983). 
Speaking of the goals of the SACP, he argues that it “identifies totally with the ANC's aim 
of establishing a democratic state and is willing to subordinate parts of its organization to 
direct ANC control to achieve this goal. However, its long term objectives go further than a 
national-democratic state" (Prior, 1983: 190). He then goes on to cite an extract from a 
1981 edition of The African Communist: 
 
 "The strategic aim of our party is to destroy the system of capitalist 
exploitation in South Africa, and to replace it with a socialist 
system..............Such a society can only be achieved if political power is 
placed firmly in the hands of the working class.  The immediate aim of 
the party is to win the objectives of the national democratic 
revolution.....At the same time it is the duty of our party to spread its 
ideology of Marxism Leninism" (Dubula, 1981: 32, cited in Prior, 1983: 
190).  
 
According to this interpretation, then, the SACP is working with the ANC in its democratic 
objectives merely as 'the first stage' (Prior, 1983: 191) of its two-stage plan, which 
combines directly with the Party’s ‘colonialism of a special type’ thesis (ibid). The 
emphasis must therefore be placed upon the convergences in the SACP’s and ANC’s 
ideological approach and strategy in the first stage only. In other words, in their mutual 
‘medium- term’ goal of the achievement of non-racial democracy. What is outlined above 
regarding the continuation of what the SACP sees as a process, much in the way that it saw 
the role of the Freedom Charter as merely part of a process (Kunert 1991: 87), is, rather, its 
long-term aim17.  
 
This may lead us to conclude that the statements contained in the 1969 Strategy and 
Tactics which hint toward the ANC’s vision of the future role of internationalism in the 
South African revolution are perhaps very much a matter of the particular ideological 
persuasions of its authors. While ANC policy continued not to state openly any formal 
coming together of the ideologies of communism and that of its own progressive 
nationalism, the overlapping membership of the two organisations and regular consultation 
between their respective leadership, undoubtedly meant that their period in exile from 1961 
to 1990, represented a phase in which the influence of SACP doctrine upon ANC 
leadership and ranks undoubtedly shaped Africans’ perceptions of their domestic 
struggle18. 
                                                          
17   See Joe Slovo, 'The Theory of the South African Revolution - The Nature of the New State', in J.Slovo, 
South Africa: No Middle Road. Slovo envisages several phases after the National Democratic Revolution. 
While the Freedom Charter doesn't conflict with its aims as such, it is not a socialist programme but is, rather, 
understood as one of the Communist Party's envisaged 'phases'. 
18 Following the Morogoro Conference political commissars, drawn from the SACP, were placed in MK 
units to train recruits. According to Ellis and Sechaba, the programme of political education and military 
training was " a watered-down version of the Party programme, guided by the principles of the youngsters to 
its own ranks of Marxism-Leninism. At the same time as the Party helped establish the system of commissars, 
it was on the lookout to recruit the most promising of the youngsters to its own ranks" (Ellis and Sechaba, 
1992: 87).  
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What then can we conclude regarding the extent to which the ANC’s ideological path and 
standing was steered and shaped by its alliance with the SACP? It appears from the 
analysis thus far that this exile period coincided with an unmistakable reduction in the 
language of democratic rights and pluralism. Additionally, between the consultative 
conference of 1969 and the ANC’s unbanning in 1990, there were no further free 
conferences of the movement, reflecting simultaneously a lack of internal democracy. 
Writing in the early 1980s, Prior suggested that the SACP’s involvement is indeed 
'extensive' and that the SACP plays a significant role in determining ANC ideology and 
policy objectives (Prior, 1983: 183). However, comparing the Freedom Charter with the 
SACP’s own programme, 'The Road to South African Freedom', adopted in 1962, he 
argues that the former “falls short of advocating policies of radical socialism” (Prior, 1983: 
191). As he outlines, the SACP's "goals are more radical than those of the ANC, which has 
only gone so far as to advocate a limited degree of economic redistribution in a unified 
political state, which hardly moves beyond the conditions for a social-democracy" (Prior, 
1983: 194). 
 
Indeed, an interesting and perhaps more unusual argument is that put forward by Suttner -  
a former member of the SACP underground - who argues that, through its alliance with the 
ANC, “the price the Communist Party paid was to lose its independence” (personal 
interview, 2005). In fact, he suggests that the influence of the Communist party is 
considerably overstated (ibid). This is a viewpoint that requires more consideration. For 
one, operating under conditions of illegality, the SACP also suffered organisational 
difficulties and setbacks (Shubin, 1999), despite its 10 years of exile experience prior to 
that of the ANC. However, an interesting issue is that the strength of the party as a cohesive 
unit was perhaps weakened somewhat in its alliance with the ANC and the overlapping 
membership that resulted from this (Ndlovu, 2004; Shubin, 1999: 112-119). Ndlovu argues 
that there were ‘re-alignments’ also going on within the SACP. Some of its leaders were 
exile in London, while others, such as Moses Kotane and J.B. Marks “became almost 
wholly absorbed in and indistinguishable from the ANC in Dar es Salaam and Morogoro” 
(Ndlovu, 2004: 436). With this in mind, where Communists became ardent members of the 
ANC, there could have been a sense amongst some of being pulled in two different 
directions. Many such alliance members in this position appear to have placed their 
nationalist objectives over those of the party.  
 
A number of different convictions, standpoints and ideological perspectives existed and 
threw up tensions within each of the organisations, not just between them. The 
consequences of this are perhaps best reflected in an observation by Ndebele and 
Nieftagodien  who state that Ambrose Makiwane, Tennyson Makiwne19, J.B. Marks and 
Robert Reshna, even though they were communists, did not believe that the ANC should 
be opened up to non-Africans. They thought there was no reason why they should not 
continue to relate with one another and cooperate as difference organisations (2004: 581).  
 
At a joint meeting between the ANC and SACP  following the Morogoro Conference, 
                                                          
19   Tennyson Makiwane was also an SACP member and leading member of the ANC in exile (Ndebele and 
Nieftagodien, 2004) 
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Tambo himself was concerned that, within MK, an SACP “faction had held separate 
meetings on several occasions and believed that their behaviour was a threat to the ANC's 
integrity and stature" (Ndlovu, 2004: 453). Tambo's concern as ANC President differed 
from that of the communists highlighted above. For him, there must not be "separatist 
strategies" that may lead to "unnecessary friction and could easily  fuel intractable quarrels 
within the ANC” (ibid). Tambo's fear was that "the inference could easily be drawn..... that 
the SACP was in control of the ANC" (ibid). Tambo's feeling, therefore, was that, while 
continuing as allies, the ANC and SACP should remain separate organisations, 
remembering that it was the ANC who was 'vanguard' of the struggle for liberation (ibid). 
The interesting issue that the ANC NEC and SACP Central Committee reports from this 
meeting noted was that there remained an imbalance and tension between the ANC 
members  "whose primary goals  were nationalistic and those who believed that liberation 
could be attained as a result of socialist construction" (Ndlovu, 2004: 453-454)20. The 
inference here is that the ANC, as the vanguard of the liberation struggle, expected the 
SACP to subordinate their own aims to those of the nationalist struggle. 
 
It may perhaps be fair to argue, therefore, that a number of communists did put aside the 
class struggle in order to focus instead on the racial struggle and the national democratic 
revolution. Similarly, Prior argues that “the SACP is more dependent on the ANC than is 
the ANC on the SACP” (Prior, 1983: 194). Slovo's comments emphasising that the first 
stage of national democratic revolution being pursued by the ANC is fundamental in laying 
the foundations from which to begin to realise its own goal of a socialist state would seem 
to back this up.  
The political traditions of the ANC in exile undoubtedly reflect a close ‘overlap’ in the 
objectives of national democratic revolution held by both the ANC and SACP, but not 
necessarily ‘control’ by the Party (Prior, 1983: 194). Rather, given that the ANC obtained 
material support, guidance concerning organisation-building in exile, much-needed 
military strength and a broader solidarity in its struggle against a racist state, then, as Prior 
concludes  “the benefits of a coalition for the ANC are many” (ibid). He also raises the 
interesting point that “while liberalism served admirably to set limits to the exercise of 
state power, it had a limited capacity for interpreting the phenomenon of 
proletarianization". The years following 1960, therefore, “increased the potential for a 
class interpretation of South African history” (Prior, 1983: 188). Nor, as the ANC's 
Politico-Military Strategy Commission highlighted in 1979, could the movement "afford to 
shun cooperation with forces in the immediate political struggle" based upon ideological 
divergences that may lead to a split in the future (cited in Barrell, 1991: 86-87). The ANC’s 
neglect of popular organisation at home during the 1960s and 1970s is a reflection of its 
concentration on the here and now, and concern with immediate and successful military 
strategy. 
 
It would be untrue to suggest the ANC was uncritical of its organisation in exile. Indeed, 
when its came to issues of everyday functioning, organisation and leadership 
                                                          
20  The original source of this material, drawn upon by Ndlovu (2004) is 'Notes on the discussion between a 
delegation from the CC of the SACP and the NEC of the ANC', late 1969 - early 1970, ANC London Papers, 
MCH02-1, Box 1, Mayibuye Archives, University of the Western Cape. 
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responsibilities, it was self-critical, seeking to ensure the movement retained it course of 
action despite difficult circumstances (see Ndlovu, 2004: 449). However, the priority of the 
ANC leadership during this period remained the unity and cohesion of the movement, as 
'factionalism' and difference could easily weaken the entire liberation movement and the 
possibilities of the front’s success (Prior, 1983: 195) 
 
Issues of democratic debate, democratic principle and the drawing up of a concrete vision 
for a future democratic state form, let alone what the movement would actually do were it 
to suddenly find itself with the very real prospect of steering the wheels of state, became 
near to redundant in the conditions of exile. It would appear that with regard to liberal 
democratic ideology, the mapping out of policy and political principle were of 
considerably less concern. Rather, action and means were prioritised over the specificities 
of the ends. Having said this, it seems also true to say that the retention of the more liberal 
democratic persuasions that characterised the ANC up until the early 1960s, were 
considerably more absent in the language of its exile politics, and there are stark contrasts 
between the language of its 1969 Strategy and Tactics and that of both the 1943 Africans’ 
Claims and the human rights emphasis of the Freedom Charter. 
 
Shubin (1999) makes an extremely relevant comment, and one especially worth noting as 
we come to consider the transitions and shifts that took place in the ANC’s relationship 
with liberal democracy from the late 1980s up to the commencement of its period in 
government from 1994. He remarks that “even if ‘Strategy and Tactics’ was the most 
radical document in the ANC history, it adequately reflected views that prevailed in the 
ANC in exile at that stage, even if these views were later to change substantially” (Shubin, 
1999: 89-90). This point is particularly worth noting. The tightly managed and internally 
authoritarian dictates that had been seen to emerge in exile, as well as the materialisation of 
ideas within the ANC that leant toward socialist conceptions of a future state empty of 
features relating to individual rights and political pluralism, would come under 
considerable pressure and transformation as it moved back into the national and 
international context of legality and democratic transition. 
 
The ANC’s lack of contact with events at home during the 1960s and 1970s had stimulated 
feelings that the leadership and movement in exile had become exceedingly ‘introverted’ 
(Ellis & Sechaba, 1992: 66). The 1980s, however, did see a deliberate shift toward political 
organisation (as opposed to armed) in order to develop an organised political base that 
would regain the internal focus of the struggle (Barrell, 1991: 65). Barrell observes that:  
 
"the ANC-SACP had pragmatically redrawn their understanding of the 
kind of vanguard role they could play. Whereas before 1978 their mode 
of behaviour implied that they had expected their potential constituency 
merely to follow their prompting, now they sought a more symbiotic 
relationship with it, recognising that it had a significant degree of 
autonomy as well as a creativity from which they could derive 
considerable benefit" (Barrell, 1991: 90). 
 
From the late 1970s and early 1980s, the internal underground activity of the ANC’s 
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followers began to surface and gain considerable strength while the ANC was preoccupied 
with issues of exile. During the movement’s later period in exile, the political organisation 
of a growing number of civic movements and, in 1983, the formal construction of the 
United Democratic Front (UDF) kept alive the symbol of the ANC and the Freedom 
Charter within South Africa. But the political traditions that materialized inside the 
country, harnessed by the ANC underground, was of a very different type to that 
consolidating itself amongst the ANC leadership and ranks in exile. Within South Africa, 
“the tide of black politics was flowing in a different direction” (Ellis & Sechaba, 1992: 66). 
The base of political protest took the form of a new and energised popular democracy, led 
by the millions of South Africans facing the everyday brunt of state oppression and for 
whom the driving force of the struggle was the realisation of a direct and participatory 
democracy, still conflicting with liberal democratic ideas.  
 
The divergent strands and conceptions of the type of democracy that was envisaged in 
South Africa, emanating from the ANC’s exile experiences on the one hand, and the 
popular organisation of the township civics, the UDF and African trade unions on the other, 
reached their climax at the end of the 1980s and the ANC’s eventual return to South 
African in 1990. The complexity of this democratic debate was only more complicated by 
the final release from Robben Island prison of some of the ANC’s most leading figures, 
most notably Nelson Mandela, who would lead the movement to a new democratic 
dispensation.  This group, who became known as “the Robben Islanders” have themselves 
come to hold their own conceptions and understandings of democracy and a vision of the 
new democratic state. The ANC’s relationship with liberal democracy would finally 
become somewhat more concrete, and yet continue to develop and shift to new terrain as 
the democratic dispensation began to take shape.  
 
 
 
Political Traditions of the UDF and the Civic Movements 
 
The following section analyses the political traditions of the ANC-aligned civic 
movements, largely through the formation and work of the United Democratic Front 
(UDF). This discussion covers the practices and ideologies advocated by the UDF 
leadership, the nature of its ideologies, many of which were borrowed from the ANC, and 
the ways in which the front began to outline and envision a new South African polity 
through its understanding of democracy. The focus, therefore, is on the competing and 
conflicting paradigms within the liberation movement at this stage, between those of 
liberal democracy on the one hand, and popular democracy on the other. These 
simultaneous tensions and convergences were a reflection of the broad ideological 
character and make-up of the ANC, housing a multitude of interests and ideological 
convictions under a united banner of liberation. 
 
Following the banning of the ANC and a number of other opposition political organisations, 
in 1961, there was a period of relative calm in internal opposition politics. As the ANC 
began to operate in exile, contact and communication between exile leaders and those 
remaining in South Africa seeking to operate underground became increasingly difficult. 
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By the mid to late 1970s, however, a combination of social and economic factors spurred 
the development of certain political activities amongst communities and in the workplace, 
the onset of which was marked by workers strikes in 1972-3, followed by the 1976 Soweto 
students’ uprising. Lodge (1991) refers to five “strands of activity” that developed from the 
late 1970s, centring around: youth and student groups; trade unions; township civic 
organisations; Indian politics; and “the revival of the nationalist tradition linked with the 
ANC” (1991: 35). The culmination of these various activities was a marker of “the 
emergence of a new fully urbanised African working class” (ibid) carrying numerous and 
increasing grievances and demands. The characteristics of the second half of the 1970s 
were a sign of the newly-charged social unrest amongst South Africa’s oppressed 
population which was met in 1978-1979 by the implementation of the state’s Total 
Strategy. This strategy was a combination of repression and reform: repression to push 
back mounting unrest in the townships; and reform through the granting of certain 
concessions and relaxations hoped to appease certain groups. An example of such reform 
was the proposed tricameral parliament in 1983 which would include Coloured and Indian 
representatives with the continued exclusion of Africans21. 
 
By the early 1980s, conditions appeared ripe for the formation of a national body - an 
organisation that could begin to group the various elements within civil society into a 
united front that could continue an on-the-ground struggle against the state, utilising unity 
and strength in numbers. Young people from the townships, in 1979, formed both the 
Congress of South African Students (COSAS) and the Azanian Students’ Organisation 
(AZASO) for schools pupils and university students respectively (Lodge, 1991: 36). 
Student protests, militancy and activism grew significantly from that point onwards 
producing new leaders from amongst these groups of educated youth.  
 
With regard to workers, by 1979 black trade unions were legalised through the Industrial 
Relations Act, allowing the onset of increasingly organised, democratic union-based 
structures such that the economic recession of the early 1980s saw an upsurge in worker 
strikes (1991: 38). A number of black trade unions were housed within the Federation of 
South African Trade Unions (FOSATU), which concentrated only on mobilisation around 
workplace issues, leaving workers to address political issues outside of the factories. 1985, 
however, saw the formation of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), 
an organisation affiliated to the ANC and formed in order to bring together both 
work-based issues and political liberation as a part of one and the same struggle. FOSATU 
was absorbed into COSATU from its inception and, as township politics developed 
nationally in its strength and tenacity, COSATU began campaigning to address the 
political demands of Africans (Lodge, 1991: 39).  
 
The growth of township civic organisations working around local socio-economic issues 
was a further contribution to this new internal political culture. Strong activists were 
leading these local groups, which increased greatly in number from the early 1980s, and 
the trade unions, although remaining organisationally separate from the civic organisations, 
                                                          
21    The Total Strategy, devised by the apartheid government, sought to implement a ‘total’ strategy to meet 
what it perceived as the ‘total’ onslaught of protest from within townships – prompted by the unrest and 
militancy unleashed by the 1976 uprising. 
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bred a generation of “experienced leaders for local civic groups” (Lodge, 1991: 39). 
Alongside was the surfacing of a culture of protest within Indian communities which, 
driven by a strong leadership, manifested itself in campaigns for a non-racial united South 
Africa with franchise for all. In 1984, an overwhelming number of Indians boycotted the 
government’s proposed constitutional changes in the formation of the Tricameral 
Parliament.  
 
These various developments in domestic politics were joined by the resurgence of the 
‘nationalist culture’ of the ANC that Lodge describes (1991: 43-45). This revival 
manifested itself in a wealth of emerging organisations and civics proclaiming their 
adherence to non-racial democracy, to the values of the 1955 Freedom Charter and 
proclaiming their loyalty to the leadership of the banned ANC (Lodge, 1991: 43). 1983 
finally saw the formation of a united front organisation which would provide an umbrella 
for South Africa’s numerous civil society groups to work together against the apartheid 
regime and keep the work and struggle of the banned liberation movement alive. Thus was 
the birth of the UDF. 
 
The background to the culmination of domestic forces is for this reason crucial to the 
understanding the formation of the UDF.  The UDF was not, as has often been alleged 
(Barrell, 1991), a ‘creation’ of the ANC, as such , triggered by commands from exile to 
form an internal legal body as an ANC front. Mac Maharaj, a prominent Indian ANC leader 
in exile, depicts the relationship between the ANC and UDF through insisting that “the 
UDF is not a creation of the ANC” (Maharaj cited in Seekings, 2000: 47). The ANC 
leadership, rather, ‘encouraged’ the formation of the front, as opposed to actually 
‘instigating’ it (Seekings, 2000: 47). The UDF must therefore not be seen as tantamount to 
a legal ANC (ibid, 2000: 298). 
 
Having said this, what must be appreciated is that "ideologically the period [of the 
formation of the UDF] was marked by the dramatic resurgence of Charterism: the ideology 
of inclusive nationalism and non-racialism associated with the Freedom Charter and the 
ANC" (Seekings, 2000: 29) (emphasis added). Moreover, affiliates of the UDF would 
necessarily be required to recognise the leadership of the banned ANC and importance of 
the ongoing armed struggle (Lodge, 1991). While the relationship was not ‘hierarchical’ as 
alleged by the state, and, indeed, the UDF contained within it so many different interest 
groups and ideological strands, its formation and unity was essentially held together “by 
loyalties to the ANC”, (Seekings, 2000: 303-304). Just less than 20 years after the banning 
of the ANC, the movement’s political traditions remained meaningful within South Africa 
and fresh in the minds of the generations who remembered the ANC of the 1950s. Equally, 
new generations of students and young people were reading revolutionary and ANC 
literature – although far less accessible since the movement’s banning. Furthermore, this 
ANC literature of the time persistently mentioned the notion of 'unity against apartheid', 
with the movement in exile “pushing internal activists to form a 'national democratic 
front'” (Mohammed cited in Seekings, 2000: 39-40). 
 
It is for this reason that the ideology and tradition of the UDF must also be analysed as an 
extremely significant facet and, indeed, phase in ANC ideology and understanding of both 
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the democratic polity to be achieved and the values and practices held in high regard during 
the period of democratic struggle itself. The extent to which this very struggle was taking 
place at a grassroots level during the 1980s consequently renders the phase of popular 
protest of extreme relevance to this research. While this is in no way to suggest that ANC 
and UDF ideology must be directly conflated, it does emphasise that the ideological trends 
and visions taking place on the ground in South Africa, were very much linked to and 
inspired by the ideology and practice advocated and inspired by the movement in exile. 
 
 A key point that should perhaps be emphasised at this point is that "while……the UDF 
undoubtedly borrowed from the traditions, symbols, iconography and ideology of the 
ANC”, it was the way in which this was done, the way in which people’s grievances, 
beliefs and objectives were articulated, that carried a far “greater force and resonance” than 
during the 1950s and 1960s (Lodge, 1991: 29-30). This is partly explained by an 
observation made by Lodge, who suggests that, by the 1980s, the constituencies who 
“fuelled the anger” and who formed a part of the new front had now altered significantly 
from the 1950s (Lodge, 1991: 30), a point that is identifiable in the emergence of the trade 
unions’ shop-floor leadership and formal expressions of grievances. The UDF was based 
upon a now “settled black urban population, comprising both the urban industrial working 
classes and the aspirant black middle classes” (Seekings, 2000: 303). 
 
The UDF’s objectives involved the overthrow of Black Local Authorites (BLAs), 
'expulsion' or even 'assassination' of collaborators with government; street-based networks 
of neighbourhood organisations; and the creation of institutions of "people's power" - 
"directed at replacing state agencies in education, justice, and municipal administration" 
(Lodge, 1991: 35). 
 
In the same way that the ANC was itself a broad church, housing a number of interest 
groups in pursuit of one common goal – the only clearly stated and concrete element of 
which was the belief in a non-racial democracy – the membership of the UDF also 
continued to reflect this ideological diversity. Alongside its support for the ANC as a 
political and liberation movement, the UDF espoused elements of a progressive 
nationalism, and what Lodge describes as “messianic socialism, and millennial 
expectations of revolutionary change" (Lodge, 1991:35). Leading advocate, and later 
leader, of the UDF, Popo Molefe, describes a national front as a method of successfully 
‘accommodating political differences’  - a point which is indicative of the way in which the 
ANC’s own ranks continued to be inhabited by an array of political persuasions, each 
trying to come together to seek the overthrow of the apartheid regime: 
 
 “- there were a number of organisations which shared the common goal 
of ridding South Africa of apartheid. Although they differed in political 
outlook, they nevertheless shared their common goal. The bringing 
together of these organisations under the umbrella of a front with a 
common goal offered a way of overcoming obstacles to unity” (Molefe 
cited in Seekings, 2000: 45). 
 
ANC political thinking during the 1970s and 1980s had a particularly revolutionary feel 
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and the activities and appeals of the UDF were certainly more radical than the earlier work 
of the ANC had been in the 1940s and 1950s. ANC literature and communication with its 
members emphasised the need for a vanguardist and revolutionary mindset. In the January 
8th statement of the ANC in 1984, President Oliver Tambo outlined what were seen as the 
‘Four Pillars of the Revolution”:  
 
“- first, the all-round vanguard activity of the underground structures of 
the ANC; second, the united mass action of the peoples; third, our armed 
offensive, spearheaded by Umkhonto We Sizwe; and fourth, the 
international drive to isolate the apartheid regime and win world-wide 
moral, political and material support for the struggle” (ANC, 1984). 
 
In these terms, the ANC appeared to conceive of itself as a vanguard of the people – an 
assumption which perhaps failed to see the diversity within ‘the masses’, nor alternative 
organs of representation outside of this ‘vanguard’ movement.  On the one hand, it must be 
emphasised that the ANC and UDF goal was one of mass action, cooperation and mutual 
support toward the achievement of one specific goal - that of the removal of the Apartheid 
system. In this goal unity was of course crucial. There is no gainsaying that a broad-based, 
united movement under a common banner of liberation would necessarily provide far 
greater strength, cohesiveness and possibilities of success than that of a disparate and 
factional approach. It should also be reiterated that the role of the UDF, specifically, was 
one of ‘organisation-building’ and strengthening resistance (Seekings, 2000: 314) and was 
not, as Seekings notes, interpreted by its leadership in ‘vanguardist’ terms (2000: 314).  
 
 The problem arises, however, where such an all-consuming and potentially ‘vanguardist’ 
approach suggested by the ANC is visualised after the attainment of the immediate goal of 
liberation. ANC documents, not least the 1984 statement mentioned above, continually 
emphasised a future South African government “whose authority derives from the will of 
all our people, both black and white” (ANC, 1984). The ANC vision was of a non-racial 
future, but the question remains as to what extent this future is of a pluralistic and 
liberty-protective form? The ‘will of all’ our people -  a notion which was certainly 
accentuated in the mass action and notions of collective struggle imparted by the UDF – 
becomes dangerous when the idea of civil society or ‘the people’, in a democratic 
framework, come to be conceived of in a unitary sense. In other words, as a collective body 
devoid of diversity and internal difference. 
 
The new generations of activists in the 1980s were seeking ideological guidance and an 
“ideological framework” for a resolution to their struggles (Seekings, 2000: 32), much of 
which they found in the literature of the ANC and through listening to Radio Freedom 
(Suttner, 2005, personal interview), but also in literature on revolutions elsewhere in the 
world, such as in Nicaragua, and through reading the works of Lenin to ‘find answers’ 
(Seekings, 2000: 32). The influence of this literature for both strategy and democratic 
vision within South Africa should not be underestimated. The understanding of the ANC’s 
role, by both its leadership and its support base, is critical in appreciating the movement’s 
relationship at this point with liberal democracy. While the ANC continued to speak of 
non-racial democracy, its discourse of rights appeared to slide during the period of the 
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1980s. Its objectives and values came to be phrased in far more hegemonic terms, terms 
which appear to assume the historic significance of the ANC and to imply the 
non-negotiable authority of the movement: “We have a purpose, a goal, an objective, a 
historic mission to accomplish for our country and for humanity. Our historic duty is to 
pursue it with relentless determination and persistence” (ANC, 1984) (emphasis added). 
Terms of individual choice; of rights; and of a plurality of choice over outcome appear to 
be absent. 
 
The language of ‘collective will’ as a feature of liberation discourse is certainly worth 
discussing further. A key feature of UDF activity, and one mentioned by Lodge above, was 
that of the township civic organisations. 1985-1986 saw the emergence of what was called 
‘people’s power’. People’s power involved the destruction of BLAs and government 
authorities, such as policing, in the townships and their replacement with a localised form 
of self-government. People formed networks of street and area committees, performing 
functions from service delivery to popular justice (Glaser, 1998: 36). What emerged, 
therefore, were forms of democratic self-organisation, or direct democracy, encouraged by 
the ANC as a part of the overthrow of apartheid structures. 
 
A similar trend ensued within the trade unions in South Africa following their legalisation 
in 1979. The tradition of councillism was, in effect, workplace self-government. The 
council model emerged first in the form of the workers councils in the Soviet Union in 
1917. Portrayed as the antipathy of perceived 'bourgeois' and pro-capitalist institutions of 
democracy, such as parties, parliaments and trade unions, the council was viewed as a 
participatory and revolutionary model, far more representative than its liberal alternative 
"because it is a creation of the masses themselves" (Glaser, 1994: 145-146). A form of 
'councillist unionism' was what emerged in FOSATU (Glaser, 1998: 36) and later 
combined with the populist orientation of COSATU who sought to combine both 
workplace issues with the broader democratic struggle. The trade unions of FOSATU 
introduced worker-controlled shop-floor organisation, moving away from a managerial 
approach to worker-controlled debate over issues. 
 
It was in the mid-1980s that this councillist tradition penetrated the townships in the form 
of people's power22. While the populist ideas and approach of the UDF, "with its emphasis 
upon leaders, symbols, high-profile media campaigns" (Glaser, 1991a: 110) were poised in 
direct contrast to the workerism of the unions, through the formation of people's power, 
Glaser notes that the ideas of councillism as a form of democratic self-organisation and 
self-government came to enter Congress discourse in the mid-1980s (1998: 36). In addition, 
from 1985, COSATU itself, combing the ideas of Charterism and workerism, began to 
adopt the council model and combined it with the politics of the political struggle. It is also 
highly relevant to note the emphasis on the role of workers being emphasised by the ANC 
during this phase. Critical to remember is that there existed considerable overlaps in 
                                                          
22   Glaser (1998: 36) hence defines the model of people's power and the institutional form that this took in the 
street and area committees as a form of 'quasi-councillism', as it was not strictly a form of representation for 
workers and producers as the council model had originated, but retained the same basis of representation in 
terms of functioning as a collectively-owned  form of representation and to fulfil a particular 'project' or 
collective purpose. 
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membership between the ANC and SACP, especially given the increase in cooperative 
work between the two organisations following the ANC's own banning 11 years after the 
SACP had been forced underground23. In 1984, the ANC made a call to workers in South 
Africa proclaiming that "the working class must lead" (ANC, 1984). Oliver Tambo's' 
January address marking the onset of two years of insurrection and the beginning of the 
ANC-initiated programme of 'ungovernability', stated: 
 
"it is the historic responsibility of the working class to take the lead in our 
struggle for people's power. In our situation, the victory of the trade 
union struggle is unattainable except as an integral part of the victory of 
the political, ideological and military struggle. The struggle of the 
working class is, therefore, and must be, an integral part of the national 
liberation struggle". 
 
The ANC's adoption of a more class-oriented outlook, alongside its traditional non-racial 
approach and primary objective of the removal of race discrimination had, by this point, 
become far more pronounced. In terms of the debate here regarding the relationship 
between these ideas and the principles of liberal democracy, then the significance of the 
councillist and quasi-councillist organs is contained in the extent to which they represent 
not only a type of democratic tradition marking this phase of the liberation movement's 
thinking, but also a conception of a future democratic institution. As Glaser highlights, 
"these organs were mainly conceived as instruments of insurrection presiding over 
liberated zones, egged on by an exiled ANC determined to up the ante of its struggle 
against the apartheid regime; but they were also imagined by some as prefiguring future 
forms of participatory government" (Glaser, 1998: 36). With regard to their being 
understood as such future institutionalised forms of  government, then Glaser goes on to 
raise a number of pertinent concerns, particularly regarding issues of genuinely democratic 
representation and political pluralism. 
 
Despite ideas of locally-owned institutions and participatory forms of rule, a fundamental 
deficiency with regard to liberal democratic concepts of pluralism, diversity, tolerance, 
openness and debate, is that "representatives [of the people’s power organs] tended to treat 
their constituency as a politically homogeneous 'people' or 'community' with a general will 
capable of manifestation in local assemblies or committee meetings" (Glaser, 1998: 38). 
As was an inherent flaw in the original Soviet model, the underlying logic of the council is 
that the debate is not what ideological path is to be taken, or, to put it another way, the 
councils did not function as a method of ascertaining the popular will, but rather as a 
method of planning its realisation. In the case of the Soviets, the pre-decided or 
pre-destined ‘will’ was the construction of the communist society (see Glaser, 1994: 148). 
There certainly seem to be a lack of acceptance of pluralism within the UDF organisations, 
a point that is reinforced by Suttner who comments that "people.......were very intolerant of 
criticisms of the Freedom Charter" (2005, personal interview).  
 
The problem inherent in the concept of people's power, as Glaser sees it, is therefore that 
                                                          
23   Examples of SACP members who were also prominent ANC figures from the 1980s and early 1990s are 
Raymond Suttner, Jeremy Cronin, Billy Nair, Charles Nqakula  (See Seekings 2000: 312-313). 
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the activists leading these local organs were 'ANC-aligned', such that "the organs of 
self-government doubled up as, in effect, local ANC (or more strictly, UDF) branches, with 
political rivals to the ANC subject to exclusion and occasionally violence" (Glaser, 1998: 
38).  If we place this against the liberal democratic idea of freedom of expression and 
assembly; the right to political choice and pluralism; and, indeed, to Schedler's theory 
(2001) of "substantive uncertainty" discussed in the opening of this paper (cited in Habib 
and Schultz-Herzenberg, 2005: 167), then the people's power model advocated by the UDF 
and ANC presents significant problems for the upholding of the aforementioned values and 
practices.   
 
A further problem drawn upon by Glaser, of both the councillism of FOSATU and the 
townships’ self-government, inevitably concerns how these "localized self-governing 
methods" could be applied on a 'larger spacial scale' (1998: 39), should it come to their 
application on a higher, perhaps national, level. The point here is certainly not to suggest 
that people's power gave residents less say or participation than before in the running of 
their residential areas - far from it. The problem lies, however, in the very conception of 
these institutions as forms of genuinely direct and participatory democracy (Glaser, 1991a: 
110). In liberal democratic terms, the democratic discourse of the ANC during the 1980s 
exhibited some key deficiencies with regard to an understanding of a pluralistic and 
rights-based dispensation, as understood in liberal democratic terms. 
 
This very issue of participatory democracy brings us to a pertinent debate within the 
liberation movement's discourse between competing notions of liberal versus popular 
democracy - discourses of which can both be found in the language of the ANC.  Popular 
democracy is seen as a participatory, self-empowering and people-controlled form of 
democracy. The people's power movements of the mid 1980s were hence understood as 
institutions of  popular democracy as the provided, as far as Congress-aligned activists 
were concerned,  "institutions of direct democracy" and "organs of a vigorous local 
democracy" with high degrees of participation (Glaser, 1991a: 110-111). Ideas of 
collective action and unitary notions of 'the people' and people's power within ANC 
discourse are a reflection of these very notions of popular democracy. A clear example is 
the ‘popular justice’ aspect of the street and area committees who administered justice and 
punishment through locally-conceived and controlled understandings of rights and justice. 
With regard to the liberal democratic language of individual rights and pluralism, the 
problem immediately arises that these supposedly 'popular' conceptions of justice are 
empty of any truly democratic and impartial understanding. Partly related to this is that the 
particular form of popular democracy advocated by the UDF could only be owned and 
driven by those aligned specifically to the ANC, rendering any notion of rights or justice as 
determined upon political allegiance - a notion entirely at odds with liberal democratic 
understandings of these concepts.  
 
Reflecting on the previous chapter, the contradictory interpretations and implications 
contained within the Freedom Charter were discussed. These highlighted the competing 
discourses of the liberal and rights-protective language of the document identifiable in the 
guarantee upon human rights and, in particular, "the right to speak, to organize, to meet 
together, to publish, to preach, to worship and to educate their children" (Freedom Charter, 
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1995); and interpretations of "democracy as popular collective self-empowerment" 
(Cronin, 2005). The latter can be found in clauses such as 'the people shall govern', stating 
that "all bodies of minority rule, advisory boards, councils and authorities shall be replaced 
by democratic organs of self-government" (Freedom Charter, 1955). Up until the later 
1980s, the language of popular democracy was perhaps of a far stronger force within ANC 
discourse than that of a more liberal democratic nature. Given the height of insurrectionary 
activity during this period, the consummate need for popular mobilisation on the ground, 
and efforts at continued direction and communication from exile, this is perhaps not 
surprising. The January statement of the ANC in 1984 stated explicitly that   
 
All revolutions are about state power. Ours is no exception. The slogan, 
"Power to the People," means one thing and one thing only. It means 
we seek to destroy the power of apartheid tyranny and replace it with 
popular power with a government whose authority derives from the 
will of all our people, both black and white. The issue we have to settle 
together is what steps to take to attain that ultimate goal, what 
intermediate objectives we should set ourselves building on what we 
have achieved, and in preparation for the next stage in our forward march 
to victory" (ANC, 1984) (my emphasis added). 
 
Having said this, Seekings, in fact, emphasises the salience of a culture of rights within the 
UDF, stating that "the UDF played an important role in promoting the salience of rights, 
and of political and economic alternatives based on rights, within popular conceptions of 
democracy" (Seekings, 2000: 322). The struggle against apartheid was fundamentally 
based upon just that - civil and political rights. The UDF can, therefore, undoubtedly take a 
vast amount of credit for keeping this very struggle alive. The point to be made here with 
regard to discourses of rights and pluralism is not to downgrade or detract from the value of 
participatory forms of democracy in any way. Rather, it is to suggest that the popular 
democratic ideas become problematic when divorced from the principles of rights 
protection and individual liberty and choice which underpin liberal democratic discourse. 
In 1985-1986 with the township insurrection, these discourses of rights were somewhat 
"subordinated to discourses of power" (Seekings, 2000: 322).  
 
By the late 1980s, discussions were emerging amongst the UDF leadership as to the 
organisation's role once the ANC was un-banned and a democratic dispensation became a 
more likely prospect. It was perhaps during this period that, as Seekings highlights, issues 
of rights once again came to the fore (2000: 322). The discussions that took place amongst 
the UDF leadership at this time are a reflection of the various democratic and ideological 
strands present within the Congress movement by the close of this decade. 
 
Within the UDF, there was most certainly a concern to see the protection of rights in some 
way. Leaders were particularly occupied by discussions as to how they would begin to 
make civics and communities engage with the new democratic government after such a 
long period of anti-government protest and defiance. How would this relationship be 
managed and changed? (See Seekings, 2000: 272). UDF leader, Popo Molefe, highlighted 
that "the challenge that faces us is how to normalise the situation without impinging upon 
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the right of the communities to engage the regime through mass action" (1991, cited in 
Seekings, 2000: 272) - a statement that reflects the concern of the UDF leadership to 
protect citizens' rights of speech, expression, organisations and association. A crucial 
question that should be asked however, is whether this is, in fact, a reference to civil 
autonomy only within the ANC camp?   
 
The UDF did also acknowledge, however, the value of a separation between state and civil 
society, recognising that its historic role as loyal to the ANC would render issues of 
impartiality difficult. UDF leader, Mofolo, commented with regard to the organisation's 
NGC that "our members feel strongly that we must not fall into the trap of Eastern Europe, 
where everyone was consumed in the party. While building the ANC as the main force, we 
must also ensure that the organisations of civil society will be central towards the search 
for a true democracy" (1991, cited in Seekings, 2000: 276).  
 
The other implication of his words however, is that which we have discussed regarding the 
organisations of civil society being incorporated and utilised as new structures of direct 
democracy. Seekings cites that "the UDF declared that it was opposed to the existing 
parliamentary institutions not only because most of the population was excluded, but also 
because parliamentary-type representation in itself represents a very limited and narrow 
idea of democracy" (Seekings, 2000: 296). Lodge, citing a UDF article written in 1986 
writes that, "for its interpreters, 'national democracy' was not liberal democracy" (Lodge, 
1991: 131): 
 
 "Democracy means, in the first instance, the ability of the broad working 
classes to participate in and to control all dimensions of their lives. This, 
for us, is the essence of democracy, not some liberal, pluralistic debating 
society notion of a "thousand schools contending" (New Era, 1986 cited 
in Lodge, 1991:131) 
 
The UDF's conception of a future democracy was hence one of 'direct' democracy and 
'mass participation', openly disparaging of ideas of representation by elites (UDF, 
'Towards a People's Democracy' cited in Seekings, 2000: 296).This is perhaps a reflection  
of the persistence of trends within the liberation movement that continue to view liberal 
democratic practices as 'bourgeois' and elitist - issues that would become only more 
controversial as the political party negotiations for a new democratic dispensation began to 
take place from 199024. 
 
It is perhaps fair to say that while the ANC continued to advocate democratic ideals of 
freedom, justice and non-discrimination at ease with the commitments of the Freedom 
Charter, the movement still contained within it notions of both popular and liberal 
democracy, alongside its traditional strands of non-racial African nationalism. During the 
1980s, however, there appeared to be no resolution to these internal debates and certainly 
not, as yet, any vision of how the two may be reconciled to form both a participatory and 
right's protective dispensation. Key liberal democratic elements missing from within the 
                                                          
24   Cronin, interestingly, also defines popular democracy as "a matter of collective engagement and popular 
participation, and not something for elected representatives or state functionaries alone" (Cronin, 2005). 
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liberation movement's discourse throughout this period were a vision or commitment 
specifying the democratic institutions and democratic guarantees that the movement's 
'national democracy' would encompass. 
 
The debates that emerged by the end of the 1980s, therefore, reflected the competing 
strands and ideologies of this era - debates which perhaps didn't truly come to the fore, let 
alone become resolved, until the prospect of an ANC-led government suddenly appeared 
imminent. The following years from 1987 to 1994 became defining moments in the 
direction that South African democracy would take and saw the consolidation of more 
concretely liberal democratic understandings for the new system. Particularly appropriate 
and pertinent to this discussion is a question posed by Seekings, who asks how "the 
character of a major political organisation or movement prior to democratisation affects 
political life in the subsequent democratic era?" (2000: 317). This underpins the very 
rationale behind analysing the period of the UDF in order to understand the broader picture 
of the ANC's ideological journey in relation to liberal democratic ideas. This is all the more 
so given that the ANC absorbed much of the UDF's leadership after 1990. The question of 
the ideological impact of the democratic struggle during the 1980s, both on the ground and 
in exile, remains a fundamental and decisive issue for the remaining chapters. 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
 
1985-1994: NEGOTIATION AND TRANSITION - THE BIRTH OF A LIBERAL 
DEMOCRATIC PARTY? 
 
 
From the mid to late 1980s a number of dramatic shifts took place within both the 
liberation camp and on a national and international level.  Moreover, the prospect of the 
displacement of apartheid with a new democratic dispensation became an increasingly real 
prospect. The first five years were a combination of hope, change and continued struggle 
on the part of the liberation movement. The era also saw the issuing of numerous 
statements, both publicly and between parties, over the prospects of a negotiated resolution 
to the conflict and a move away from the more radical and revolutionary language of 
‘conquering state power’. 
 
Reflecting back for a moment on the mapping of ANC thinking with regard to liberal 
democratic values, processes of change have taken place within the movement over a 
number of decades, both as a freely operating nationalist organisation within South Africa 
and during its years as an exiled movement from 1960. The early years of the ANC 
between 1912 and the early 1940s saw little in the way of radical shifts in ideological 
thinking, largely retaining a liberal, yet conservative, outlook. The formation of the ANC 
Youth League in 1944 brought with it a more radical nationalist language and approach, 
yet is also retained much of the liberal thinking and traditions of its predecessors as well as 
adopting a romantic nationalism that also carried with it certain aspects of conservatism 
(see Gerhart, 1978). The ANC’s hostility to the Communist Party - originating largely from 
  55
its interpretation of communism as a ‘foreign ideology’, the class focus of which masked 
the racial oppression characterising the South African situation - had, by the mid`1960s, 
turned into a formal political and military alliance based upon solidarity and unity of action 
in the struggle against a repressive and racially exclusive state system. 
  
The period in question in this chapter, however, saw a number of significant shifts with 
regard to liberal democratic ideas taking place within the liberation camp. These shifts and 
the direction in which they led the ANC were stimulated by various factors, with the result 
that, oftentimes, it has been difficult to distinguish the main causes and factors at play. 
Moreover, many of these triggering events have emerged outside the control of the 
liberation movement itself.  
 
In terms of the ideological approach and outlook of both the ANC and the Pretoria regime, 
a vast amount of quite momentous change occurred in South Africa in what was barely a 10 
year period. Nonetheless, looking at the years from 1985 to 1994, it is possible to view the 
evolution of the ANC’s seemingly growing commitment to liberal democratic values and 
practice as a somewhat gradual process. Changes in the movement’s ideas and 
understanding of democracy certainly did not occur overnight. Rather, it was a process 
which can be mapped and traced through the course of both the liberation movement’s 
interactions with other parties and in the publication and production of various documents, 
public statements and addresses.  
 
One of the most important and, one could add, most groundbreaking documents of this 
period was the production of the ANC’s Draft Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic 
South Africa in 1988. The Constitutional Guidelines were the first open and official public 
statement by the ANC expressing a commitment to particularly liberal democratic 
thinking with regard to the future state envisaged for South Africa. As the previous 
chapters have shown, the years prior to this (and in particular those from the late 1940s 
onwards with the advent of the system of apartheid) exhibited little in the way of any 
concrete formulations or commitment to a future democratic state form. Rather, it appears 
unclear as to whether the ANC envisaged any other political grouping, other than itself,  as 
being able to ’legitimately’ represent the South African people in a post-apartheid state. 
The Constitutional Guidelines were later followed up with an ANC discussion document, 
Constitutional Principles and Structures for a Democratic South Africa, in 1991. Having 
said this, there are in fact a number of documents and statements either belonging to the 
ANC or in which the ANC was a co-author or signatory, in which the commitment to 
liberal democratic values of political pluralism and rights are expressed. Looking at some 
of these key documents in turn, it is possible to see a gradual commitment to ideas of 
fundamental rights and freedoms in a democratic polity. 
 
Glaser has described that, during the second half of the 1980s, there was “a gradual 
liberalisation of the political language and programme of the ANC and SACP” (1997: 8). 
Contrasting the emergence of this with the language of the ANC exhibited in documents 
such as its 1969 Strategy and Tactics, provide particular points of contrast. Reflecting back 
on the section above concerning the UDF and civic movements, the January 8th Statement 
of the ANC in 1984 was referred to. This annual address of the ANC cited the ongoing 
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struggle for “power to the people”, emphatically reiterating the objective to “destroy the 
power of apartheid tyranny and replace it with popular power with a government whose 
authority derives from the will of all our people” (ANC, 1984). This, the 1984 document 
states, is the liberation movement‘s “ultimate goal” (ibid). 
 
 By the time of the ANC’s January 8th address in 1986, while the ANC continued to uphold 
its commitment to the ‘dislodging’ of apartheid and the “transfer of power to the people” – 
the problematic connotations of which have already been discussed - this time the address 
indicated formally that the ANC would entertain the idea of negotiations with the Pretoria 
regime, on the basis of certain conditions (ANC, 1986). Following the ANC’s National 
Consultative Conference in Kabwe in 1985, speculation had begun over supposed ‘secret 
talks’ that were rumoured to have taken place between the ANC and the Botha regime. 
While the 1986 statement of the ANC fundamentally denied this claim, it did state that at 
this stage there was no change in the ‘tactical’ approach being taken by the ANC, 
emphasising that “there can be no negotiated settlement of the South African question 
while the Botha regime continues to imprison our leaders and refuses to acknowledge that 
South Africa must become an undivided, democratic and non-racial country” (ANC, 
1986). 
 
The January 8th statements of both 1986 and 1987, according to Sachs, reflected the two 
"critical decisions" of the 1980s, taken by the ANC National Executive (Sachs, 2005, 
personal interview). These were the acceptance of South Africa "as a multi-party 
democracy"; followed by the acceptance of an 'entrenched' bill of rights (ibid). The ANC’s 
opening statement on January 8th 1987 - an address by President Oliver Tambo which 
marked the 75th anniversary of the ANC - displayed a clear and open declaration of the 
acceptance of guaranteed ‘individual and equal rights’ (ANC, 1987a), among which were 
stated key political and civil rights underpinning liberal democratic commitments:  
 
The revolution will guarantee the individual and equal rights of all South 
Africans without regard to any of these categories, and include such 
freedoms as those of speech, assembly, association, language, religion, 
the press, the inviolability of family life and freedom from arbitrary 
arrest and detention without trial. For all this, the victorious revolution 
demands and must ensure thorough-going democratic practice (ANC, 
1987a). 
 
Likewise, the document goes on to state that “For its [the revolution’s] own success, it 
imposes the obligation that all should be free to form and join any party of their choice, 
without let or hindrance” (ANC, 1987a) (emphasis added). It also states that "each person 
shall have the right both to vote and to be voted to any elective organ" (ANC, 1987a). 
There is no doubt that the guarantees laid out within the document indicate that a 
democratic form of state is visualised by the ANC leadership. Moreover, while it is not 
described as such here, it appears also to be structured along liberal democratic lines.  
 
In the same year (1987), the ANC issued another statement entitled Statement on 
Negotiations, setting out the movement’s position with regard to negotiations and the 
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conditions upon which it would agree to them. This document, produced in October, 
similarly placed emphasis upon individual rights while also accepting their status as 
constitutionally guaranteed rights: 
 
 To end apartheid means, among other things, to define and treat all our 
people as equal citizens of our country, without regard to race, colour or 
ethnicity. To guarantee this, the ANC accepts that a new constitution for 
South Africa could include an entrenched Bill of Rights to safeguard the 
rights of the individual. (ANC, 1987b). 
 
As this study has shown so far, the idea of ‘rights’ has, from the beginning, been a 
fundamental part of the ANC’s programme. The degree to which the movement’s language 
of rights has been couched in terms that marry-up to the realisation of a liberty-protective, 
pluralistic and tolerant democratic system, however, is our key concern. This portrayal of 
the future democratic state also brings to the fore the combination of political traditions 
contained within the ANC - traditions which are not necessarily complimentary to one 
another. 
 
 While the ANC appears to have placed emphasis upon notions of individual rights within a 
constitutional framework, it simultaneously continues to refer to a "people's government"; 
power by the "masses of the people"' (1987a); and "the transfer of power to the people" 
(1987b). Between the language of individual liberties and political pluralism on the one 
hand, and what appears as a collective notion of 'the people' on the other, it is difficult to 
decipher the ANC's precise position with regard to a genuine belief in the values of liberal 
democratic ideas at this stage. Are these inclusions of individual rights and freedoms, 
slotted into these statements amidst a barrage of statements insinuating the homogeneity of 
"the people's" opinion - both in the context of the struggle and in a future democratic state -  
to be read as genuine commitments? Or are they an attempt to appease critics, in national 
and international circles, who were increasingly voicing their concerns over the influences 
upon the ANC of its continued alliance with the Communist Party? 
 
The ANC's exact understanding of 'individualism' or the 'individual' basis of rights, is also 
somewhat unclear, and from the content of the aforementioned documents there is by no 
means any guarantee that this understanding complied with the liberal democratic 
interpretation. Were the rights to freedom of expression, association, assembly, etc, 
expressed above, to be played out within a pluralistic and open democratic system in which 
the debate and exchange of ideas and views are to be encouraged? Or were they, rather, 
seen as being guaranteed only to the extent that they concurred with the dominant thoughts 
within the ANC? An especially interesting point which, in some way, brings to our 
attention the need for to be aware of these possibilities is the ANC's description of itself as 
"the democratic parliament of the South African people", a status which it believed had 
been conferred upon it by the 'the people' through their 'expression' of "allegiance to the 
premier instrument of liberation they have created" (ANC, 1987a). This understanding of 
the liberation movement itself is highly problematic for liberal democratic understandings 
of representation and reinforces the notion that the ANC is capable of representing and 
giving voice to 'the people' or 'nation' as a whole within the bounds of its own organisation. 
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Thinking back to chapter one of this report, a highly relevant point by Steven Friedman 
was noted that within the Congress tradition is a “concern to recruit all political 
persuasions”, a task which “becomes an attempt to compress the full range of popular 
opinion into one hegemonic movement” (Friedman, 1991: 11). The fact that the ANC at 
least referred to itself as a "parliament of the people", as opposed to the Communist Party's 
conception of the "dictatorship of the proletariat", is of little consolation given that the 
fundamental problem underlying this conception remains: That is, that the assumption that 
the multiplicity of interests and opinions existing within society can be represented by the 
ANC alone is to deny the very existence of pluralism and, therefore, of the value of liberal 
democracy itself. Several contradictions in the ANC's language and commitments 
therefore continued to dog the apparent liberal democratic breakthroughs in its publicly 
stated objectives and ideological standpoints.     
 
Drawing upon the example of the ANC's desire to maintain the unity of all the various 
elements of the liberation camp, the 1987 January address stated that "no elements from 
among ourselves should seek to impose their views on others. We should rely on political 
work to organise and mobilise the masses of the people into united action" (ANC, 1987a). 
Having emphasised the importance of free choice, the very same document houses the 
following statement: 
 
"-the mass democratic movement needs to maintain and enhance its own 
unity around a democratically agreed programme of action with clearly 
set tactical and strategic objectives.......We should therefore take all 
necessary measures to entrench, within the ranks of the mass democratic 
movement, the depth of unity which our movement has worked for, for 
three-quarters of a century. We must combat all manifestations of 
factionalism, revolutionary arrogance and individualism" (ANC, 1987a). 
 
On the one hand, as the earlier chapter concerning the exile traditions of the ANC, the 
challenges and vulnerability of the movement in exile led to the extreme concern of its 
leaders to ensure that division and internal factionalism would not infect the movement and 
risk derailing the revolutionary process. However, such continuing emphasis upon 
conformity in a move toward a process of supposed political liberalisation is undoubtedly 
problematic.  
 
 
The 1988 Draft Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa 
 
A worthwhile progression from here is to analyse more closely both the formulation and 
broader context of the ANC's 1988 Draft Constitutional Guidelines mentioned above. The 
Draft Constitutional Guidelines were a product of a lengthy period of research by the 
ANC's Legal and Constitutional Department who formed a Constitutional Committee 
charged by Oliver Tambo with producing a set of draft guidelines that would be applicable 
to a democratic South Africa, as understood by the ANC. The ANC's Constitutional 
Committee, according to Styles (1989), was comprised of Jack Simons as Chairman (and 
also a senior SACP member); Z.N. Jobodwana as Committee Secretary; Zola Skweyiya 
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(Head of ANC's Legal Affairs Department) and ANC lawyer Albie Sachs (see Styles, 
1989: 67). Others involved on the Constitutional Committee were Penuel Maduna, Ted 
Baker and Brigitte Mabandla (Jobodwana, 2006, personal interview). 
 
The announcement of the guidelines was of course welcomed by liberals who were 
becoming increasingly weary of the liberation movement’s ongoing cooperative 
relationship with the SACP, and were hence concerned to see the ANC voicing more solid 
commitment to ideas of pluralism and individual rights. Indeed, while in 1987 the ANC 
had expressed that both multi-party democracy and a bill of rights would hold an important 
place in South Africa, its Statement on Negotiations issued that very same year, reaffirmed 
their continued alliance with the SACP25. For many, the guidelines were therefore a 
welcome step in terms of liberal democratic commitments. 
 
The 1988 guidelines, of course, referred to the ANC’s historic commitment to universal 
franchise, but also stated the inclusion of a Bill of Rights containing “basic rights and 
freedoms, such as freedom of association, expression, thought, worship and the press”; as 
well an acceptance of multi-party democracy, giving each party “the legal right to exist and 
to take part in the political life of the country” (ANC, 1988). 
 
Others, however, have made the point that the apparent ‘commitment’ in the Constitutional 
Guidelines should not be ‘exaggerated’ (Glaser, 1998: 40). Styles, writing in 1989, was 
particularly cynical as to the genuine nature of the ANC’s commitment to constitutional 
principles and political pluralism. Placing the Constitutional Guidelines in their broader 
context and circumstances, he suggested that they “are an important tactical creation which 
the ANC will certainly employ in its efforts to isolate the South African government 
internally and internationally" (Styles, 1989: 67). He did correctly place the shift in ANC 
thinking against the backdrop of important changes: the moral and political weakening of 
the apartheid bloc; its growing international isolation; and the increasing need for the ANC 
to prove to its international allies and onlookers that it is both politically competent and 
democratic, but whether his understanding of the logic behind the document was accurate 
at the time is questionable.  
 
Although not quite as damning in his interpretation of the document, Glaser did warn that 
“it is difficult to judge whether the guidelines are a coherent blueprint for a future society 
or a tactical intervention to broaden the ANC’s base, widen its appeal and accelerate 
progress towards a negotiated settlement” (1988: 28) (emphasis added). We will return in a 
moment to the grounds on which these cautions were based and reasons for their legitimate 
consideration in light of the broader circumstances of the South African political situation 
at that time. First, however, we will look to the ANC’s explanations for its initiation of this 
project by its Constitutional Committee. 
                                                          
25      The Statement on Negotiations, October 1987, stated emphatically: “we reject all efforts to dictate to us 
who our allies should or should not be, and how our membership should be composed. Specifically, we will 
not bow down to pressures intended to drive a wedge between the ANC and the South African Communist 
Party, a tried and tested ally in the struggle for a democratic South Africa. Neither shall we submit to attempts 
to divide and weaken our movement by carrying out a witch hunt against various members on the basis of 
their ideological beliefs.” (ANC, 1987b) 
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The purpose of writing the guidelines was, according to Sachs, “to convert the Freedom 
Charter into an operational document, from a programme of ideals into a constitutional 
structure or foundation for South Africa” (2005, personal interview). He therefore 
emphasises that, even in the ANC’s decision to draw up a new document stating the ANC’s 
position on issues of a new democracy, the Freedom Charter remained the “key 
document” (Sachs, 2005, personal interview). His suggestion therefore seems to be that 
there was no sudden sea change in the ANC’s thinking but rather it was to produce a 
document that was more explicit as to the ANC’s vision of constitutional structures, while 
not repositioning itself with regard to the statements outlined in the Freedom Charter: 
 
 We were asked by Oliver Tambo whether we could draft a constitution 
because South Africa's friends in the world wanted to know ‘what's the 
ANC's position’?  Everybody was asking that. There was a lot of material 
coming from the South African government, from the Inkatha Freedom 
Party, and the ANC simply had the Freedom Charter which didn't deal 
with the constitutional structures and the enforcement of constitutional 
rights (Sachs, 2005, personal interview). 
 
The choice to formulate the Constitutional Guidelines was, as the ANC acknowledged, 
prompted by both the political circumstances and ideological context in which the ANC 
found itself by the mid-1980s. One such factor was the “increased international profile of 
the ANC from 1984-6” (Styles, 1989: 71), as well as the nature of the international political 
context in which a great number of African states were beginning to reach points of crisis 
with regard to the political and economic stability of their countries. The government's of 
these states were beginning to face mounting threats by emerging opposition movements 
as a result of what had become increasingly authoritarian, repressive and dictatorial 
regimes in a number of cases, and the onset of pressure from overseas for governments to 
both reduce the role of the state and liberalise their political systems. Given that the ANC 
realised that it needed to issue a more forthcoming and concrete statement with regard to 
democratic guarantees in a future state, the Constitutional Guidelines were not such a 
‘tactical’ move empty of any real commitment to ideas of pluralism and rights as was 
suggested (1988; 1998). Having said this, however, it is worth delving into this issue a little 
deeper. Given the formal establishment of multi-party constitutional democracy in South 
Africa today, it is all too easy to say that the 1988 guidelines were a document mirroring 
the democratic commitment of the ANC.  This claim, however, requires far greater 
consideration. The question that is critical to ask concerns the extent to which these 
seemingly liberal democratic claims actually reflected both the genuine commitments and 
vision of the ANC at that time. 
 
Glaser, taking into account the “shifting international climate” saw the Constitutional 
Guidelines as very much a response on the part of the ANC to the waning influence of 
communism worldwide (1990: 27). The ANC’s reliance upon the communist states, most 
specifically the Soviet Union was, by this stage, looking increasingly uncertain. By this 
time Mikhail Gorbachev had come to power in the Soviet Union and had introduced his 
policies of political and economic restructuring (perestroika and glasnost), and had 
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withdrawn from military confrontation with western states. What is more, as international 
pressure was mounting upon the South African regime in Pretoria to accept the need for 
change, The ANC was also becoming aware of its need to court the favour a number of 
western states who held considerable amounts of power and influence26.  
 
Sachs and Jobodwana, on the other hand, not unsurprisingly, attribute far less causal 
influence to the occurrences in the Eastern European Communist states, rather placing 
emphasis upon the need to demonstrate that they had a more concrete plan in place (see 
Sachs above). As Jobodwana states, there was a need for “something specific, something 
concrete.  Not just slogans, programmes of action without a component as to how they 
were to be implemented” (personal interview, 2006).  
 
Although the intention of the 1988 guidelines was to show that the ANC was prepared for 
power, a task embarked upon to convert the Freedom Charter into something concrete, 
rather than altering its content, it is still perhaps true to argue that the more explicitly liberal 
democratic working in the guidelines was an upshot of the changes occurring on an 
international level with regard to the Soviet Union and the Cold War, thereby having 
considerable impact within the ANC given its ties with Moscow and SACP. A statement by 
Jobodwana is telling of this circumstances in which the ANC found itself:  
 
“- It was at a time when the ideological base of socialism or communism 
was being questioned and its credibility, I think, was waning in quite a 
number of ways…….With the advent of things like Perestroika, under 
the leadership of Gorbachev, it was clear that he was intent on reforming 
the economy of the Soviet Union. Also it became clear to us that in the 
future we were not going to rely much on the Soviet Union” (Jobodwana, 
2006, personal interview).  
 
While Jobodwana does not interpret a crumbling of the eastern European communist 
regimes as having an ‘impact’ on the drafting of the constitutional guidelines, as such, he 
believes that “it re-enforced the ideas that were already floating there” (ibid) (emphasis 
added)  Moreover, he suggests that even some SACP leaders, such as Joe Slovo, were 
becoming aware that there would no longer be such a possibility for communism as a basis 
for a future “political and economic dispensation in South Africa” (Jobodwana, 2006, 
personal interview). Drawing upon the idea in Slovo’s well known piece, Has Socialism 
Failed?, published in 1990 in which Slovo articulates the need for a more democratic 
socialism and describing the Stalinist period as ‘socialism without democracy’, Jobodwana 
suggests that theses ideas contained in Slovo’s piece were actually first circulated as a part 
of a discussion document as early as 1987-88 (2006, personal interview). This would mean 
that the document’s content which came to envisage socialism as one of a number of ways 
forward and which must, therefore, be chosen in South Africa within a multi-party context 
may have had an influence upon the liberalisation of Congress thinking earlier than is 
perhaps assumed - as early, in fact, as the drafting of the ANC’s Constitutional Guidelines. 
                                                          
26   The ANC’s close relationship with Moscow over the decades in exile had, in fact, prevented the 
opportunity of obtaining strategic and material support from the USA (Prior, 1983) – an ally which could 
have both leant the ANC significant leverage internationally, as well proving fairly lucrative in the long term. 
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Having said this, Jobodwana also comments that “there were stalwarts of the SACP, who 
were also members of SACTU, and who were still confident that the real ideology that can 
guide South Africa into the future was socialism and communism” (ibid). Although 
unclear as to whether such ‘stalwarts’ were also members of the ANC, given the 
overlapping membership between the two organisations, it is far from impossible that this 
was the case. 
 
Also on an international level, but with reference to other world allies of the ANC, by 1986 
the ANC held offices in more than 20 countries across the globe (Jobodwana, 2006, 
personal interview). Consequently, according to Jobodwana, “countries that were 
supporting the ANC, [such as] the Nordic countries, were asking: ‘supposing the regime 
implodes, would you be ready to take over power?  Are you ready? If you are ready, how 
are you ready?’ ” (ibid). Accordingly, the ANC was also under a certain pressure to prove 
that it  not only had a plan of action in place, but that it was prepared with some sort of 
political confidence for building a new democracy.  
 
What must also be remembered with regard to the particular shifts taking place during the 
late 1980s, however, is that the ANC in exile had drawn considerable inspiration from not 
only its Soviet allies, but also from neighbouring African states who were now struggling 
to implement the Socialist model and realise the developmental results they had expected:  
 
What confused….. people when it comes to sticking to the 
ideology of socialism and communism was the fact that even our models 
like Mozambique were already surrendering to the dictates of the South 
African regime……The policies of the economic and political 
dispensation were having a resounding effect on the direction these 
states were taking in furthering the aims of developing socialist models 
of production. They were [also] involved in their own internal crisis 
situations in terms of opposition parties militarily confronting them…. 
So there were already states who could not sustain any future 
development when it comes to implementing socialist ideas. (Jobodwana, 
2006, personal interview). 
 
A question that must be asked, therefore, concerns the extent to which the ANC genuinely 
believed in the value of these liberal democratic ideas now floating in the air. Or, did it, 
rather, adopt a far more liberal democratic and less ambiguous model of democracy than its 
earlier doctrine espoused, simply because of the diminishing prospects of obtaining wider 
support for a more socialist or Marxist-Leninist-oriented model of democracy? How 
committed was the ANC at this point in time to a multi-party democracy? – A question that 
is all the more valid in light of the broader circumstances in which the 1988 Constitutional 
Guidelines were formulated. 
 
Styles (1989), interpreting the 1988 guidelines from a particularly cynical standpoint with 
regard to the genuity of the commitment behind the document’s clauses at this time, argued 
that the Constitutional Guidelines in no way replace the Freedom Charter, despite the 
impressed response of many observers. For him, “the latter will continue to be used as a 
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primary mobilisational tool and lowest common denominator in the national democratic 
struggle" (1989: 70). However, while Styles intends this to be a criticism of the ANC, his 
very argument that the guidelines do not ‘replace’ the Freedom Charter in any way is, 
ironically, directly in line with the account given by Sachs. According to Sachs, the 
Constitutional Guidelines were not seen by the ANC as overriding the Freedom Charter. 
Rather, the guidelines were “an operational document”, a conversion of a “programme of 
ideals” (expressed in the Freedom Charter) into specific statements on future 
"constitutional structures" (Sachs, 2005, personal interview).  
 
Nonetheless, the first version of the draft guidelines were by no means accepted without 
criticism or proposed amendments by elements of the ANC leadership. The Constitutional 
Committee had also to consult with the ANC Sub-Committee on the Constitution, many of 
whom were also members of the NEC (Jobodwana, 2006). The question that concerns us is 
the extent to which debate or difference within the Constitutional Committee or 
sub-Committee centred on the adoption of certain political rights. According to Jobodwana, 
the issue that most concerned the sub-Committee was the need for greater attention to 
socio-economic rights (ibid). It is perhaps worth reflecting again on some of the quotes 
cited above, in particular those regarding the deteriorating influence of socialist ideals. In 
discussing any divisions that surfaced within the Committee or particular shifts in opinion 
over clauses to be included, it was noted that Joe Slovo, who was a member of the 
sub-Committee, had 'attacked' the first draft of the guidelines "as just a bourgeois type of 
document" (Jobodwana, 2006). On the one hand, Jobodwana also states that Slovo's 
criticism was based upon the concern of the sub-Committee in general to see greater 
attention paid to socio-economic rights in a future democracy. As far as they were 
concerned, this had been given little focus within the document. 
 
Certainly the second half of the late 1980s exhibited a significant modification in the 
ANC’s language with regard to liberal democratic commitments compared to the language 
of its earlier exile politics. However, according to members of the Constitutional 
Committee, the political and civil rights appear to have been, in general, unproblematic and 
widely accepted (Jobodwana, 2006; Sachs, 2005). Multi-party democracy, by this stage, 
was already something fully accepted by the ANC (Sachs, 2005; Jobodwana, 2006) and the 
vote, of course, “had always been central - one person one vote” (Sachs, 2005). With 
reference to the content of the Constitutional Guidelines, Sachs argues that  
 
Everything in the guidelines was consistent with his [Oliver Tambo’s] 
outlook and his views and it was necessary to draft a document that 
would unify all those opposed to racism; would lay the foundations for a 
truly democratic society (Sachs, 2005, personal interview). 
 
He similarly remarks that “there was enthusiasm for all the clauses and the principles. And 
there was never any substantive….alternative or conceptual alternative” (ibid). However, a 
document later issued by the NWC of the ANC in 1992, entitled Negotiations: A Strategic 
Perspective, outlined the balance of forces by the end of the 1980s and the factors that led 
to a negotiated settlement. This document adopted by the ANC states that:  
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 The crisis in Eastern Europe, and the resultant change in the relations 
between world powers brought the issue of a negotiated resolution of 
regional conflicts to the fore - in this context, South Africa was not going 
to be treated as an exception. Importantly, these changes also exerted 
new pressures on the regime to fall in line with the emerging 
international "culture" of multi-party democracy (ANC National 
Working Committee, November 1992) (emphasis added).  
 
This would appear to undermine, to some extent, the claims made by ANC Constitutional 
Committee members that the inclusion of multi-partyism in ANC doctrine was never a new 
or contentious matter. It may well have become an accepted reality by the ANC at this 
stage, as a feature that now had to be adopted in the new circumstances, and thereby no 
longer worth debating or questioning. It would serve us well, however, to remain cautious 
as to the fervour and sincerity underlying its new focal position in ANC discourse. 
 
 Two particular conclusions can, nonetheless, be made at this point, and should be borne in 
mind during the remainder of the discussion when making further deductions regarding the 
ANC's relationship with liberal democratic values. Firstly, any disagreement over the 
content of the Constitutional Guidelines seems to have come from those on the political 
left within the alliance. This is reflected in the quote cited above concerning the persistent 
belief in the late 1980s amongst some SACP and trade union members that socialism and 
the communist route still provided the true way forward for South Africa. Secondly, the 
debate which dominated the formulation and re-formulation of the Constitutional 
Guidelines before their approval by all concerned, involved the inclusion (or exclusion) of 
particular socio-economic, rather than political, rights. Differences of opinion over 
socio-economic clauses within the guidelines appear to have dominated the debate during 
the late 1980s far more than that of political rights.  
 
On the one hand, this provides a sound picture of the adoption of civil and political 
freedoms amongst the Congress leadership and reflects a consolidating relationship 
between the ANC leadership and the meaning of such liberal democratic values and 
principles. On the other hand, however, the quandary that comes into view is a problem 
that was touched upon in the earlier part of this paper. This is that the focus on issues of 
class struggle and nationalisation of the country’s wealth - as advocated by the political left 
in South Africa - while ignoring critical aspects of democracy such as political rights and 
freedoms and portraying them, rather, as a form of 'bourgeois' democracy, is to suggest that 
such rights are not the concern of the lower and working classes within society (see Glaser, 
1989). This viewpoint equally implies that socio-economic rights are in some way superior 
to those basic civil and political freedoms which underpin any truly democratic polity27. 
 
Furthermore, at the risk of being overly cautious in interpreting the guidelines as a genuine 
commitment to liberal democracy on the part of the ANC, we do need to consider more 
                                                          
27     Interestingly, Jobodwana suggests that one of the key problems that surfaced around the inclusion of 
socio-economic rights was concerned whether in fact they would be justiciary / justiciable or not. Would they 
realistically be 'enforceable' rights? Or would they merely be something on paper?  Could they actually be 
implemented or only "provided that the state has the resources at its disposal"? (2006, personal interview).  
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carefully the ease with which political rights were included rather than debated. Regarding 
the inclusion of rights such as freedom of association; freedom of expression; freedom of 
the press, etc, and how they came into the document, Jobodwana comments that "I think 
there was a lot of support for that.  More especially, these were things that people were 
experiencing on the ground. So it is very easy to sell such things as freedom of the press.... 
Most civil and political rights were not a problem" (2006, personal interview). The idea 
that some such rights were 'sold' to party members, rather than them being embraced, based 
upon their intrinsic value in a tolerant and liberty-protective system, does not suggest that 
serious liberal democratic conviction existed throughout the ANC leadership.  
 
One further related point is also worth noting here. This concerns the extent to which civil 
and political freedoms are endorsed willingly by a leadership when it faces no other serious 
opposition threat. In other words, it is worth bearing in mind whether many of the rights 
guaranteed in the Constitutional Guidelines are envisaged as taking place within the ANC 
itself? Is there to be tolerance of free speech, movement and association provided that it 
falls within the ambit of the ANC's programme for South Africa - both within the broad 
liberation movement itself and in wider society? If numerous political parties are to be 
accepted, as the guidelines set out, then what does the liberation movement understand as 
being their role? These debates raised here are worth bearing in mind as we begin to 
discuss the negotiations paving the way to the first democratic elections of 1994 and are 
particularly relevant to the final chapter covering the ANC's relationship with liberal 
democracy during its period in government. 
 
By the end of the 1980s, while the ANC had certainly begun to state far more openly and 
unambiguously its position with regard to multi-party politics and key political rights, a 
position which was influenced greatly by a number of political changes and realities 
materialising on both a national and international level, it is fair to say that there remained 
elements within the liberation movement who remained strongly influenced by 
Marxism-Leninist ideas and who continued to not appreciate fully the value of liberal 
democratic rights and principles of political pluralism. 
 
 
Democracy on the Horizon:  The road to constitutional negotiations 
 
Thinking back to the discussion regarding the ANC-SACP relationship in exile during the 
1960s to 1980s, bonds of solidarity were forged in the organisation's common pursuit of 
liberation. Moreover, overlapping membership between the two organisation proliferated 
substantially during the years in exile, with a number of Leninist-Marxist traditions 
emerging within the ranks and leadership of the ANC. A question that this prompts 
therefore, is whether the more left wing and Marxist-Leninist language of the ANC 
remained visible (if at all its did) from 1988 onwards, and more specifically following the 
collapse of the Eastern European Communist bloc from 1989 to 1991. 
 
A key comment made by Prior, writing several years earlier in 1983, is that in exile 
"pragmatic accommodation serves the interests of a strong opposition", guarding against 
the prospects of factionalism and internal splits that carry the potential to weaken the 
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liberation front (Prior, 1983: 195). However, he goes on to caution that "when this phase 
ends moves are likely to be taken to assert domination" (ibid). With the fall of the 
Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, for so long a source of support for the ANC-SACP 
alliance, the ANC began to realise the need for greater support from western governments, 
and increasing number of which were starting to back the ANC by the mid-late 1980s. 
Prior hence warned that "as a coalition party the ANC is increasingly faced with the 
dilemma of deciding whether its source of greatest support lies in communist ideology or a 
modified liberal pragmatism" (Prior, 1983: 195).  
 
The emerging reality of the failure of communism and exposure of its devastating 
consequences, alongside an international audience now placing immense value upon 
political liberalisation, the role of the SACP within the Congress Alliance was suddenly 
uncertain. The ANC's liberal political commitments in the 1988 Constitutional Guidelines 
also presented certain complications to SACP-aligned members. Ellis and Sechaba present 
this very conundrum in describing that "Party control of the ANC in the past depended not 
just on packing ANC committees with Party members, but on a culture of secrecy and 
collectivisation reinforced by the threat of infiltration and assassination by the security 
police" (Ellis and Sechaba, 1992: 206). Such a closed culture and context, however, would 
no longer be applicable to the ANC-SACP relationship in the new situation in South Africa. 
Indeed, although Slovo's 'Has Socialism Failed?' provided a thorough understanding of the 
imperative of opening up socialism to democratic practice and debate - a landmark 
commitment in Communist language - Ellis and Sechaba's question seems particularly 
pertinent. They ask whether "the SACP [can] assimilate this admission truly into its own 
behaviour, shrugging off a long tradition of democratic centralism, as this brand of tyranny 
is known?" (Ellis and Sechaba, 1992: 206). While the debates taking place with regard to 
the Constitutional Guidelines only a year earlier may have been focused around 
socio-economic, as opposed to political, issues, the shocks suffered by Communists in 
1989-90 prompted a fading of their ‘scepticism’ about ‘bourgeois’ democracy, and was 
“replaced by the (sometimes grudging) acceptance that rights and liberties associated with 
liberal-democracy were (however insufficient) not mere ‘window dressing’ (Marais, 1998: 
202). The possible ambivalence with which some ANC members had granted the inclusion 
of political and civil freedoms in 1988 had, by 1989, come to be considered as 
unquestionable in the new global reality and would become a permanent and far more 
central feature of the movement’s discourse. 
 
August 1989 saw the signing of the Harare Declaration by members of the ad-Hoc 
Committee of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU). The document, also signed by 
the ANC, laid out a statement of principles of what the Committee saw as the key 
conditions acceptable for negotiations; the climate and guidelines for process of 
negotiation; and a programme of action (OAU, 1989). According to Marais, the Harare 
Declaration “laid down conditions under which the organisation was prepared to negotiate 
a transfer of power with the apartheid regime. The declaration modified some of the ANC’s 
previously hardline positions and was widely interpreted as opening up space for talks” 
(Marais, 1999: 28).  
 
The Harare Declaration appears to have built upon the ANC’s commitments in the 
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Constitutional Guidelines and provides a clearer and more systematic layout of the 
constitutional order and principles that must be adopted for any negotiation to take place. It 
outlines the necessity of multi-party politics; “universally recognised human rights, 
freedoms and civil liberties, protected under an entrenched Bill of Rights”; a legal system 
guaranteeing “equality of all before the law”; and “an independent and non-racial 
judiciary” (OAU, 1989). It then went on to propose that the relevant parties must then 
decide upon further principles for the new constitution and negotiate “the necessary 
mechanism for drawing up the new Constitution” (OAU, 1989). 
 
While the ANC was officially unbanned and its political prisoners released, including 
former Robben Islander, Nelson Mandela, the National Peace Accord, which would bring a 
formal end to armed hostilities and commit the nation to Peace and negotiations, was only 
signed in September 1991. Several months earlier in April 1991 the ANC issued a 
discussion document entitled Constitutional Principle and Structures for a Democratic 
South Africa. This document was a far longer and more detailed publication. Moreover, it 
was a result of   a period of conferences, workshops, discussion and meetings as well as 
bring “distributed………within the broader democratic movement” (ANC, 1991). The 
document was thus a refection of “views and responses” collated by the time of April 1991 
in order to “formulate documents identifying principles and a possible structure for a new 
Constitution” (ibid).  
 
The opening of the Constitutional Principle and Structures discussion stated that: 
 
While the documents reflect the broad thinking within the ANC and 
allied organisations, they are not put forward as final positions or 
blueprints. They are meant for discussion and debate within the ANC 
branches, trade union movement and all allied organisations – and 
indeed amongst South Africa’s people. This will enable the ANC to 
arrive at a set of proposals based on the will of the people” (ANC, 1991) 
(emphasis in original). 
 
The 1991 document hence requested the submission of suggestions and criticism – a 
particularly open request by the ANC that the broader populations decide, “sympathetic or 
unsympathetic” to the ANC (1991), what must be included within a new constitution. The 
output of this discussion and collation of views was then formulated by the ANC 
Constitutional Committee and translated into a comprehensive document. The 1991 
Principles and Structures document or course retained the same commitments to equality 
and non-racialism; to a Bill of Rights, a multi-party dispensation with the previously stated 
civil and political liberties, and the separation of powers. It also however covered issues of 
a Presidential system with a limited number of terms stipulated (two five-year terms), and 
how members of parliament would be elected. It also put forward as most appropriate a 
system of proportional representation. There was also a premium placed upon the 
importance of procedures to ensure a free and fair election. Moreover, the freedoms to be 
included in the Bill of Rights were also far more detailed and elaborate. Perhaps most 
interesting are the questions presented in the opening of the discussion section of the 
document, questions which the ANC asks the reader to focus attention on, one of which 
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asks: 
 
What provisions should be included to avoid over-centralization and 
ensure democratic participation in government at central, regional and 
local levels? Also, what provisions could be included to ensure 
structured accountability of all officials and organs of government? 
(ANC, 1991). 
 
From the vague political formulations of the Freedom Charter, to the open acceptance of 
liberal democratic values in the 1988 Constitutional Guidelines and finally the 1991 
Principles and Structures signified a gradual yet by no means insignificant move toward an 
intrinsic understanding of liberal democratic principles and their applicability to a new 
South Africa. For Styles, as noted earlier, the 1988 guidelines and the move toward 
negotiations by the ANC were a mere 'propaganda ploy' (1989: 72). However, in following 
the 1988 document with Principles and Structures in 1991, the ANC proved, rather, to be 
considering in far more depth how the new state would be shaped.  
 
A further point that should be given its due concerns the Constitutional Committee’s 
decision to shift from constitutional guidelines to principles and structures instead. Sachs 
describes the reasoning behind this move by stating that there was the “notion that the 
constitution had to emerge from a body with a mandate from the whole nation……..the 
principle that only a democratically chosen South African National Assembly, Constituent 
Assembly, could draft a constitution. So that's why we moved from drafting a constitution 
to doing principles” (2005, personal interview). 
 
The encouragement of openness and widespread participation in the gathering of ideas on 
what a future constitution should look like, as well as reflecting a liberalisation of thought 
within the Congress camp, was also an off-shoot of the new legalised domestic context in 
which they were operating. As Jobodwana relates, the guidelines of 1988 were jut that – 
‘guidelines’ – and the ANC was utilising them from exile in part as “a mobilising 
instrument”, acknowledging that the document was devoid of much detail (2006, personal 
interview). The ANC’s external mission “did not have [the] opportunity of consulting with 
all the constituencies inside the country……That type of consultation was fundamental” 
(ibid). Contrasted to the ANC’s return to South Africa in 1990, however, Jobodwana states 
that “more people could join the ANC without fear. The Constitutional Committee was 
broadened [with] greater participation” and from this point the guidelines were improved 
(ibid).  
 
In September of 1991, the National Peace Accord was also signed by some forty 
organisations in South Africa committed to a new peace and unity. The document, to which 
the ANC was of course a signatory, stipulated the conditions and principles to which all 
organisations must adhere to in order to bring about “multi-party democracy” as a 
“common goal” (1991). The document complied with liberal democratic ideas for the 
holding of a free and fair election, listing “certain fundamental rights” which must be 
‘recognized’ and ‘upheld’ by all participants. It also listed a specific “Code of Conduct for 
political parties and organisations” (1991). 
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With the ANC’s unbanning, the ANC’s Constitutional Committee, according to 
Jobodwana began to function also as a ‘research unit’ (2006, personal interview). The 
ANC sought to prepare itself for very new territory and with the commencement of 
negotiations in December 1991, the Constitutional Committee also prepared documents for 
use at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA). 
 
At the Multi-Party Negotiating Forum (MPNF) that followed CODESA in April 1993, 
actual technical committees were set up to carry out the formulating of the interim 
constitution which would allow for the holding of democratic elections just one year later. 
As the technical committees were formed, largely comprised of lawyers who were there to 
advise the participating parties, the involvement of the ANC’s Constitutional Committee 
that had drafted the 1988 and 1991 documents seemed to decline. Much of the discussion 
now took place at a “leadership level” (Jobodwana, 2006, personal interview). 
 
In the drafting of the interim constitution, a number of lawyers advised and assisted the 
ANC in various ‘capacities’ and ‘fields’ (Cheadle, 2006, personal correspondence). The 
two lawyers advising the ANC specifically on the Bill of Rights were Halton Cheadle and 
Penuel Maduna - a point that is particularly interesting to note as Penuel Maduna had also 
been a member of the ANC’s Constitutional Committee formed for the drafting of the 1988 
guidelines. A number of reports were prepared by the technical committee on the Bill of 
Rights and submitted to the Constitutional Committee of the MPNF. According to Cheadle, 
an initial problem with the reports lay in “the extensive nature of the rights enumerated by 
the TC for inclusion in an interim constitution” (2006). As he describes, “the technical 
committee had engaged in an exercise of listing every single conceivable right and placing 
this before the Constitutional Committee” (ibid). An interesting point that Cheadle makes 
is that, he considered  
 
The proper criteria for the entrenchment of rights in the interim 
constitution was what was necessary to ensure a free and fair election 
(equality, expression, association, assembly, franchise, fair trial rights, 
etc); and what was necessary to satisfy the parties to the process that a 
majority party in the interim legislature and executive would not use 
their powers to adversely affect their strongly held interests (property, 
fair trial rights, fair labour practices, life etc)  (Cheadle, 2006, personal 
correspondence). 
 
A further issue of note is that he also believed that these rights “should be cast as restraints 
rather than individual rights” (ibid). (my emphasis added). This, he emphasizes, “was not 
because of any lack of commitment to the establishment of a bill of rights” (Cheadle, 206) 
but, rather, highlights an important point that was raised earlier by the ANC Constitutional 
Committee concerning the decision to opt for ‘principles’ over ‘guidelines’. He states that 
the drafting of a full and final Bill of Rights must be 
    
- The job of an elected constitutional assembly and that a full house of 
rights would pre-empt the work of that assembly. The interim 
constitution was not a constitution for all time but a holding operation 
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pending the drafting and passing of a final constitution by a 
democratically elected constitutional assembly (2006, personal 
correspondence). 
 
The point here that is particularly relevant to us, is that the ANC concurred with Cheadle’s 
perspective – a decision that led to "some reservation that the ANC had gone too far 
already and that it would look bad publicly to seem to be recanting on rights" (Cheadle, 
2006). Following these reports, an Ad-Hoc committee on the bill of rights was established 
in which Cheadle and Maduna then represented the ANC as negotiators within the MPNF.  
What comes to the fore in corresponding with Cheadle however, is that, just as Sachs and 
Jobodwana highlighted the lack of debate or difference over political rights within the 
ANC’s constitutional documents, Cheadle also states that  there was ‘unanimity’ over the 
political and democratic rights to be included. As far as a free and fair election was 
concerned, these rights were ‘fundamental' (ibid). 
 
Through analysing the content and language of documents that appeared – both those 
produced by the ANC itself and those such as the Harare declaration and Peace Accord 
that were formulated and agreed to on a regional and national level, respectively – it is 
possible to trace what Cheadle refers to as “a commitment to both democracy and 
equality……to a trend towards a greater acceptance of a bill of rights enforceable by 
judicial review” (2006, personal correspondence). In 1992 and again in 1993 the ANC 
Constitutional Committee produced revised versions of a Bill of Rights and the revisions 
were made based upon comments received from ANC membership (ANC, 1992; 1993). 
Jobodwana also concedes that more liberal ideas relating to political rights were more 
‘predominant’ during the MPNF than they had been in the 1980s (2006, personal 
interview). A point that must be emphasised here, however, relates to the context in which 
the negotiations took place. South Africa continued to be ‘engulfed’ in violence after 1990, 
with many people dying as a result of ongoing political violence. As such, ANC delegates 
made certain ‘compromises’ at the negotiating table (Jobodwana, 2006), compromises that 
may, therefore, have been made for the sake of peace, rather than out of the genuine will or 
political conviction of their participants.  
 
The distinction that we perhaps must draw for ourselves is that while the ANC had 
historically campaigned for the equal rights and status of Africans in South Africa, and 
spoke very early on of universal suffrage upon the basis of one man, one vote, this by no 
means constituted a commitment to or belief in values of liberal democracy for a future 
South Africa. Indeed, even by the time of the 1988 guidelines and commencement of the 
negotiations themselves, the ANC’s language of human rights remained ambiguous and 
unclear on some points. As the chapters so far have shown, there had equally been an 
ambiguity and lack of formal commitment to a future state form through much of the 
movement’s history until its addressing in the documents analysed above. Cheadle hence 
refers to the Constitutional Committee of the MPNF as playing “an important role in 
slowly diffusing a rights approach within the ANC” (2006, personal correspondence).  
 
The late 1980s and early 1990s saw significant shifts with regard to both the clarity and 
acceptance with which the ANC spoke of a new democratic state and the pluralism and 
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rights which it would guarantee. Indeed, the significance of this must not be understated, as 
Glaser has noted, the commitments made to pluralism and rights have emerged from "a 
movement whose historical allegiances and practices are far from consistently democratic” 
(1997: 5). The ANC’s own decision to pursue negotiations as opposed to war – a decision 
that by no means went down well with the more militant and radical elements within the 
movement – was itself a reflection of the ANC’s choice to opt for “democratic principles 
and process” (Cheadle, 2006) over the seizure of state power. It is in the ensuing period of 
the post-1994 democratic dispensation, however, that these apparent commitments to 
liberal democratic values will need to be assessed. Furthermore, a crucial aspect of this 
analysis relates not only to the formal commitments made on paper, but to the way in which 
the ANC’s own understanding of pluralism and rights come to be played out in the first two 
decades of South Africa’s democracy.  
 
Before moving on to the democratic era, however, the issue of the ANC’s own 
interpretation of itself as liberal democratic requires greater attention as it becomes most 
relevant both to the period just discussed and the discussion to follow. Both Suttner (2005) 
and Sachs (2005) independently argue that the ANC would certainly not regard or refer to 
itself as ‘liberal democratic’. Indeed, Sachs suggests that Oliver Tambo would be horrified 
by such a definition (2006).  
 
A number of authors writing about post-apartheid South Africa, however, refer to the ANC 
as a liberal democratic party28. Given the universal franchise and constitutional rights that 
early ANC leaders campaigned for (see in Chapters 2 and 3), these men were considered by 
many to be ‘liberals’ (see Welsh, 1998 in Johnson, 2003: 330). Liberalism in South Africa, 
however, has historically been associated with white political parties, such as the Liberal 
Party and Progressive Party (later to be the Democratic Party). Moreover, liberalism has 
also been linked in the past to capitalist exploitation (Adam, Slabbert and Moodley, 1997). 
Historical factors impacting upon the shaping of the struggle for liberation in South Africa 
have caused what Slabbert accurately describes as a ‘polarisation’ of South Africa during 
this period (1993, cited in Laurence, 1998: 46). A result of the overlapping of class and 
racial polarisation pre-1994, therefore, roused a situation in which “political forces [such 
as liberalism] which sought to promote an alternative more often than not found 
themselves castigated as part of the problem” (Laurence, 1998: 46). Such historic 
associations with liberalism in South Africa have perhaps led to an aversion for parties to 
associate themselves directly with the ideology. Interestingly, Laurence notes that, in 1994, 
none of the parties chose to describe themselves as ‘liberal’ (1988: 45). 
 
A point that can be legitimately made, however, is that the ANC had openly adopted and 
agreed to conform to principles and values which underpin liberal democracy itself, and 
which reflect directly the key components of liberal democracy outlined in the theoretical 
introduction to this paper. Moreover, South Africa’s current Constitution (1997) contains 
the very liberal democratic commitments to pluralism and rights discussed. The earlier 
notions of ‘people’s democracy’ - continuously a feature of ANC doctrine even where 
commitments to fundamental human rights and one person, one vote were simultaneously 
advocated – became absent from ANC documents and publications in the early 1990s. The 
                                                          
28   See, for example, K. Johnson (2002); McKinley (2002); and W.M. Gumede (2005)  
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ANC has adopted and embraced parliamentary democracy. 
 
However, this very point brings us to a principal issue characterising the debate over forms 
of democracy taking place in South Africa, both during the late 1980s and, to a degree, in 
the present period. The point to be made is that the ANC’s adoption of a parliamentary 
model of democracy was a controversial issue between it and its aligned members in the 
civic movements and political left.  
 
As the previous chapter alluded to, a number of different political traditions began to play 
themselves out from the late 1980s. The space for this variety of traditions in a new 
democratic dispensation, and, moreover, which of them would take precedence over others 
also became a bone of contention within the Congress camp and its support base. This can 
be seen most starkly in the language of people’s democracy which embedded in many 
South Africans the idea of a participatory and mass-driven democracy as the only natural 
development from their active role in the mass politics of the struggle (see Cronin, 2004). 
Many of the more liberal democratic ideas of representative democracy that came to be 
espoused from 1990, however, conflicted with many of the expectations on the ground and 
within the ANC’s left-wing allies. The conflict that arose reflects the ‘hybrid’ of 
approaches that exist within the democratic movement (Marais, 1998: 204). 
 
Here we must link back to what was said in chapter 4 with regard to the UDF’s 
understanding of democracy as participatory, providing for control by the working classes 
over their own lives, rather than what it described as "some liberal, pluralistic debating 
society” (New Era, 1986 cited in Lodge, 1991:131). This very quote is key to 
understanding the multiplicity of traditions existent within the ANC camp. The liberal 
democratic and parliamentary notion of democracy which the ANC came to adopt 
conflicted immensely with the view of many ANC members of its bourgeois and elitist 
connotations. What had in fact happened in South Africa was not what the UDF had 
envisaged. It had initially wanted a ‘national convention’, understood as a type of 
‘bargaining forum’ and later supplanted with the idea of 'People's power' and a people’s 
democracy (Seekings, 2000: 295). What they had not expected were “negotiations between 
political parties” (ibid). 
 
The merging of the various political traditions in the Liberation movement was only 
complicated more by the Marxist-Leninist strands within the ANC leadership themselves 
that also became visible. As Marais comments, “the exercise of power from below”, a 
tradition that the emerged within South Africa during the 1980s, "contrasted with the 
reifying thinking employed by the ANC and SACP. The discourse there remained 
virulently Leninist” (1998: 200-201). The leadership was thereby accused of taking 
decisions for itself while expecting ‘the people’ to ask no questions and to follow. Again 
arose, therefore, the tensions between popular/participatory democracy on the one hand, 
and the leadership’s new version of democracy on the other.  
 
A particular matter that remains, and one that the remaining chapters will seek to qualify, is 
that however much the ANC recognises the importance of pluralism and rights and, we 
must add, since coming to power has not constitutionally traversed these rights, there have 
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remained elements of the movement’s discourse and suggestions within the language of its 
leadership, since 1994, that reflect the legacy of exile; intolerance of dissenters; and a 
continuing collective and unitary understanding of South Africa’s citizens as needing no 
other representative vehicle outside of the ANC itself. In a number of ways it appears to 
have retained the image of itself as the movement and vanguard of ‘the people’. Moreover, 
the downfalls of the ‘broad church character’ of the ANC have come to the fore most 
prominently since the early-mid 1990s. The movement and its supporters have confronted 
numerous ideological divisions with regard to policy and programmes and over the 
(sometimes conflicting) variances within the movement over the form and type of 
democracy desirable for South Africa. Simultaneously the ANC continues to seek to be all 
things to all people in the context of a ‘formally’ multi-party democracy.  It is to the 
dilemmas thrown up by the movement’s own understanding of liberal democracy and its 
implications in post-1994 South Africa that the following chapters now turn.  
 
 
 
PART II 
 
Chapter 6 
 
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY POST-1994: THE ANC IN THE MULTI-PARTY 
CONTEXT  
 
 
The discussion thus far has followed the ANC’s changing relationship with liberal 
democracy using a periodisation approach, looking at the shifts that have taken place and 
alterations in the ANC’s understanding of democracy over time within different periods of 
the movement’s existence and activity. The following sections, however, are broken down 
into facets of the liberal democratic debate as they apply to South Africa. The reason for 
this is, in part, that we are just over 10 years in to South Africa’s young democracy. The 
period under analysis is therefore arguably too short to identify specific phases that would 
provide an applicable framework for the objectives of this study, although we can certainly 
trace an evolution. 
 
The approach chosen here is to analyse this period via a particular categorisation of liberal 
democratic theory, as it appears most relevant to post -1994 South Africa. The intention is 
that this approach will provide a better understanding of the nature of the ANC’s 
relationship with liberal democratic ideas as well as the movement’s own understanding of 
such principles as both a social movement and a governing party. The chapter is thus 
broken down into particular categories which provide a lens through which to analyse the 
state of post-1994 liberal democracy: a) the relationship between state and civil society; b) 
the ANC’s understanding of political opposition within the multi-party dispensation; and 
c) issues of internal party democracy. It has already been noted that, although internal 
democracy is not specifically a feature of liberal democratic theory, given the context of 
one-party-dominance in South Africa, then it becomes of tremendous consequence to the 
maintenance of a democratic value system. 
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The Relationship between State and Civil Society 
 
Marais, in speaking of the challenges facing post-apartheid South Africa, notes that a 
pertinent concern characterising this phase concerns "the relationship between the state and 
civil society within the context of a national reconstruction effort" (Marais, 1998: 209). 
Indeed, for the UDF and Civic movements many of these debates began to take place in the 
1990s and questions regarding what the new role of civil society would be within the 
democratic dispensation came to the fore. The UDF had actually formally disbanded a few 
years earlier in 199129, but the issues that confronted the movement were a pertinent 
reflection of the challenges to come for civic movements at large, and evidently a prime 
feature of these debates concerned the new focus upon the need for an autonomous civic 
realm. Simultaneously, however, it should be remembered that by the late 1980s, the ANC 
had already succeeded in extending its hegemony throughout South African society 
(Marais, 1998: 207). The crucial debate, therefore, became how those civic groups 
historically aligned to the ANC, would find their appropriate role in the new South Africa. 
Moreover, civil society had formerly adopted an antagonistic role with the state and one 
that had been characterised by confrontation and protest. Such groups now had to find a 
more 'constructive' relationship with the state - a dilemma that would especially come to 
confront COSATU over the coming years. 
 
A prominent and highly relevant question is posed by Marais (1998). He notes that the 
anti-apartheid struggle had an 'adhesive effect' on the variety of civic groups and political 
affiliations that were contained within the ANC camp. Thinking back to the second part of 
chapter four, it was noted that support for the ANC and the armed struggle was what held 
these various organisations together. However, Marais asks not only how these 
heterogeneous organisations are suddenly to relate to one another, but also, with the 
liberation movement now in power, how are they to relate to the ANC? (1988: 207, 208).  
In liberal democratic theory, one of the key mechanisms in ensuring that the government 
remains accountable to the electorate is an autonomous civil society that is able to criticise 
government and keep a check on the abuse of authority. Civil society therefore has a key 
accountability function to play. Not only would many civic groups face challenges of 
adopting a non-partisan approach, as was the predicament faced by the UDF before its 
disbanding (Seekings, 2000: 276), but their historic relationship with the (now) ruling 
party threw up uncertainty as to how the all-encompassing ANC itself would deal with and 
treat the growth of an independent civic realm. 
 
One of the most prominent elements of the ANC's relationship with civil society is the 
movement's understanding of 'the people' as a homogeneous group a tightly held notion 
carried over from the struggle era. This idea of a unitary understanding of the people and 
viewing society as a 'collective' body (Glaser, 1991; Marais, 1999; Fine, 1992) has already 
been discussed and needs no additional explanation here. However, the continued use of 
                                                          
29   The UDF had considered adopting the role of development and reconstruction in the post-apartheid era. 
However, following a number of tensions and disagreements amongst the UDF leadership and between the 
UDF and other Charterist groups, the front finally decided in 1991 to disband (See Seekings, 2000) 
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this unitary notion of the people in the democratic era is necessarily problematic for the 
consolidation of liberal democracy and reflects a lingering deficiency in the ANC's 
understanding of individual rights and pluralism. Marais, speaking of the years of the 
struggle and quoting the work of Fine (1992) comments that "the idea of 'the people' was 
''turned into a formalism whose singular consciousness was homogenised by the 
movement which spoke in its name', while a 'plurality of opinions' was 'negated by the 
singular notion of public opinion' " (Fine, 1992: 80 quoted in Marais, 1998: 207). One of 
the fundamental challenges faced in the post-apartheid era, therefore, has been 
reconstructing the state-society relationship away from both notions of the state as 
something to be feared, and toward a more constructive relationship while still maintaining 
the civil autonomy that is so important to ensuring civil freedoms and allowing the 
diversity of society to flourish, rather than be contained. The ANC's broad-church 
character however, has made these challenge all the more difficult. 
 
One of the key issues underlining this is the ANC's understanding of itself as the 'vanguard' 
of the democratic struggle. On the one hand, we must be careful when speaking of the 
ANC’s commitment to liberal democratic values and institutions. As the previous chapter 
discussed, the number of documents crafted by the ANC itself and the formal 
commitments made in documents such as the Harare Declaration and the Peace Accord to 
liberal democratic rights and principles represented a tremendous sea change in the 
liberation movement's thinking during that time. The significance of its commitments 
should therefore not be underestimated. The South African Constitution, compiled in 1997 
following the commencement of the Government of National Unity, provides for the 
protection and autonomy of democratic institutions and mechanisms as well as an array of 
individual rights enshrined in a bill of rights. Moreover, it is also crucial to emphasise the 
impressive role of institutions such as the Constitutional Court and Independent Electoral 
Commission (IEC) whose roles have been constantly respected and strengthened by the 
ruling party. The point that needs to be made here, however, is that there remain certain 
elements within the ANC's language and discourse that suggest understandings of the role 
of civil society and the liberation movement's own role vis-à-vis civil society that are 
problematic for liberal democracy. 
 
Since its unbanning in 1990, Herbst notes that “while recognising the importance of 
developing a clear political programme, the ANC has...........also been unwilling to move 
too far from its origins as a mass movement” (ibid). Reflecting back on a document drafted 
by the ANC in 1991, the movements stated: 
 
The ANC is not a political party, but a liberation movement. It must 
therefore remain the political home for all individuals interested in and 
committed to this future, without regard to ideological beliefs that are 
not in conflict with its basic policy positions and programme. At the 
same time, the ANC must rapidly develop to master all the methods of 
political contest that operation under conditions of legality demand. It 
must deliberately prepare itself for the different challenges of the 
transition and the future, including work in an Interim Government, 
elections into a Constituent Assembly and so on. However, this must not 
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be allowed to infringe on the main character of the movement as an 
organisation of the people, pursuing their aspirations, rather than an 
elitist cabal (Section 46, ANC Advance to National Democracy: 
Guidelines on strategy and tactics, 1991) (emphasis added). 
 
By the ANC's 49th National Conference in 1994, then vice-president, Thabo Mbeki stated 
that   
 
     The ANC's crucial role as a ruling party needs to be carried through 
effectively and professionally. This role should reinforce, not undermine, 
the ANC's continuing role as a broad movement with effective 
grass-roots structures, capable of organising and mobilising the broad 
mass of our people (ANC, 1994) (emphasis added).  
 
Therefore, by the time of entering government in 1994, the ANC had begun to recognise 
the need for crucial adaptations in its role as a political and governing party. However, the 
point highlighted by both of the above statements, in 1991 and 1994,  is that the ANC 
continued to view itself as a broad social movement able to represent the people at large, 
hence the statement that it is a home for 'all individuals'. The feature that enabled the ANC 
to provide such a home however, was its central goal of ending racial domination. What 
must be questioned, however, is the suitability of the ANC to provide a political home and 
function as a representative body for all who no longer agree with its ideological beliefs or 
policy as a ruling party. The conception that it can adequately represent all corners of a 
diverse society surely conflicts with notions of pluralism. Furthermore, coinciding with the 
unitary notion of 'the people' of 'the masses' is the understanding that the ANC is the very 
embodiment of the people. The scenario that enters the our discussion here is therefore that 
if you are against the ANC, then as the movement of the people, this implies you are also 
against the people themselves (See Friedman, 1992: 83).  
 
The conundrum that has transpired for a number of civics and unions since 1990, but in 
particular since the ANC's position in government in 1994, is that they have "grappled for 
an institutional framework which would allow them to access future state resources and 
support without compromising their prized autonomy" (Glaser, 1998: 42-43). Civics are 
aware that the tremendous power and electoral dominance of the ANC in government 
renders them considerably reliant on the movement for access to much needed state 
resources. Simultaneously, however, society is no longer allied to the ANC in the same 
way as the struggle against apartheid has been won. Society now looks to the ANC for 
delivery, responsiveness and representivity as a governing party. The key question, 
therefore, concerns how the ANC views civil society and what it assumes the appropriate 
role for civil society to be. 
 
 Undoubtedly, a vast number of civic movements have been historically aligned to the 
ANC. A point that Friedman has made, however, is that we must not conflate particular 
civic movements representing a particular interest group or political alignment with civil 
society as a whole (1991: 10-13). Given the ANC’s broad-church’ character and its 
long-standing practices of seeking unity and organisational cohesiveness under a banner of 
liberation politics, then Friedman's caution is worth bearing in mind. He warns that the 
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“Gramscian heritage" of these civic movements, which were formed during the fight for 
liberation and in line with the Congress movement “may also ensure that their most 
talented leadership take up positions in the new state…[As a result]...this may leave them 
so weakened that they will not be able to act as effective “watchdogs” even if they chose 
this role” (Friedman. 1991: 13).  
 
This has certainly been a feature of post-apartheid society that has manifested itself in 
some of South Africa’s larger and most politically influential civic organisations, such as 
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the leadership of the United 
Democratic Front (UDF), who lost many of their skilled and key leaders to the ANC. A 
prominent concern raised by those wishing to see the growth and consolidation of an 
autonomous civil society able to hold the government to account is that the ANC has not 
responded favourably to those organisations and individuals within society who have 
criticised or raised objections to the ANC's policy directions or programmes in government 
(Gumede, 2005). Rather, Gumede suggests that the given the ANC's historic relationship 
with civics during the struggle, it has, in fact, reacted angrily to the idea of civil society 
adopting a 'watchdog role' (2005: 284). In a 1997 address by President Nelson Mandela at 
the 50th national conference of the ANC, Mandela chastised sections of the 
non-governmental (NGO) sector for promoted the idea of such a role and labelling them as 
forces of reaction. Moreover, he seems to have sought to link these forces within civil 
society with bitter remnants of the UDF: 
 
" - sections of the non-governmental sector which seek to assert that the 
distinguishing feature of a genuine organisation of civil society is to be a 
critical "watchdog" over our movement, both inside and outside of 
government. Pretending to represent an independent and popular view, 
supposedly obviously legitimised by the fact that they are described as 
non-governmental organisations, these NGO's also work to corrode the 
influence of the movement. Strangely, some of the argument for this 
so-called "watchdog" role was advanced from within the ranks of the 
broad democratic movement, at the time when we all arrived at the 
decision that with the unbanning of the ANC and other democratic 
organisations, it was necessary to close down the UDF. ..........Certain 
elements, which were assumed to be part of our movement, set 
themselves up as critics of the same movement, precisely at the moment 
when we would have to confront the challenge of the fundamental 
transformation of our country and therefore, necessarily, the determined 
opposition of the forces of reaction. (Mandela, ANC, 1997). 
 
This very quote highlights the problem of rethinking and re-evaluating the role of civil 
society in such a way that enhances and protects democracy in a context in which the new 
ruling party is also the former liberation movement. We should also add to this the ongoing 
role and identity of the ANC as a broad social movement. This difficulty of the ANC's 
transition to a political party highlights the historically broad reach of the ANC, which now 
seems to encompass both state and civic realms in the new South Africa. Needless to say, 
this places tremendous strains on civil autonomy and balancing the state-civil society 
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relationship. Mathebe's observation is therefore particularly relevant here. She comments 
that the 'strength' of the ANC as movement against apartheid was "the fact that the 
organisation was able to transform itself into a national narrative"(2001: 21) (emphasis 
added). The tremendous reach of the ANC which became a political home to many 
throughout the liberation struggle, has left many groups within civil society with no other 
familiar territory or political association outside of the all-embracing ANC. Shubane 
therefore argues that "there are characteristics inherent to liberation movements which 
militate against the emergence of civil society"  (1992: 37). 
 
What has appeared therefore in the years post-1994 is a difficulty, or perhaps 
unwillingness, on the part of the ANC to come to terms with notions of autonomous groups 
within society that represent an opposing or alternative political home to the ANC. The 
tremendous moral legitimacy earned by the ANC and the way in which this has carried 
over into the democratic era is aptly reflected in the extract below from the ANC's Draft 
Strategy and Tactics document in 1997, itself entitled "All Power to the People":  
  
"The ANC is the vanguard of all these motive forces of the NDR 
[National Democratic Revolution], the leader of the broad movement for 
transformation. Its leadership has not been decreed; but earned in the 
crucible of struggle and the battles for social transformation. It should 
continually strengthen itself as a national political organisation; and 
ensure that it is in touch with the people in their day-to-day life" (ANC, 
1997, Draft Strategy and Tactics) (emphasis added). 
 
The idea of a legitimately earned 'right' by the ANC to represent and lead the 'people' of 
South Africa underlines the movement's understanding of its ideas of the path for South 
Africa's future as the only way that will truly represent the people. On the one hand, we 
must be careful to make the conceptual distinction between a party seeking to lead a 
people - a legitimate democratic function of all contenders in a multi-party dispensation  -  
and, on the other hand, a party that already see itself as an embodiment of the people, in 
such a way that it represents that people by proclamation, rather than as a result of gaining 
consent for this role from within civil society. The latter is therefore a self-defined role 
irrespective of public opinion. The line of distinction with regard to this within the 
language of the ANC, however, remains somewhat blurred, and the movement appears to 
tread a very delicate line between its legitimate democratic function and a continued 
assumption of its preordained vanguard role as an embodiment of the people. In light of our 
concern to see the safeguarding of liberal democratic values and practice, then the ANC's 
understanding, which appears to fall largely into the latter of these two distinctions, should 
keep us on guard against the abuse of legitimate democratic terrain.  
 
 A frequently cited 1996 discussion document belonging to the ANC, The State and Social 
Transformation, similarly stated that "Over the decades, through its theory and practice, 
this movement had proved that it is the only vehicle which possesses the capacity to act as 
the leader of the people in their struggle to establish a truly democratic state" (ANC, 1996). 
The crucial point in the contemporary context is not so much the notion of the ANC as the 
'vanguard' movement pre-1994 - a claim that had long been reiterated by the ANC during 
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its years in exile - but the continuing use of the term in the democratic era. On the one hand, 
as early as 1991, the ANC's Guidelines on Strategy and Tactics stressed that   
 
We should...ensure that the ANC and its allies do not behave in such a 
way that they are seen by the people as formations which they should 
fear, because of such wrong methods of work as political intolerance. 
(ANC, 1991) 
 
However, it is fair to say that it was not until the ANC actually entered government and 
found itself on pluralistic political terrain in which space must be shared with numerous 
forces, not necessarily in agreement with the ANC, that the ANC's ability to adapt to a 
culture of tolerance and diversity was fully put to the test. The crux of the matter is that the 
ANC's dominance means that it has not been threatened to any significant degree by 
opposition or dissenting forces from within its own ranks. Perhaps it thought it would never 
encounter them, for as such forces have surfaced from within civil society, the movement 
has not taken kindly to their emergence.  
 
The worrying suggestion is that those who disagree with the ANC's policies are therefore 
not only against 'the people', whom the ANC sees itself as embodying, but also as hijackers 
of the ANC's project of transformation. The notion that the ANC is the only body able to 
legitimately spearhead the process of transformation in South Africa has lead to 
(often-unwarranted) attempts to de-legitimate the opposition in the face of legitimate 
criticism of its policies or practice. This is an issue that will be discussed in more detail in 
the following section. In relation to the ANC's understanding of the role of civil society, 
however, it also becomes significant.    
 
A point that must be made is that the ANC, since coming to power, has shown respect for 
constitutional rights and institutions of governance. In fact, since the onset of democracy in 
South Africa and emergence of overwhelming electoral and political dominance by the 
ANC, Alence has argued that this "has coincided with the institutional strengthening of 
political contestation and constitutional government”. Moreover, he conceives that the 
growth of this dominance “has not been taken as licence to dismantle [these institutions]” 
(2004). A prominent criticism of the Mbeki presidency, from 1999, however, is that 
repressive and centralised tendencies have surfaced, beginning to show increasing 
intolerance of criticism and dissent (Gumede, 2005). The brunt of much of this intolerance 
has been received by civil society organisations that have been portrayed by the ANC as 
criticising a movement representing the heart of the 'people' of South Africa. Gumede 
(2005) cites ANC targeting of new social movements as a particular concern. ANC 
intolerance has stemmed from such movements' tendency to shine lights in places that the 
ANC would rather they did not and to highlight failures in government practice or 
delivery30.  
 
                                                          
30  In October 2005, for example, The Star newspaper published an article citing Mbeki's complaints at 
foreign donors for funding social movements in South Africa (Peter Fabricius, 17 October 2005). In a similar 
vein, the ANC government has more recently sought to divert foreign funding away from non-governmental 
groups toward state programmes and distribution. 
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Having said this, Murray and Pillay, looking at 2004 figures from Afrobarometer, argue 
that South Africans "rarely had to be careful of what they say about politics", and that 
freedom of association and political participation "are realised to a fair degree" (2005: 196). 
Equally it is important to note that, unlike in some African states, South African civil 
society is active, well organised and, historically, politically charged. Since the onset of 
democracy, the unions and civic-based organisations have not failed to stand up and make 
their voices heard (Brooks, 2004: 150-151; see also Khosa, 2005: 145).  However, what 
becomes relevant to us is that as the ANC's political dominance continues to grow - which 
it is has done during the years from 1994 - then its angry reaction to critical voices from 
within civil society, let alone attempts to scapegoat them as 'reactive' forces set on 
hijacking the process of transformation, as suggested in the quote from Mandela above, 
become worrisome for liberal democracy. Marais' comment that "a constantly admired 
feature of the anti-apartheid era was the success of the ANC (and the UDF) at enveloping 
different classes, ethnicities, generations and ideologies" (Marais, 1998: 214) appears 
highly ironical given that it has more recently shown to be a danger to civil rights and 
liberties. 
 
For those civic organisations in need of state resources, then their autonomy is put in severe 
jeopardy by the need to weigh up the importance of, on the one hand, acting as a 
government watchdog while running the risk of being cut-off from much-needed funding, 
and, on the other, keeping their projects in line with government dictates in order to obtain 
resources while putting up with non-accountability or government failure. The former 
choice, for some NGOs has resulted in castigation and discrediting by the ANC (see 
Gumede, 2005: 286-287). A question that this throws up hence involves "on whose terms" 
'engagement' between state and civil society will take place? (Murray & Pillay, 2005: 196). 
 
Looking at particular areas of civil activity, a point that does seem to be applicable is that 
some fundamental rights have been restricted by the ANC in seeking to protect another 
right. The South African constitution contains a section entitled 'limitation of rights' which 
states that rights "may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the extent 
that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant-factors" (see 
Appendix 1). In this way, a particular right, such as freedom of speech for example, can be 
legitimately infringed upon of it is impacted negatively upon another, such as freedom 
from discrimination.  An example here would be the media enquiry report of the South 
African Human Rights Commission (HRC), the details of which have been covered by 
Glaser (2000). The issue contained in these reports concerned the "handling of race and 
incidence of racism in the media" and carried out an investigation into two major South 
African newspapers (2000: 374). Glaser's analysis of the enquiry provides a reflection of 
the way in which the role of institutions such as the HRC in protecting enshrined individual 
rights can be weakened when there is state interference in areas that should remain 
autonomous. According to Glaser, the HRC reports "appeared to equate vigorous criticism 
of the black majority government with racism" (2000: 374), demonstrating "a remarkably 
impoverished understanding of freedom of expression" (2000: 375).  
 
The issue of the HRC reports links back to the notion of 'bounded uncertainty' (Schmitter, 
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1994), discussed in chapter one, in which certain key rights and issues should remain 
outside of the reach and interference of politicians and the state.  Glaser therefore reflects 
upon the reports as an "illustration of what can happen when intellectual activity is placed 
in the service of repressive state power" (2000: 373). The media, therefore, widely viewed 
as being a key part of civil society able to disseminate information to the public; allow for 
discussion and participation of broad sections of the population; and which should be a 
reflection of the diversity of South African society at large, is encroached upon by 
government, thereby undermining its autonomy and impartiality as well as the 
fundamental right of freedom of speech and of the press (see Appendix 1). The danger here, 
as Glaser points out, is that there is a risk of the media "being harnessed into some form of 
state policing role (Glaser, 2000: 375). 
 
The concern that arises from this analysis, therefore, is that, despite formal commitments, 
ANC language and its continued understanding of its own role and that of civil society - 
seen as needing to cooperate with government in order to achieve the ANC's vision of a 
future South Africa - remain problematic in terms of liberal democratic conceptions. As 
must be pointed out, state and civil society should not be seen as two distinct and opposing 
fields. Rather they are interdependent (Atkinson, 1992) and there is a crucial and necessary 
reciprocity that must be achieved between the two. However, so long as the ANC continues 
to retain an idea of protecting only those civil freedoms that boost the movements own 
agenda, or at least pose no threat to it, then the very essence of pluralism and rights remain 
undermined. 
 
 
ANC Understanding of the Political Opposition:  Invaluable or just Unwelcome? 
 
A key point made by Southall, and highlighted at the beginning of this paper, is that in 
post-apartheid South Africa, “increasingly the debate is not just about whether democracy 
in South Africa will survive, but about the quality of that democracy” (Southall 2001:1). 
The logic of this comment emanates largely from the emergence of a dominant party 
system in South Africa since 1994. In 1994, the ANC entered into the Government of 
National Unity (GNU) with 62.65 per cent of votes, alongside the National Party (NP) – 
now the defunct New National Party (NNP), with 20.39 per cent and the Inkatha Freedom 
Party (IFP), with 10.54 per cent (EISA 1999). In 1999, the ANC's share of the vote 
increased to 66.35 per cent and by the 2004 national elections marking ten year of South 
Africa's democracy this had increased to 69.68 per cent, with the main opposition party, the 
Democratic Alliance (DA), receiving only 12.37 per cent of the vote (EISA, 1994, 1999; 
IEC, 2004). 
 
It must be noted that dominant-party systems are by no means uniform (Giliomee & 
Simkins 1999: xvii-xviii), and the rise of one party to dominance, as well as the 
maintenance of this dominance, may take place by either democratic or inherently 
undemocratic means. Giliomee and Simkins who take a particularly negative stance on 
ANC dominance, categorise South Africa as ‘a democratic system with a dominant party 
playing according to some liberal democratic rules, but still well short of the alternation of 
power’ (1999: xviii) (see Brooks, 2004: 129). Having said this, reflecting again upon 
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Alence's comments regarding the ANC's programme of Constitutional government, 
Edigheji also notes that "‘the South Africa [sic] Constitution provides for a liberal regime 
for the formation and operation of political parties, which the government has upheld" 
(Edigheji 2004: 17).  The issue that concerns us here, however, is the prospects for the 
nurturing of liberal democracy in the context of a dominant party system in which there 
remain elements of the ANC's discourse that undermine the formal constitutional 
commitments made by the movement. 
 
Alongside the value of an autonomous civil society as a 'countervailing force' upon the 
ruling regime and hence increasing prospects for the sustainability of democracy, various 
theorists have equally cited the value of a strong political opposition (Giliomee and 
Simkins, 1999: 337). This viewpoint is vehemently argued by Giliomee and Simkins 
(1999). For them, in a dominant-party system ‘the vital elements of democracy, namely 
genuine competition and uncertainty in electoral outcomes, are removed in a process that is 
self-sustaining’ (1999, p 340) (emphasis added). The importance of uncertainty of the 
outcome of the game was a point noted in the theoretical framework for this paper. 
Moreover, it was added that while the ANC has unarguably won political power according 
to democratic rules, if the key means by which alternative and contesting political views 
can be represented (i.e. through a political opposition) is particularly weak, then the ANC's 
own observance of liberal democratic practice becomes all the more important. 
 
It has been argued that ‘one party dominance becomes problematic when a governing party 
sees less and less need to respond to public opinion because it is assured of re-election’ 
(Africa, Mattes, Herzenberg & Banda 2003: 2). As I have said in a previous piece, "the 
existence of political opposition within a competitive party system presents alternatives to 
the governing party and therefore stimulates debate within society about ideas and policies 
and allows society to question the actions and choices of government" (Brooks, 2004: 123). 
A prominent feature of the post-1994 dispensation, however, is the weak and fragmented 
nature of the political opposition. Simultaneously, as I have argued elsewhere, the 
increasing electoral dominance and overwhelming political power of the ANC "is not 
matched by unquestionable voter satisfaction and contentment with the current 
government and its delivery. Space, in fact, exists for a political opposition that would 
appeal to the interests of the electorate" (Brooks, 2004: 122). 
 
If we concur with the point made by Africa, Mattes, Herzenberg and Banda (2003), above, 
then  the adherence of the ANC to liberal democratic rules becomes all the more important 
in a dominant part system. A considerable amount of useful research has been undertaken 
in the democratic era analysing the state of opposition politics in South Africa and the risks 
posed to democracy by the weak and considerably racialised opposition31. Moreover, the 
                                                          
31  For further reading on the specific role and nature of opposition in South Africa see, for example, Habib, 
A. and R Taylor (2001) ‘Political Alliances and Parliamentary Opposition in Post-Apartheid South Africa’ in 
R Southall (ed). Democratization. Special Issue, Opposition and Democracy in South Africa 8 (1); Habib, A 
and L Nadvi. (2002) ‘Party Disintegrations & Re-alignments in Post-Apartheid South Africa’. Review of 
African Political Economy 92; Schrire, R. (2001) ‘The Realities of Opposition in South Africa: Legitimacy, 
Strategies and Consequences’ in Southall, R. (op cit); Brooks, H. (2004) 'The Dominant Party System: 
Challenges for South Africa's Second Decade of Democracy', Journal of African Elections, 3 (2), Electoral 
Institute of Southern Africa 
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three democratic elections since 1994 have resulted in a decreasing number of seats being 
held by an increasing number of opposition parties, a feature that has only increased the 
ANC's majority and ability to dominate in parliament. The objective of this paper, however, 
is not to analyse the role of the opposition in South Africa. Rather, in order that we can 
understand more clearly the ANC's relationship with liberal democracy over the post-1994 
period, the following discussion seeks to examine the ANC's understanding of the 
opposition and what it considers its appropriate role to be.  
 
A point that was highlighted earlier, and is worth reiterating here, is that of the liberation 
movement’s perception of itself is “as the only legitimate party in government” (Shubane, 
1992: 41). The consequence of this, as Shubane has argued, is that “the idea of multiplicity 
in political representation… [is]…done away with" (ibid). As the previous section 
demonstrated, in looking at the language of the ANC in its various documents during the 
democratic period so far, the ANC has not moved far from its understanding of itself as the 
sole representative of the people or nation – reinforcing both the notion of the ‘collective 
will’ raised by Glaser (1997), and the denying of social and political diversity. The 
criticisms and labelling targeted at civil society groups by the ruling party have been 
equally, if not more, a feature of the ANC’s interaction with the political opposition.  
 
Alongside the ANC's continued view of representing the nation as a whole, is its ongoing 
perception of opposition parties - despite their constitutional right to exist - as undermining 
the ANC's project of transformation and equality. At the 50th National Conference of the 
ANC in 1997, President Mandela expressed his interpretation of opposition parties, 
referring to their "their effort to challenge and undermine our role as the political force 
chosen by the people to lead our country" (Mandela, 1997). The ANC, of course, has a 
prize hand to play in being able to fall back upon both its own liberation credentials, as well 
as the predominantly white racial make-up of a number of the opposition parties. Schrire, 
for example, notes that, for the ruling party and its supporters "opposition is frequently 
identified with the creation of obstacles to delivery and the protection of illegitimate 
special interests" (Schrire 2001: 147). 
 
 The fact that it remains willing to use such tactics, however, in some way undermines its 
stated commitment to tolerance and pluralism of the political terrain. A further point to 
note is that its language with regard to such commitments remains somewhat ambiguous 
and at some points contradictory. In fact, in the very same address, Mandela goes on to 
make a particularly intriguing statement:  
 
"-These parties see themselves as playing an opposition role to the ruling 
party in a multi-party democracy. Our movement, which led the struggle 
for the defeat of the apartheid regime and the establishment of the new 
constitutional and political order, respects and defends the right of these 
parties to play this legal opposition role without let or hindrance" 
(Mandela, 1997). 
 
On the one hand, his statement asserts the willingness of the ANC to 'respect ' and 'defend' 
the right of parties to undertake their legal role. On the other hand, however, he 
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simultaneously appears to be critical and suspicious of this role. The emphasis here should 
perhaps be placed upon the word ‘legal’ . While the ANC may be respectful of the legality 
of the opposition's role, given Mandela's cleverly placed reference to the ANC's leading 
role in establishing "the new constitutional and political order", then whether the ANC in 
fact views this role as legitimate is quite another matter. Surely in any multi-party system, 
let alone one formally committed to liberal democratic values, then the very essence of the 
opposition is to oppose and provide alternatives to the party in power. 
 
An equally fascinating statement on the 'character of the ANC' is made within the 
movement's 1997 Draft Strategy and Tactics document. This extract states that 
 
   "while at this stage we define ourselves as a liberation movement, it is 
trite to counterpose this to being "a party" in the broad sense or as 
understood by adherents of formal bourgeois democracy" (1997) 
(emphasis added). 
 
While stating its commitment to liberal democratic values, the ANC simultaneously refers 
to the form of democracy that this entails as ‘bourgeois’. While South Africa may well be a 
formally multi-party democracy with an array of institutional mechanisms in place to 
protect the liberal democratic gains of the post-1994 period, it is language such as this that 
raises cause for concern as to the ANC’s real commitment to liberal democratic values as 
well as its own interpretation and understanding of its underlying principles that raise cause 
for concern. 
 
A statement by Thabo Mbeki the following year, having been elected the new President of 
the ANC, portrayed 'right wing' opposition as seeking to prevent the process of 
transformation when they criticised the ANC for abandoning its Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) :  
 
- They hope to turn the masses of our people who voted for us in 1994 
against our movement by seeking to project the notion that we have 
betrayed the trust that the people placed in the ANC. We must, of course, 
expect that these opposition parties will play this role, in their interest, as 
part of their strategic objective to weaken and defeat our movement to 
bring to a halt the process of the fundamental transformation of our 
country (Mbeki, 1998) 
 
Undoubtedly, there were elements of the South African right who sought to promote a 
reversal of the gains of 1994. Unfortunately, however, such criticisms have not been 
directed only against right wing elements - as reflected in Mandela's branding of internal 
critics as allies of opposition forces (see previous section). Four years into democracy, the 
ANC seemed to retain the notion of 'the people' as a collective unit with a common will. 
Suttner, while presenting himself as a strong critic of any contention that the inherent 
nature of national liberation movements may prove nugatory to democratic gains, does 
concede, "the consolidation of democracy...is not the task of the ANC as majority party 
alone". He asserts, rather, that "neither the ANC nor any other political party or 
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organisation can be equated with the nation...There are interests within the nation that 
require representation outside of the national liberation movement" (2004: 112-113). The 
ANC, however, far from assuming that there will inevitably be those who are in 
disagreement with aspects of its programme, categorises all those outside of its camp as 
being both racist and against the nation as a whole. One of the crucial points that the 
post-1994 era demonstrates is that continued elevation of the liberation struggle in the 
politics of the ruling party may have a destabilising effect on democracy (Brooks, 2004).  
 
While the weak political opposition in South Africa has shown itself to be inept at targeting 
the broader population and moving away from narrow interest groups and racial appeals32, 
considerable blame for the narrowing of political debate must also lie with the ruling party. 
On the one hand, we must take note of the ANC's commitment to a parliamentary form of 
democracy. Suttner, who joined parliament as an ANC member in 1994, notes that 
significant changes were made in order to make parliament more open and with "greater 
access than before" (2005, personal interview). However, a key point that has been 
frequently highlighted as a particular feature of the Mbeki era from 1999, is that the role of 
parliament has been significantly weakened in favour of the executive. The lack of values 
placed upon the sharing of views within parliament, reinforced by the ANC's apparent 
view of the illegitimacy of opposition, undermines one of the key strengths of liberal 
democracy found in the role of parliament and its ability to keep a check on the executive. 
Moreover, as Habib and Schultz-Herzenberg state, the weakening of the legislature, in turn, 
weakens the vote of citizens, which forms their key 'leverage', 'vis-à-vis' the state (2005: 
168-169). 
 
On the one hand, numerous observers have highlighted the predictability and inevitable 
results of the 1994 election. Daniel, in fact, describes it as symbolic, ‘a rite of passage’, 
rather than a contest between parties (2004: 13). The further South Africa has moved into 
the democratic era, however, and the consolidation of the ANC's political dominance, then 
issues of the way in which the ruling party perceives and relates to the opposition become 
all the more significant. The years from 1999 are therefore crucial to observing how liberal 
democracy is panning out in South Africa. 
 
What appears to have emerged are conflicting interpretations of the ruling ANC and the 
political opposition of the role that opposition should play in the new democracy. Thus, 
while South Africa is formally a multi-party democracy with institutionalised political 
opposition, "the key debates revolve around which interests should be represented by 
which party and how should this opposition be expressed" (Schrire 2001: 141). South 
Africa’s political history of discrimination against the black majority renders this a delicate 
and controversial issue. A prominent concern has related to the tendency for the ANC 
leadership to display intolerance of criticism (both from opposition parties and from within 
its own ranks) and to view the opposition as enemies of the transformation project 
(Myburgh 2004), as the above extracts have demonstrated. As Schrire has noted, while the 
ANC "recognizes the philosophical justifications for an opposition, it harbours serious 
                                                          
32  Butler, for example quite legitimately suggests that ‘it may be the current absence of credible opposition 
parties reflecting the interests of the discontented, rather than unshakeable affiliation, that secures current 
ANC control’ (2003: 9) 
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reservations about the nature of opposition …Given its unqualified commitment to 
‘transformation’, it maintains that opposition based upon a rejection of fundamental 
socio-economic change is not legitimate…[and]…it does not accept the legitimacy of 
opposition parties that are based upon the representation of minority interests" (2001: 
140)33. This very argument would appear to fit in with Mandela's statement, cited above, 
that seems to counter-pose the legality and legitimacy of the opposition. 
 
 Since 1999, these conflicting understandings can be seen most starkly in the ANC’s 
response to the DA. The DA has become known for its fairly ‘robust’ and adversarial 
stance, creating a considerable degree of animosity between the DA and the ANC 
government in the 2004 election. If we concur with Myburgh’s interpretation (2004) that 
"for Mbeki the opposition were welcome to participate in the elections, but once the will of 
the people had been freely expressed and the ANC returned to power, there should be unity 
in action, and the minority should submit to the majority", then increasing intolerance of 
opposition – in particular when opposition takes a critical stance against the ruling party – 
could well be a warning sign to look out for (see Brooks, 2004: 142).  
 
It is this very weakness of political and parliamentary opposition in post-1994 South Africa 
that highlights the issue of internal party democracy as a crucial lens through which to view 
the ANC's relationship with liberal democracy over recent years. The key issue remains 
how we can ensure that government remains accountable to its citizens. What must be 
emphasised in this analysis is that in a context in which the likelihood of the ANC being 
displaced is so marginal, then the issue of internal democracy within the Tripartite 
Alliance and the ANC itself becomes all the more important.  
 
 
Internal Party Democracy  
 
The key debate surrounding Tripartite Alliance negotiations concerns the extent to which 
the political Left actually retains meaningful influence within this alliance. This balance of 
power is of concern as, given the highlighted weakness of political opposition parties, then 
internal pluralism and debate within the alliance and the ANC itself has come to be seen as 
playing an extremely crucial role in both maintaining checks on government power, and 
ensuring that liberal democracy is not undermined by arbitrary and centralised 
decision-making.  
 
As this paper has shown, the nature of the ANC as a liberation movement is such that it has 
been able to extend its appeal and expand its support base to varying groups within society. 
The result, as Reddy describes, it that it has within its ranks supporters who are at differing 
points along the ideological spectrum (Reddy, 2002: 7-8). Its extensive influence, “strong 
organisational structures” (Reddy, 2002), and centralised leadership (Butler 2003: 8-9) 
have enabled the party to contain the varying viewpoints and policy stances within it in 
order to retain the cohesion and authority of the party (Butler, 2003; Reddy, 2002). 
However, this is a feature which has become more pronounced as a result of the 
precariously balanced relationship of the ANC with business and capital on the one hand, 
                                                          
33  See Brooks, H. (2004: 141-142) 
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and with the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African 
Communist Party (SACP) in the Tripartite Alliance on the other (see Suttner 2004) 
(Brooks, 2004).  
 
A key dimension of the ANC’s relationship with liberal democracy in the current 
democratic era is, therefore, its historic alliance with labour and the political left. Much of 
the debate surrounding the internal relations of the Tripartite Alliance relate to the apparent 
sea change in the ANC’s economic policy direction since entering government. The former 
Marxist terminology, re-distributive and socialist-oriented language of the liberation 
movement with regard to socio-economic rights has been displaced, post-1994, by the 
appeasement of big business and a dramatic shift toward a neo-liberal and market oriented 
economic policy. This move is clearly at odds with the ideology and programme of the 
ANC’s allies - COSATU and the SACP. While perceived as having played a valuable role 
during the liberation struggle, their influence on the ANC government’s policy post-1990 
has given labour far less to shout about, not least given the government's move toward the 
global economic orthodoxy (Brooks, 146-147). There consequently exists a contentious 
power balance within the alliance, as Webster outlines, in which labour and the Left must 
consider which is the lesser of two evils: they can “cooperate and face marginalization”, or 
oppose their ally but risk “a government coming to power that is less friendly towards 
labour” (Webster 2001: 271). 
 
What has emerged, is not so much a three-way alliance, as originally envisaged by the 
ANC’s partners, as an unequal and somewhat estranged relationship between the three in 
which the ANC in government, and its central leadership in particular, directs policy with a 
decreasing level of consultation and debate. Indeed, Raymond Suttner, a member of both 
the SACP and a former ANC member of parliament from 1994 to 1997, states that the 
question that must be asked is “whether the components of the Tripartite Alliance today 
relate to one-another simultaneously as allies and opponents or even enemies?" (2002: 56). 
The following discussion looks at the development of this tendency and the conclusions 
that we can draw regarding the treatment of internal difference and plurality of opinion in 
light of the ANC’s current commitment to the liberal democratic values of debate and 
tolerance.   
     
On the one hand, the focus of the internal democracy debate has come to pivot around the 
Mbeki Presidency, viewed in a particularly critical light concerning debate and tolerance. 
Mbeki’s presidency has, without a doubt, differed starkly to that of his predecessor, Nelson 
Mandela - not least due to their immensely different character traits and personalities as 
well as the very different roles they have played in their respective eras of South Africa’s 
democracy. The wealth of literature that has emerged focusing on the perceived intolerance 
of the Mbeki era is certainly telling of the nature of his Presidency34.  
 
Having said this, looking at the below extract from a report by Mandela in 1997, the 
tendency toward intolerance and suppression of difference within the movement is clearly 
                                                          
34  See, for example, W. Gumede (2005) Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC; R. Calland and 
P. Graham (eds) (2005) ‘Democracy in the Time of Thabo Mbeki’; and S. Jacobs and R. Calland (2002) 
Thabo Mbeki’s World: The Ideology of the South African President. 
  88
detectable: 
 
"The current phase of the NDR contains many new and complex 
dynamics; and the ANC should itself continue to be a vibrant 
organisation within whose ranks there is constant exchange of ideas, 
however different such ideas may be. Its cadre policy should encourage 
creativity in thought and in practice, and eschew rigid dogma. However, 
it should exercise maximum discipline among its members, and ensure 
that, after ideas have been exchanged and decisions have been taken, all 
its structures and members pursue the same goal" (ANC, 1997) 
(emphasis added). 
 
This statement appears to articulate the old Leninist principle, discussed earlier, of 
democratic centralism. At the very same time as emphasising the importance of ‘the 
exchange of ideas’, Mandela states the ongoing importance, even in the democratic era, it 
would seem, of ’maximum discipline’ and the importance of submitting and adhering to 
party decisions. The very idea of uniformity and maximum discipline are surely somewhat 
at odds with eschewing ’rigid dogma’. This mode of thinking, nonetheless, reflects the 
ongoing concern within liberation movement leadership to maintain the ANC’s unity and 
conformity of its members, and the tight, disciplined organisational structures of its exile 
years. The problem that this tradition throws up for internal democracy is concisely 
outlined by Gumede, and interestingly echoes Shubane’s earlier point concerning the 
inherently negative impact of liberation movements on broader autonomy and pluralism 
(1992). Gumede quite rightly argues that "the methods required by a clandestine liberation 
movement facing a ruthless enemy are not the stuff of which a vibrant and dynamic 
democracy is made. Democracy recognises that in difference and dissent lie strength" 
(2005: 292).   
 
Gumede has applied his arguments most vehemently in his recent book entitled Thabo 
Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC, focussing specifically on both his presidency 
and his path to leadership positions. At a frequently cited meeting of Thabo Mbeki with the 
SACP at the 10th Congress of the SACP in 1998, Mbeki made an overtly condemning 
speech about critical members in the SACP and COSATU in which he placed them in the 
opposition camp. Tactics used against civil society have also been used within the party 
and alliance (see Gumede, 2005: 299). In his speech to the SACP congress, he 
acknowledged “the important question of how we should handle the differences and 
contradictions that will necessarily and inevitably arise among ourselves as members of the 
Alliance and members of the mass democratic movement” (1998). However, rather than 
encouraging the need for open debate and the sharing of ideas, he castigates alliance 
partners’ criticisms as illegitimate and as seeking to derail the crucial tasks of the 
democratic movement. As Atkinson has pointed out, "a culture of debate and 
argumentation is necessarily part of a rights culture" (1991: 50). Mbeki, however, argues 
that “the real victories we must score must be against our real enemies and not against other 
comrades” (1998), going to on to state that: 
   
“None of us should go around carrying the notion in our heads that we 
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have a special responsibility to be a revolutionary watchdog over the 
ANC. We must understand that none among the left forces of our country 
is challenged to capture the soul of the ANC, to avoid it being stolen by 
forces of the right. This supposed left victory would mean that we, who 
are members and cadres of the ANC, will sit in helpless surrender as 
whatever force takes away our soul, leaving us as nothing but pliable 
instruments in the hands of whoever controls us” (Mbeki, 1998)  
 
Thinking back to Mandela‘s comments about the civil society groups and 
their ’self-conceived’ role of acting as watchdogs over government, Mbeki appears to be 
making the very same criticism of left-wing members of the Tripartite Alliance, this time 
referring to them as ‘revolutionary watchdogs’ - a notion more in fitting with the alliance 
partners’ disapproval of the ANC’s right economic turn. Mbeki’s address to the SACP 
concluded with his certainty that the SACP would pay heed to his words, reiterating the 
need for “the cohesion of the democratic movement” (Mbeki, 1998). A point that is 
particularly relevant here in terms of establishing a rights-protective culture of tolerance is 
that made by Atkinson, who notes that "people need to become comfortable with the idea 
that the exercise of rights by others is not inherently threatening to their own rights" 
(Atkinson, 1992: 52-53) - a comment which equally applies to the ANC.  
 
The irony in Mbeki’s words regarding the project of ‘capturing’ the “soul of the ANC” 
relates precisely to the title of Gumede’s book cited above. For him, it seems that Mbeki is 
the main contender in this battle, as he seeks to dominate the movement with like-minded 
comrades who will continue to fulfil his legacy and policies.  Since his ascendancy to the 
head of the ANC, Mbeki has been accused by various sources of both deploying the more 
‘loyalist’ party members, known to be uncritical of decisions taken at the centre by Mbeki, 
to more prominent positions within state organs (Southall 2001:17); as well as sending 
those who appear willing to voice their concerns or alternatives to more low-profile posts 
(Gumede, 2004: 297). Good similarly raises issues of internal accountability as Ministers 
appear to now only be accountable to the Presidency (Good, 2002: 125) - a feature which 
ties in with the substantial transfer of power from the legislature to the executive. Good’s 
argument lends a considerable degree of credence to Gumede’s description of the ANC 
NEC as now essentially a ‘rubber stamp’ committee (Gumede, 2005: 295). 
 
Such actions as highlighted by Southall (2001) and Gumede (2005) have functioned as 
mechanisms to curb criticism from within. As a result, healthy debate within the party is 
stifled, and critical voices have come to be portrayed by party leadership as enemies of the 
movement (Southall, 2001: 17-18). In one of two, now well-known, interviews between 
SACP leader Jeremy Cronin and Irish academic Helena Sheehan, Cronin cited what he 
understood to be the ‘bureaucratisation’ and “ZANU-fication” of the ANC, in which the 
movement has displayed an increasing degree of centralisation and coercion at the expense 
of contact with its membership and support base (Cronin, 2002)35. Similar concerns over 
                                                          
35 This interview with Jeremy Cronin was conducted by Dr Helena Sheehan on 24 January 2002 at the 
Parliament of South Africa. An earlier interview was also conducted on 17 April 2001 at the University of 
Cape Town. Transcripts of both interviews can be found at www.comms.dcu.ie/sheehanh/za/cronin02.htm 
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the Mbeki presidency have been voiced by Suttner, who observes that "the parties [within 
the alliance] relate to one another with little pretence of equality" (2002: 57). Rather, he 
suggests that the SACP and COSATU, recognising the ANC’s increasingly independent 
and authoritarian position, "relate to the ANC/government as interest groups or petitioners" 
(ibid). A point of particular note here is that, following Cronin’s aforementioned criticisms, 
he was, in fact, ’requested’ to make a public apology for his comments regarding the ANC 
and its centralising tendencies.  
 
As the post-democratic era has progressed, the continuing influences of the ANC‘s exile 
traditions become apparent, despite the movements commitment to liberal democratic 
practice. On the one hand, internal democracy of the ANC during the 1960s to 1980s was 
occasionally provided for. The 1969 Morogoro Conference was an example of this, 
facilitating a consultative forum precisely because dissent and growing internal differences 
had begun to swell in ANC ranks. There were no obligations on the ANC, however, at this 
stage to foster a plurality of interests. The issue that concerns us here is the ANC’s 
willingness to allow for internal debate in the present context. This harks back to Southall’s 
idea about a heroic past that legitimises the role of liberation movements and their leaders 
in the present. Hence 'popular election victories' in the democratic era only reaffirm in the 
minds of liberationists a preordained authority that they see as deriving from their historic 
role (Southall, 2003: 129 cited in Butler, 2005: 730). This notion in itself echoes the 
'vanguardist' ideas of the movement’s role, whose authority and legitimacy is 
un-contestable due to only their ability to fulfil the historic project. 
 
Post-liberation warnings of the internally authoritarian tendencies of the ANC, whereby 
the central leadership, with Mbeki as ringleader, dictates party policy and direction 
continue to be voiced. Disagreement or discussion within the party membership is 
ruthlessly quashed (Gumede, 2004: 300-301). Mbeki's intolerance of accusations such as 
this was directly reflected in his defensive and angry response to a speech made by 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu in November 2003. In this address, the Archbishop spoke of his 
concern and disappointment at the lack of 'vigorous' and 'open' debate over pertinent 
national issues such as AIDS, and "unthinking, uncritical, kowtowing party line-toeing 
[that] is fatal to democracy" (2003)36. Relating to civil society, therefore, Murray and Pillay 
make an important and related comment that, while “the public is told of rigorous debate 
within the  ANC...[it]..is not privy to it” (2005: 202).  
 
A crucial point that must be touched upon here relates to the way in which the ANC’s 
historical role and moral weight continues to exert a tremendous pull on its membership 
and affiliates, despite widespread emerging concerns over its internal democratic culture 
(or lack of) and the pattern of treatment of its internal critics. This very issue is discussed 
by Marais, who refers to the “force-field of ‘national liberation‘” in which the socialist left 
is held (1999: 16). He notes the way in which those within the alliance remain loyal to the 
ANC, despite fundamental disagreement and contradictions with their own organisation’s 
principles and ideology. As Marais describes, Mbeki’s words to the SACP at its 19th 
congress were “a reminder that the terms of its alliance with the ANC preclude aggressive 
contestation of ANC policies....bounds of permissible dissent were asserted: debate, and 
                                                          
36    For Mbeki's written response, see New African, No.436, January 2005, pp. 17-21. 
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even disputes, are allowed, but on terms set and policed by the ANC leadership” (1998: 15). 
‘Inclusivity‘ in the alliance, therefore, “is maintained at the expense of leftist 
organisational autonomy, heterodox criticism and dissenting activities” (Marais, 1999: 16).  
 
Emerging anger on the part of the alliance partners, however, and in particular COSATU, 
is reflected in recent protests over economic issues and their impact on workers. It is 
important to state, therefore, that COSATU’s unswerving commitment to their alliance 
with the ANC is by no means set in stone. A similar example, relevant to more recent 
events, is the pro-Jacob Zuma protests and demonstrations that have come to the fore in the 
wake of  the former deputy president's firing from his government post and prosecution 
charges. While the form that these protests have taken may not themselves have been 
particularly acceptable, they are one example of the backlash from within the Congress 
camp and civil society against the growing authoritarianism of Thabo Mbeki. However, as 
Suttner highlights, "a factor that militates against splits is the continued and considerable 
overlap in membership between the organisations, especially the ANC and SACP, at every 
level" (2002: 58). An additional and pertinent point is raised by Lodge, who argues that the 
left alliance partners in fact “prefer access and influence to opposition and exclusion” 
(2002: 115). The question that COSATU must regularly ask itself is where it would find 
funding should it choose to break away from the ANC?  
 
An extremely interesting feature of the internal democracy debate is, ironically, that the  
SACP and left wing voices, once pinpointed as the source of the ANC’s authoritarian 
traditions due to their influential Marxist-Leninist ideas, are now the very ones being 
marginalized and criticised for their desire for internal discussion and internally 
democratic decision-making. The political left itself has become the victim of the traditions 
of democratic centralism and enforcement of internal unity. The point that must be made 
here, therefore, is that the ideological strands that appear to pull the ANC away from real 
commitment to liberal democracy are not those within the Marxist-Leninist camp, but the 
more radical Africanist tradition, which appears to have resurfaced in the democratic era. 
The ANC’s demonstration of its willingness to play the race card when faced with criticism, 
from both outside and within, is itself a reflection of this. Suttner highlights the ANC’s 
belittling of the SACP in which the ruling party condemned the Party for what it perceived 
as 'infantile leftism’ (2002: 57). The irony of this is also highlighted by Glaser, who notes 
that an Africanist discourse is most certainly being ’employed’ by the government, while at 
the same time the ANC seeks to appease white business and capital (2000: 385).   
 
The point that this discussion emphasises is that such loyalty to the movement occurs 
despite the starkly different views that the alliance partners hold on the ANC’s economic 
policymaking. The content of much of the difference of opinion between the ANC and the 
Left has evolved around the ANC’s economic policy choices and as well as the lack of 
debate and consultation over such choices. This brings us to an important argument 
presented in the first chapter of this paper. It was suggested that the ideas of political 
liberalism and economic liberalism, while undoubtedly sharing mutual origins, can and 
should be analysed as separate and distinct ideologies. It was also argued that, given their 
mutual exclusiveness, the two are by no means necessarily mutually reinforcing, and that 
contemporary South Africa is a case in point. The issue of internal democracy brings this 
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point to the fore. As the ANC has chosen an increasingly liberal economic policy mandate 
- arguably far more so than was ever even considered by the ANC’s white National Party 
predecessors - it has simultaneously been seen as retracting on its commitments to political 
liberalism.  
 
The central issue here that must be reiterated is that in a context in which the ANC is 
politically dominant - a context in which the ANC has become worryingly synonymous 
with the democratic era itself in South Africa - then the internal practices and traditions of 
the ANC become increasingly critical to the continuation of the movement’s adherence to 
democratic practice. The conclusions that have been drawn within this paper demonstrate 
that despite elements of the ANC‘s historic discourse which do coincide with politically 
liberal ideas, as well as its more recent open commitments to liberal democratic values 
since the 1980s, there nonetheless remain suggestions within its language which prove 
problematic for genuinely liberal democratic ideas. Elements of this discourse are 
undoubtedly carried over from the struggle era, most notably that spent in exile, and hence 
represent consistencies in some of the ANC‘s older traditions and understandings of 
democracy. Moreover, the liberation movement’s current interpretation of the various 
components of liberal democracy does not always tie in with the broadly accepted 
understandings of liberal democracy. 
 
A point which is relevant to the post-democratic era at large, but in particular to the aspect 
of internal democracy, is that, despite the rhetorical ‘emphasis’ placed upon ‘consensus’ 
and “shared decision-making”, as Murray and Pillay highlight, “if democratic 
decision-making means representing the plurality and diversity within South African 
society, the question still remains as to whether these characteristics are to be reflected 
within the democratic process of the dominant party, or to be reflected in the relationship 
between it and minority parties" (Murray & Pillay, 2005: 201). This statement echoes the 
issues discussed in Chapter one regarding the exercise of rights and pluralism and whether 
the ANC actually envisages these rights as being exercised only within the confines of a 
broad ANC hegemony. Thus, if issues of true representation, accountability, pluralism and 
rights are to be upheld in South Africa, then those concerned to see such consolidation will 
need to maintain a watchful eye on internal party democracy. 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
This paper set out to provide an analysis of the ANC’s changing relationship with liberal 
democracy over the course of the movement’s history, mapping the origins of liberal 
democratic thinking and the way in which these strands developed and altered from the 
ANC’s inception to the present The variety of traditions housed within the ANC, from 
liberal notions, to African Nationalism and Marxism-Leninism have also had considerable 
influences on its ideology and practice, and to differing extents in the various periods of its 
leadership. 
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Strands of liberal thinking within the ANC can be found in the early leadership of the 
Congress during the 1920s and 1930s. This original leadership group by no means had its 
roots in a working class or impoverished section of the African population. Rather, the 
early Congress leaders were beneficiaries of missionary education who held a distinct 
respect for the actual form of existing democracy, reflected in the value placed upon the 
franchise in the Cape - a source of inspiration for many educated Africans. The key role of 
the Congress at this time was by no means one seeking a radical change of the existing 
system. Rather, the ANC sought its equal extension to the African majority through the 
granting of the vote. It is clear to see that liberal influences pertained within the ANC from 
an early stage. The very formation of the movement was based upon the notion of universal 
franchise and representation of the rights of Africans. As expressed in the 1919 
constitution of the movement, the Congress by no means sought an overthrow of the 
existing parliamentary system, nor any vision of a desired alternative. In fact, in contrast to 
what was to emerge over the following decades, in particular from the 1950s and during the 
movement’s period in exile through its growing alliance with the Communist Party, the 
ANC of the pre-1940s was bereft of any real form of radical influences. 
 
It was, in fact, the 1940s and 1950s through the emergence of the ANC Youth league that 
saw the surfacing of an ideology of African Nationalism within the ANC, a nationalism 
that evoked ethnic connotations and a romantic vision of an African past and roots. While 
this ideology was not specifically liberal or anti-liberal, it was a nationalist strand within 
the ANC that had the potential to lend itself to more authoritarian dictates. However, what 
is crucial to state in understanding the shift that took place during this period is that while it 
certainly reflected something of a discursive turn in the language of the ANC, the area of 
change did not reflect a move away from liberal democracy as an ideal, as such. Rather, the 
shift induced by the Youth League formation and rise to prominence of African nationalists 
within the ANC was a move away from liberalism in the sense of gradualism - a method 
and vision so far promoted by the more conservative ANC leadership.  
 
With the formation of the Youth League in 1944 the programme of the ANC reflected a 
shift towards a more assertive approach with an added degree of militancy. Although 
utilising a far more radicalised and nationalist language, the League, in essence, retained 
the inherited objectives of the older liberation leadership, continuing to campaign for the 
extension of the vote and a vision that remained in line with representative democracy and 
Africans' rights. What can also be identified, however, is a more clearly articulated and 
explicit understanding of the various rights being campaigned for by the ANC, as reflected 
in the Africans’ Claims document of 1943.  
 
With the removal of the Cape franchise in 1936 and the implementation of the system of 
apartheid from 1948, the 1950s saw the onset of a far more significant shift in the ANC‘s 
thinking with regard to liberal democratic ideas through its growing relationship with the 
SACP. The mutual experience of increased state repression forged a new bond between 
members of the SACP, now banned as a communist organisation, and the ANC who 
embarked upon a new willingness to embrace alternative allies in the liberation struggle.  
 
The 1950s certainly represented a slight broadening of the ANC’s ideological programme 
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as a number of prominent communists joined the ranks of the ANC and saw the growth of 
overlapping membership between the two organisations. At this stage, however, the 
relationship between them appears to have remained largely one of ‘pragmatic 
cooperation’ as opposed to any ‘ideological conversion’ (Ranuga, 1996: 52). The years 
from 1952 to 1967 were also characterised by the Presidency of Chief Albert Lutuli, 
himself a prominent leader of liberal thinking, who outlined some of the most explicit ideas 
of the ANC regarding the demands of Africans, which seemed to tie in with some liberal 
democratic ideas. A concrete ideological stance on the issue of rights, however, let alone a 
future democratic state form, remained absent within this period. 
 
During the 1950s, as a result of SACP influence, the ANC also began to acknowledge the 
important role of the working class within the liberation struggle, although the movement  
maintained that its prime concern remained, first and foremost, the removal of racial 
oppression. A further point of note with regard to ideological influences upon the ANC at 
this time links to its acknowledgment from the late 1960s of the 'international' trend toward 
socialism, a trend which it appeared not to see as conflicting with its own programme, yet 
remained ambiguous as to how it viewed and positioned itself in relation to this wider trend. 
A point which is critical to highlight in referring to the 1960s and 1970s is the growth of the 
overlapping membership of the ANC and SACP following the consolidation of a formal 
alliance in exile. The issue of overlapping membership necessarily led to a degree of 
blurring of the ideological boundaries between the two organisations as a number of ANC 
members became influenced by ideas of Marxism-Leninism. Moreover, the SACP's 
central concept of the two-stage theory of revolution, combined with the overlapping 
membership between the two organisations, certainly encouraged concerns during this 
period over the negative impact of SACP ideology upon the ANC. As this paper has 
discussed, the two stage theory is essentially problematic for notions of liberal democracy 
given its suggestion that the democratic 'gains' of the first stage may be supplanted by a 
second stage of transition to socialism, empty of any commitment to democracy (Glaser, 
1991a; 1991b). Furthermore, as Glaser has argued, the ideologies of the SACP and ANC - 
that of anti-colonial nationalism and orthodox communism, respectively - both "employ 
unitary and organic conceptions of the democratic subject" (Glaser, 1991a: 95), 
fundamentally contradictory to liberal democratic ideas of individual rights and pluralism 
(ibid). 
  
At the same time however, this era was one in which the nature of the ANC as a broad 
movement, encompassing an array of political traditions and ideologies came particularly 
to the fore. This, however, is a feature which led the liberation movement in its later years, 
from the late 1980s onwards, to encounter significant difficulties in meeting the challenge 
of maintaining the unity and conformity of its broad movement while, simultaneously, 
maintaining principles of tolerance and debate crucial to a pluralistic and rights-protective 
polity. 
 
The ANC’s period in exile led to increasing debate and questioning surrounding the actual 
influence of the SACP on ANC thinking. Having formed a formal military alliance in exile, 
the influence of Marxist-Leninist thinking within the ranks of the ANC undoubtedly 
became more pronounced between 1960 and the late 1980s. One of the most prominent 
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concerns of the era, and one also outlined above, was the influence of the two stage theory 
of the SACP, for whom the ANC was a key vehicle in realising this very vision. This 
centrality of the SACP’s alliance with the ANC for the possibility of embarking upon the 
second stage toward socialism has hence led some to highlight the SACP’s greater reliance 
upon the ANC than vice versa (Prior, 1983: 194).  
 
A further prominent characteristic of the movement’s period in exile was the premise it 
placed upon unity and centralised decision-making over more democratic consultation. 
This was a tradition adopted in the conditions of exile in which dissent could prove divisive 
and weaken the liberation movement. The lack of intra-movement consultation during this 
period, however, was also a reflection of both the ANC's growing belief in itself as greater 
than the sum of its parts, and a reinforcement of its self-conceived identity as the 
embodiment of the people. 
 
A notable feature of the ANC in exile, however, and one which seems to have contributed 
significantly to concerns at the time that the ANC was envisioning not a future state built 
along liberal democratic lines, but, rather, a state in line with the SACP’s vision of the 
two-stage theory, was that the ANC outlined no clear vision for a future state form. Rather, 
its alliance with the SACP and absence of a mapping out of future policy and principle, 
opened up the possibility of a future state representing the collective notion of ‘the people’ 
and empty of any real liberal democratic content, particularly with regard to 
constitutionally enshrined pluralism and rights. This notion was reinforced by the nature of 
the 1955 Freedom Charter as a political document. Despite the various interpretations of 
the Charter from both the political right and left, it was essentially a document with no 
clear ideological orientation – a characteristic which Prior (1983) highlighted as a key 
factor in explaining the document’s enthusiastic acceptance by such a broad spectrum of 
ideological inclinations within the Congress Camp, including the SACP. 
 
It seems fair to argue that considerations of action and means were certainly prioritised 
over the specificities of the ends during the ANC’s years in exile. Earlier suggestions of 
liberal democratic thinking – reflected in documents such as the 1943 Africans’ Claims, 
were considerably more absent from the ANC’s doctrine in exile.  
 
As this discussion has highlighted, the political traditions of the ANC from the 1960s up to 
the late 1980s inevitably had a tremendous impact on the nature of the movement that 
made its way back to conditions of legality within South Africa after 1990. Moreover, 
these traditions were starkly different to those that had surfaced inside South Africa in the 
townships and civics organisation with the simultaneous rise of UDF-driven people’s 
power in the 1980s. Placed alongside the development of a highly centralised and elite-led 
external movement, used to operating in covert and high-security circumstances, the ANC 
in exile posed a stark contrast to the parallel mass-driven campaigns of the UDF 
advocating a popular and participatory democracy. The problem with these popular 
democratic notions of the UDF, however, is that they undermine some of the key principles 
of liberal democratic theory regarding pluralism and rights. The popular democratic 
understandings being advocated within South Africa during the 1980s brushed over the 
need for institutions in which the diversity of political opinion and interests in society 
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could be represented. The flaw in the institutions of people’s power, as far as liberal 
democratic understandings are concerned, was that ideas such as justice, participation and 
democracy were narrowed to the confines of the ANC-aligned democratic movement and 
hence represented an impartial understanding of democracy.  
 
Moreover, the UDF’s explicitly-stated aversion to notions of liberal democracy as a bogus 
form of democracy suggest that ‘pluralism’ was viewed by the front as a crass substitute 
for real democratic control by the people. The period of the UDF and people’s power inside 
South Africa similarly marked this period in the ANC’s history in which there was 
considerable neglect, or even absence, of liberal democratic notions emphasising the 
importance of individual liberties and rights. 
 
The late 1980s, however, saw a dramatic shift in the ANC’s relationship with liberal 
democracy. Indeed, the years from 1986 to 1994 became defining moments in the 
formation and shaping of South Africa’s democratic future. Moreover, the various forces 
and ideological persuasions contained within the ANC, emanating from both the 
movement’s exile and domestic experiences, fundamentally shaped the processes of 
change and transition.  
From 1986, a number of momentous statements emerged within addresses and documents 
issued by the ANC, stating distinctly liberal democratic notions of a future state, including 
the importance of a bill or rights for South Africa, enshrining the rights and liberties of the 
individual. Moreover, the January 8th statement of 1987 specifically stated those freedoms 
of speech, assembly, association and the press, fundamental to a liberal democratic order. 
What is more, Tambo added to this the freedom of all to join or form any party of their 
choice, free of any interference (1987a). Not only did these expressions represent 
land-mark changes in the political ideology of the ANC, but the address also stated the 
ANC's acceptance of these rights for the national democratic revolution's own success 
(1987a).  
 
These were statements and acceptances that had never before been a feature of the 
liberation movement's discourse and hence represent dramatic changes in the ANC's 
relationship with liberal democratic values. A number of factors, both internal and external, 
influenced these shifting ideas of the ANC, a key one of which was linked to the dramatic 
shifts occurring in the international environment and sea-change of ideas in the Soviet 
Union, manifesting itself both globally and in South Africa in the waning influence of 
communism. A similarly linked issue was the democratic waves sweeping across a number 
of African states -  many of which were now suffering the negative effects of failed 
socialist programmes. Such states, a number of which had served as inspirational models 
for the ANC in exile, were now suffering crises of political legitimacy and were, therefore, 
confronted with the necessity of liberalising their political systems. The 1988 
Constitutional Guidelines therefore represented a culmination of these various shifts 
taking place within ANC thinking, and stimulated by the aforementioned factors. 
 
A further crucial influence of note pertained to the need for the ANC to prove itself 
prepared to start building the democratic state it had so long referred to but never fully 
outlined. Prior to 1987, the precise form of democracy and democratic state envisaged by 
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the ANC had remained fairly ambiguous. Moreover, the suggestion made within its 
language and discourse - visible in the various documents cited above, often appeared to 
conflict with other simultaneously stated principles. On the one hand, this characteristic by 
no means disappeared from the various ANC statements and publications in the late 1980s, 
nor has it since the 1990s. The very same 1987 statement that recognised the need for the 
entrenchment of individual rights continued to refer to collective notions of the people and 
an assumed homogeneity of the people's opinion. There also remained indications 
throughout the drawing up of the Constitutional Guidelines that the ANC did not fully 
recognise the democratic value of pluralism and rights.  
 
Nonetheless, the dramatic acceptance of political pluralism and individual rights by the 
ANC represented its first open and concrete commitments to liberal democratic principles, 
a point which, given the ANC's earlier traditions deriving from both African-Nationalist 
and Marxist Leninist schools of thought, should certainly not be understated. These 
commitments to a pluralistic and rights-based culture were only further consolidated 
during the negotiation and transition period in which the fundamental principles of 
multi-party democracy and individual political and civil rights manifested themselves in an 
agreed-upon Interim Constitution and Bill of Rights. 
 
Since 1994, the implications for South African of the political orientation of the ANC 
voiced during the transition period have played themselves out, and the ANC's respect for 
the institutional mechanisms put in place to protect such democratic gains have, on the 
whole, been respected. The ANC has shown no sign of seeking to override the rights and 
freedoms underscored by the constitution. When compared to other states on the African 
continent, with the exception of extreme sceptics of democratic prospects in the context of 
a dominant party system, many would argue that South Africa represents a key model for 
liberal democratic commitments. The adherence to liberal democracy and the values 
agreed upon between 1990 and 1994 on the part of the ANC must be given the credit that 
they deserve.  
 
Having said this, there remain certain elements within ANC discourse and practice that are 
problematic for the sustainability and consolidation of liberal democracy. Despite the 
movement's formal commitments to its most fundamental principles, the potential threat to 
democratic consolidation would appear to lie in the ANC's own understanding and 
interpretation of these principles. It has been noted that numerous debates sprung up during 
the early 1990s regarding the appropriate role for civil society in in the new democratic 
dispensation. This conundrum was made all the more complex by both civil society's 
historically antagonistic role with the state, and the simultaneous alignment of a broad 
range of civic groups with the ANC. The tendency of the liberation movement, however, 
has been to continue to conceive of itself, and itself alone, as able to represent the vast 
spectrum of ideological opinion and political diversity existing within society. Indeed, the 
reasons for this tendency can be easily located in the ANC's historic role as a broad social 
movement, a role which its post-1994 documents indicate that it is keen not to stray from. 
Rather, there remain indications in the movement's discourse that suggest a degree of 
continuity in both its understanding of civil society as a collective body and of itself as the 
vanguard and embodiment of the people. Furthermore, a central and related concern lies in 
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the movement's unwillingness to accept the democratic value of civil society's role in 
ensuring government accountability. The dangers of this continued understanding are, of 
course, reinforced by the ANC's overwhelming political dominance.  
 
One party dominance has become a prominent and much-debated feature of post-1994 
South Africa and has itself served to increase both concerns over the sustainability of South 
Africa's young democracy as well as the need to follow very closely the ANC's 
commitment and adherence to the values of liberal democracy. A pertinent and legitimate 
concern of many analysts relates to the ANC's growing intolerance of critical voices, both 
within and outside of its own ranks. Certainly, with regard to party politics and electoral 
competition, the ANC has shown no indication of seeking to suppress opposition. However, 
it has also demonstrated no reluctance to resort to deliberate tactics aimed at 
de-legitimising the opposition through continued reference to its own liberation credentials 
and historic role as constructors of the new democracy. It has also sought to portray the 
opposition as hijackers of the transformation project. A concerning point as far as liberal 
democratic ideas are concerned, therefore, lies in the ANC's understanding of the 
appropriate role for the opposition in the post-1994 polity. As the above discussion has 
indicated, there seems to remain discrepancies between the ANC's acceptance of political 
opposition as 'legal' and its acceptance as 'legitimate'.  
 
The brunt of emerging ANC intolerance has by no means been felt only by parliamentary 
opposition. Rather, traditions of the ANC's years in exile, emphasising the need for unity 
and the suppression of dissent, have resurfaced in the democratic era within the Tripartite 
Alliance - a practice that, itself, harks back to Leninist notions of democratic centralism. 
The ANC, and the leadership of Thabo Mbeki, in particular, has been the target of severe 
criticism regarding the emergence of internally authoritarian practice. Furthermore, 
denunciations of both the SACP and COSATU have shown the very limitations of the 
ANC's ability to house a broad range of interests under its roof, while continuing to adhere 
to principles of tolerance and diversity. Under Mbeki, the ANC's alliance partners have 
been increasingly forced to 'tow the line', a point which has far "greater salience" in light of 
the parallel weakness of parliament compared to the executive, and the ANC's political 
dominance (Murray & Pillay, 2005: 201). Such political traditions are similarly echoed in 
the ANC leadership's portrayal of that internal difference as serving to play into the hands 
of opposition forces. The vital role of internal party democracy, while not strictly a feature 
of liberal democratic theory, is absolutely critical in the South African situation. In a 
context in which the opposition is weak and the ANC faces little threat of election defeat, 
then the role of internal debate and democratic accountability becomes invaluable to the 
consolidation of liberal democracy. 
 
As this study has shown, the consolidation of formal multi-party democracy in South 
Africa, and the open commitments on the part of the ANC to the key principles of political 
pluralism, tolerance and individual civil and political rights are extremely valuable in 
realising a liberal democratic future for South Africa. Moreover, the extent to which these 
commitments by the ANC represent a momentous shift in ideological inclination should 
not be understated. Through mapping the ANC's changing relationship with liberal 
democracy, it becomes clear that various ideological traditions have influenced and shaped 
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this relationship over time. The commitments and shifts of the late 1980s to 1994, however, 
represent the fundamental turning point in the ANC's understanding of democracy and of 
the future form of the democratic state. In terms of prospects for a continual strengthening 
of the movement's relationship with liberal democracy, then this is, undoubtedly, critical. 
Further analysis of the post-1994 era, however, does show that such formal commitment's 
by the ANC should by no means be taken for granted. There remain indications within the 
discourse and language of the ANC that continue to pose threats to liberal democracy.    
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX  .1. 
 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  Chapter 2. 
 
    BILL OF RIGHTS 
 
An extract from the Bill of Rights, as applicable to an understanding of liberal democracy.  
 
The below extract encompasses only those specific rights that are understood to be 
promoted and protected within any liberal democratic system. 
 
 
Rights 
7. (1) This Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democracy in South Africa.  It 
enshrines the rights of all people in our country and affirms the democratic values 
of human dignity, equality and freedom. 
 (2) The state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights. 
       (3) The rights in the Bill of Rights are subject to the limitations contained or referred to 
in section 36, or elsewhere in the Bill. 
 
Application 
8. (1) The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the executive, the 
judiciary and all organs of state. 
 (2) A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the 
extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature 
of any duty imposed by the right. 
(3)  When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic person in 
terms of subsection (2), a court- 
(a)  in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, of if necessary develop, 
the common law to the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right, 
and 
(b) may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided that the 
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limitation is in accordance with section 36 (1). 
(4)  A juristic person is entitled to the rights in the Bill of Rights to the extent required by 
the nature of the rights and the nature of that juristic person. 
 
Freedom of Expression 
16. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which included - 
  (a) freedom of the press and other media: 
  (b) freedom to receive or impart information or ideas: 
  (c) freedom of artistic creativity; and 
  (d) academic freedom and freedom of scientific research. 
 (2) The right in subsection (1) does not extend to - 
  (a) propaganda for war 
  (b) incitement of imminent violence; or 
  (c) advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and that 
constitutes incitement to cause harm. 
 
Assembly, demonstration, picket and petition 
17.  Everyone has the right, peacefully and unarmed, to assemble, to demonstrate, to picket 
and to present petitions. 
 
Freedom of association 
18.  Everyone has the right to freedom of association. 
 
Political rights 
19.  (1) Every citizen is free to make political choices, which includes the right - 
  (a) to form a political party 
  (b) to participate in the activities of, or recruit members for, a political party, 
and 
  (c) to campaign for a political party or cause. 
(2) Every citizen has the right to free, fair and regular elections for any legislative body 
established in terms of the Constitution. 
 (3)  Every adult citizen has the right - 
 (a) to vote in elections for any legislative body established in terms of the 
Constitution, and to do so in secret; and  
  (b) to stand for public office and, if elected, to hold office. 
 
Limitation of Rights  
36. (1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general 
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open 
and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into 
account all relevant-factors, including -  
  (a)  the nature of the right; 
  (b)  the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
  (c)  the nature and extent of the limitation; 
  (d)  the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
  (e)  less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
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(2)  Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution, 
no law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights. 
 
 
  
APPENDIX .2. 
 
 
Freedom Charter, June 26, 1955 
 
Freedom Charter of the Congress of the People 
 
We, the people of South Africa, declare for all our country and the world to know: 
 
 that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white, and that no 
Government can justly claim authority unless it is based on the will of all the people; 
  
 that our people have been robbed of their birthright to land, liberty and peace by a 
form of Government founded on injustice and inequality; 
  
 that our country will never be prosperous or free until all our people live in 
brotherhood, enjoying equal rights and opportunities; 
 
 that only a democratic state, based on the will of all the people, can secure to all 
their birthright without distinction of colour, race, sex or belief; 
 
 And therefore, we the people of South Africa, black and white together - equal, 
countrymen and brothers - adopt this Freedom Charter.  And we pledge ourselves to strive 
together, sparing nothing of our strength and courage, until the democratic changes here set 
out have been won. 
 
The People Shall Govern 
 
Every man and woman shall have the right to vote for and to stand as a candidate for all 
bodies which make laws. 
 All people shall be entitled to take part in the administration of the country. 
 The rights of the people shall be the same, regardless of race, colour or sex. 
 All bodies of minority rule, advisory boards, councils and authorities shall be 
replaced by democratic organs of self-government. 
 
All national groups shall have equal rights 
 
There shall be equal status in the bodies of state, in the Courts and in the schools for all 
national groups and races. 
 All people shall have equal right to use their own languages, and develop their own 
folk culture and customs. 
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 All national groups shall be protected by law against insults to their race and 
national pride. 
 The preaching and practice of national, race or colour discrimination and contempt 
shall be a punishable crime. 
 All apartheid laws and practices shall be set aside. 
 
The people shall share the country's wealth 
 
The national wealth of our country, the heritage of all South Africans, shall be restored to 
the people. 
 The mineral wealth beneath the soil, the Banks and monopoly industry shall be 
transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole. 
 All other industry and trade shall be controlled to assist the well-being of the 
people. 
 All people shall have equal rights to trade where they choose, to manufacture and to 
enter all trades, crafts and professions. 
 
The land shall be shared among those who work it 
 
Restrictions of land ownership on a racial basis shall be ended, and all the land redivided 
amongst those who work it, to banish famine and land hunger. 
 The state shall help the peasants with implements, seed, tractors and dams to save 
the soil and assist the tillers. 
 Freedom of movement shall be guaranteed to all who work on the land. 
 All shall have the right to occupy land wherever they choose. 
 People shall not be robbed of their cattle, and forced labour and farm prisons shall 
be abolished. 
 
All shall be equal before the law 
 
No one shall be imprisoned, deported or restricted without a fair trial. 
 No one shall be condemned by the order of any Government official. 
 The courts shall be representative of all the people. 
 Imprisonment shall be only for serious crimes against the people, and shall aim at 
re-education, not vengeance. 
 The police force and army shall be open to all on an equal basis and shall be the 
helpers and protectors of the people. 
 All laws which discriminate on grounds of race, colour or belief shall be repealed.  
 
All shall enjoy equal human rights 
 
The law shall guarantee to all their right to speak, to organize, to meet together, to publish, 
to preach, to worship and to educate their children. 
 The privacy of the house from police raids shall be protected by law. 
 All shall be free to travel without restriction from countryside to town, from 
province to province, and from South Africa abroad. 
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 Pass Laws, permits and all other laws restricting these freedoms shall be abolished. 
 
There shall be work and security 
 
All who work shall be free to form trade unions, to elect their officers and to make wage 
agreements with their employers. 
 The state shall recognize the right and duty of all to work, and to draw full 
unemployment benefits. 
 Men and women of all races shall receive equal pay for equal work. 
 There shall be forty-hour working week, a national minimum wage, paid annual 
leave, and sick leave for all workers, and maternity leave on full pay for all working 
mothers. 
 Miners, domestic workers, farm workers and civil servants shall have the same 
rights as all others who work. 
 Child labour, compound labour, the tot system and contract labour shall be 
abolished. 
 
The doors of learning and of culture shall be opened 
 
The Government shall discover, develop and encourage national talent for the 
enhancement of our cultural life. 
 All the cultural treasures of mankind shall be open to all, by free exchange of books, 
ideas and contact with other lands. 
 The aim of education shall be to teach the youth to love their people and their 
culture, to honour human brotherhood, liberty and peace. 
 Education shall be free, compulsory, universal and equal for all children.   
 Higher education and technical training shall be opened to all by means of state 
allowances and scholarships awarded on the basis of merit. 
 Adult illiteracy shall be ended by a mass state education plan. 
 Teachers shall have all the rights of other citizens. 
 The colour bar in cultural life, in sport and in education shall be abolished. 
 
There shall be housed, security and comfort 
 
All people shall have the right to live where they choose, to be decently housed, and to 
bring up their families in comfort and security. 
 Unused housing space to be made available to the people. 
 Rent and prices shall be lowered, food plentiful and no one shall go hungry. 
 A preventive health scheme shall be run by the state.  Free medical care and 
hospitalization shall be provided for all, with special care for mothers and young children. 
 Slums shall be demolished and new suburbs built where all have transport, roads, 
lighting, playing fields, creches and social centres. 
 The aged, the orphans, the disabled and the sick shall be cared for by the state. 
 Rest, leisure and recreation shall be the right of all. 
 Fenced locations and ghettoes shall be abolished, and all laws which break up 
families shall be repealed. 
  104
  
There shall be peace and friendship 
 
South Africa shall be a fully independent state which respects the rights and sovereignty of 
all nations. 
 South Africa shall strive to maintain world peace and the settlement of all 
international disputes by negotiation - not war. 
 Peace and friendship amongst all our people shall be secured by upholding the 
equal rights, opportunities and status of all. 
 The people of the Protectorates - Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland - shall 
be free to decide for themselves their own future. 
 The right of all the peoples of Africa to independence and self-government shall be 
recognized, and shall be the basis of close cooperation. 
 Let all who love their people and their country now say, as we say here: "These 
freedoms we will fight for, side by side, throughout our lives, until we have won our 
liberty."  
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ANC Draft Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa, 1988 
 
As drafted by the Constitutional Committee of the ANC, 1988 
 
 
The State: 
a. South Africa shall be an independent, unitary, democratic and non-racial state. 
b.  i)   Sovereignty shall belong to the people as a whole and shall be exercised through 
one central legislature, executive and administration. 
      ii)   Provision shall be made for the delegation of the powers of the central authority to 
subordinate administrative units for purposes of more efficient administration and 
democratic participation. 
c. The institution of hereditary rulers and chiefs shall be transformed to serve the 
interests of the people as a whole in conformity with the democratic principles 
embodied in the constitution. 
d. All organs of government including justice, security and armed forces shall be 
representative of the people as a whole, democratic in their structure and functioning, 
and dedicated to defending the principles of the constitution. 
 
Franchise 
e. In the exercise of their sovereignty, the people shall have the right to vote under a 
system of universal suffrage based on the principle of one person, one vote.   
f. Every voter shall have the right to stand for election and be elected to all legislative 
bodies. 
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National Identity 
g. It shall be state policy to promote the growth of a single national identity and loyalty 
binding on all South Africans.  At the same time, the state shall recognise the linguistic 
and cultural diversity of the people and provide facilities for free linguistic and cultural 
development. 
 
A Bill of Rights and Affirmative Action 
h. The constitution shall include a Bill of Rights based on the Freedom Charter.  Such a 
Bill of Rights shall guarantee the fundamental human rights of all citizens irrespective 
of race, colour, sex or creed, and shall provide appropriate mechanisms for their 
enforcement. 
i. The state and all social institutions shall be under a constitutional duty to eradicate race 
discrimination in all its forms. 
j. The state and all social institutions shall be under a constitutional duty to take active 
steps to eradicate, speedily, the economic and social inequalities produced by racial 
discrimination. 
k. the advocacy or practice of racism, fascism, nazism or the incitement of ethnic or 
regional exclusiveness or hatred shall be outlawed. 
l. Subject to clauses (i) and (k) above, the democratic state shall guarantee the basic rights 
and freedoms, such as freedom of association, expression, thought, worship and the 
press.  Furthermore, the state shall have the duty to protect the right to work, and 
guarantee education and social security. 
m. All parties which conform to the provisions of paragraphs (i) to (k) shall have the legal 
right to exist and to take part in the political life of the country. 
 
Economy 
n. The state shall ensure that the entire economy serves the interests and well-being of all 
sections of the population. 
o. The state shall have the right to determine the general context in which economic life 
takes place and define the limit the rights and obligations attaching to the ownership 
and use of productive capacity. 
p. The private sector of the economy shall be obliged to co-operate with the state in 
realising the objectives of the Freedom Charter in promoting social well-being. 
q. The economy shall be a mixed one, with a public sector, a private sector, a 
co-operative sector and a small-scale family sector. 
r. Co-operative forms of economic enterprise, village industries and small-scale family 
activities shall be supported by the state. 
s. The state shall promote the acquisition of managerial, technical and scientific skills 
among all sections of the population, especially the blacks. 
t. Property for a personal use and consumption shall be constitutionally protected. 
 
Land 
u. the state shall devise and implement a Land Reform Programme that will include and 
address the following issues: 
 i)  Abolition of all racial restrictions on ownership and use of land 
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 ii) Implementation of land reforms in conformity with the principle of Affirmative 
Action, taking into account the status of victims of forced removals. 
 
Workers 
v. A charter protecting workers' trade union rights, especially the right to strike and 
collective bargaining, shall be incorporated into the constitution. 
 
Women 
w. Women shall have equal rights in all spheres of public and private life and the state 
shall take affirmative action to eliminate inequalities and discrimination between the 
sexes. 
 
The Family 
x. The family, parenthood and children's rights shall be protected. 
 
International 
y. South Africa shall be a non-aligned state committed to the principles of the Charter of 
the Organisation of African Unity and the Charter of the United Nations and the 
achievement of national liberation, world peace and disarmament. 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 4 
National Peace Accord 
 
A selected extract from the National Peace Accord, signed and adopted by more than forty 
organizations on 14 September, 1991 
 
 
To signify our common purpose to bring an end to political violence in our country and to 
set out the codes of conduct, procedures and mechanisms to achieve this goal. 
 
We, the signatories, accordingly solemnly bind ourselves to this accord and shall ensure as 
far as humanly possible that all our members and supporters will comply with the 
provisions of this accord and will respects its underlying rights and values and we, the 
government signatories, undertake to pursue the objectives of this accord and seek to give 
effect to its provisions by way of the legislative, executive and budgeting procedures to 
which we have access. 
 
Chapter 1 
Principles 
1.1 The establishment of a multi-party democracy in South Africa is our common goal. 
Democracy is impossible in a climate of violence, intimidation and fear. In order to ensure 
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democratic political activity all political participants must recognise and uphold certain 
fundamental rights described below and the corresponding responsibilities underlying 
those rights. 
 
1.2 These fundamental rights include the right of every individual to:  
• freedom of conscience and belief;  
• freedom of speech and expression;  
• freedom of association with others;  
• peaceful assembly;  
• freedom of movement;  
• Participate freely in peaceful political activity.  
 
1.3 The fundamental rights and responsibilities derive from established democratic 
principles namely:  
• democratic sovereignty derives from the people, whose right it is to elect their 
government and hold it accountable at the polls for its conduct of their affairs;  
• the citizens must therefore be informed and aware that political parties and the 
media must be free to impart information and opinion;  
• there should be an active civil  
• society with different interest groups freely participating therein;  
• political parties and organisations, as well as political leaders and other citizens, 
have an obligation to refrain from incitement to violence and hatred.  
 
1.4 The process of reconstruction and socio-economic development aimed at addressing 
the causes of violent conflict, must be conducted in a non-partisan manner, that is, without 
being controlled by any political organisation or being to the advantage of any political 
group at the expense of another. 
 
1.5 Reconstruction and developmental projects must actively involve the affected 
communities. Through a process of inclusive negotiations involving recipients, experts and 
donors, the community must be able to conceive, implement and take responsibility for 
projects in a co-coordinated way as close to the grassroots as possible. In addition, 
reconstruction and development must facilitate the development of the economic and 
human resources of the communities concerned. 
 
1.6 The initiatives referred to in 1.4 and 1.5 above, should in no way abrogate the right and 
duty of governments to continue their normal developmental activity, except that in doing 
so they should be sensitive to the spirit and contents of any agreement that may be reached 
in terms of 1.5 above. 
 
1.7 The parties to this process commit themselves to facilitating the rapid removal of 
political, legislative and administrative obstacles to development and economic growth. 
 
1.8 The implementation of a system to combat violence and intimidation will only succeed 
if the parties involved have a sincere commitment to reach this objective. Only then will all 
the people of South Africa be able to fulfill their potential and create a better future. 
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1.9 It is clear that violence and intimidation declines when it is investigated and when the 
background and reasons for it is (sic) exposed and given media attention. There is, 
therefore, need for an effective instrument to do just that. It is agreed that the Commission 
established by the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation Act, 1991, be used as an 
instrument to investigate and expose the background and reasons for violence, thereby 
reducing the incidence of violence and intimidation. 
 
1.10 Since insufficient instruments exist to actively prevent violence and intimidation and 
regional and local levels, it is agreed that committees be appointed at regional and local 
levels to assist in this regard. Peace bodies are therefore to be established at both regional 
and local levels to be styled "Regional Dispute Resolution Committees" (RDRC) and 
"Local Dispute Resolution Committees" (LDRC) respectively. These bodies will be 
guided and co-coordinated at a national level by a National Peace Secretariat. At the local 
level the bodies will be assisted by Justices of the Peace. 
 
1.11 The Preparatory Committee has played a crucial role in the process of bringing the 
major actors together to negotiate a Peace Accord. There is still much to be done to 
implement the Accord and establish the institutions of peace. To assist in this regard, a 
National Peace Committee shall be established. 
 
1.12 There should be simple and expeditious procedures for the resolution of disputes 
regarding transgressions of the Code for Political Parties and Organisation by political 
parties and organisations who are signatories to the National Peace Accord. These disputes 
should wherever possible, be settled at grassroots level, through participation of the parties 
themselves; and by using the proven methods of mediation, arbitration and adjudication. 
 
1.13 An effective and credible criminal judicial system requires the swift and just 
dispensation of justice. This in turn will promote the restoration of peace and prosperity to 
communities, freeing them of the ravages of violence and intimidation. Special attention 
should be given to unrest related cases by setting up Special Criminal Courts specifically 
for this purpose. 
 
 
  
Chapter 2 
 
Code of Conduct for political parties and organisations 
The signatories to this Accord agree to the following Code of Conduct: 
 
2.1 We recognise the essential role played by political parties and organisations as 
mediators in a democratic political process, permitting the expression, aggregation and 
reconciliation of different views and interests, and facilitating the translation of the 
outcome of this process into law and public policy, and respect the activities of political 
parties and organisations in organising their respective structures, canvassing for support, 
arranging and conducting public meetings, and encouraging voting. 
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2.2 All political parties and organisations shall actively contribute to the creation of a 
climate of democratic tolerance by:  
• publicly and repeatedly condemning political violence and encouraging among 
their followers an understanding of the importance of democratic pluralism and a 
culture of political tolerance; and  
• acting positively, also vis-à-vis all public authorities including local and traditional 
authorities, to support the right of all political parties and organisations to have 
reasonable freedom of access to their members, supporters and other persons in 
rural and urban areas, whether they be housed on public or private property.  
 
2.3 No political party or organisation or any official or representative of any such party, 
shall:  
• kill, injure, apply violence to, intimidate or threaten any other person in connection 
with that person's political beliefs, words, writings or actions;  
• remove, disfigure, destroy, plagiarise or otherwise misrepresent any symbol or 
other material of any other political party or organisation;  
• interfere with, obstruct or threaten any other person or group travelling to or from 
or intending to attend, any gathering for political purposes;  
• seek to compel, by force or threat of force, any person to join any party or 
organisation, attend any meeting, make any contribution, resign from any  
• post or office, boycott any occasion or commercial activity or withhold his or her 
labour or fail to perform a lawful obligation; or  
• obstruct or interfere with any official or representative of any other political party 
or organisation's message to contact or address any group of people.  
 
2.4 All political parties and organisations shall respect and give effect to the obligation to 
refrain from incitement to violence and hatred. In pursuit hereof no language calculated or 
likely to incite violence or hatred, including that directed against any political party or 
personality, nor any willfully false allegation, shall be used at any political meeting, nor 
shall pamphlets, posters or other written material containing such language be prepared or 
circulated, either in the name of any party, or anonymously. 
 
2.5 All political parties and organisations shall:  
• ensure that the appropriate authorities are properly informed of the date, place, 
duration and where applicable, routing of each public meeting, rally, march or other 
event organised by the party or organisation;  
• take into account local sentiment and foreseeable consequences, as well as any 
other meetings already arranged on the same date in close proximity to the planned 
event, provided that this shall not detract from the right of any political party or 
organisation freely to propagate its political views; and  
• immediately and at all times, establish and keep current effective lines of 
communication between one another at national, regional and local levels, by 
ensuring a reciprocal exchange of the correct names, addresses and contact 
numbers of key leaders at each level, and by appointing liaison personnel in each 
location to deal with any problems which may arise.  
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2.6 All political parties and organisations shall provide full assistance and co-operation to 
the police in the investigation of violence and the apprehension of individuals involved. 
The signatories to this Accord specifically undertake not to protect or harbour their 
members and supporters to prevent them from being subjected to the processes of justice. 
 
 
Source: http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/transition/npaccord.html 
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